Abstract: 1. Any theory of events should be adequate to the fact of recurrence, to the fact that there are some things that recur, or happen more than once. How shall we describe the recurrence of an event? (i) We might consider saying that there are three different times such that the event occurs at the earliest and at the latest and not at the one in the middle. But this will not do if we are reluctant to suppose that, in addition to events, there are such things as "times." (ii) We might consider saying that there are three different occasions such that the event occurs on the earliest and on the latest and not on the one in the middle. But what are the things we would then be calling "occasions"? (iii) We might say that, if an event p recurs, then there are events q, r, and s of this sort: r occurs after q, and s occurs after r, and p is exemplified or instantiated in q and in s and not in r. In this case, we would appeal to two quite different sets of entities: "abstract events," or "event types," such as p, which may be instantiated or exemplified in "concrete events" such as q, r, and s. This surely would be to multiply entities at a very early point. (iv) I suggest that, instead of positing such entities as "times," "occasions," or "concrete events," we describe recurrence by making use of the concept of the negation of an event. We could say tenselessly that an event recurs if and only if the event occurs and then after that the negation of the event occurs and then after that the event occurs. We must distinguish, then, between saying that a certain event does not occur and saying that the negation of that event does occur. For "p recurs" implies "p occurs and not-p occurs," but it does not imply "p occurs and p does not occur."

Abstract: ive Singular Terms There are a host of familiar ways in which we, in English, form abstractive singular terms. To the general term, "pious", there is a mated singular, "piety". To "red" there is "redness". Logicians form abstraction operators, creating class references from predicates. These abstractive singulars fall into two main types. There are This content downloaded from 207.46.13.144 on Mon, 13 Jun 2016 06:56:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Abstract: 1. A scandal of deduction. C. D. Broad has called the unsolved problems concerning induction a scandal of philosophy.' It seems to me that in addition to this scandal of induction there is an equally disquieting scandal of deduction. Its urgency can be brought home to each of us by any clever freshman who asks, upon being told that deductive reasoning is "tautological" or "analytical" and that logical truths have no "empirical content" and cannot be used to make "factual assertions": In what other sense, then, does deductive reasoning give us new information? Isn't it perfectly obvious that there is some such sense, for what point would there otherwise be to logic and mathematics?2 This question is apt to cause acute embarrassment, for no such sense has ever been defined in the literature. The only honest answer to our imaginary freshman's question is given by those few unregenerate logical positivists who are bold enough to deny the existence of any objective (nonpsychological) sense in which deductive inference yields new information.3 This is a straightforward answer, although its consequences (which are not always explicitly mentioned) are somewhat implausible. If no objective, non-psychological increase of information takes place in deduction, all that is involved is merely psychological conditioning, some sort of intellectual psycho-analysis, calculated to bring us to see better and without inhibitions what objectively speaking is already before our eyes.4 Now most philosophers have not taken to the idea that philosophical activity is a species of brainwashing. They are scarcely any more favourably disposed towards the much more far-fetched idea that all the multifarious activities of a contemporary logician or mathematician that hinge on deductive inference are as many therapeutic exercises calculated to ease the psychological blocks and mental cramps that initially prevented us

Abstract: Gustav Bergmann's recent book, Realism,, is divided into two 'books'. Book One, entitled "Facts, Things, Ideas," consists of an exposition of some facets of Bergmann's own ontological thought. Book Two, entitled "Brentano and Meinong," consists of an exposition of the ontologies of Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong. Book One, in turn, is subdivided into two parts, the first called "General Ontology," and the second, "Representationalism." I wish, in this review, to discuss some features of Bergmann's general ontology. I shall thus be concentrating my attention on the first part of the first 'book' of the book before us. In order to come to understand this, however, I shall enlist the aid of other recent ontological writings by Bergmann. Coming to understand is a problem of major dimensions in dealing with the writings of Bergmann. Partly this is because of the difficulty of the issues under consideration. Mostly, though, it is due to the extraordinarily idiosyncratic and mannered style which Bergmann uses to present his thoughts-a style fractured, elliptic, and involuted. The philosophical world is scarcely ablaze with discussion of Bergmann's ontology. In good measure, the blame for this must be laid to the style with which the ontology is presented. Bergmann regards his espousal of the bare particular as one of the most significant and innovative features of his philosophy. I do not myself regard it as the most innovative. Bergmann's concept of the particular is representative of a long philosophical tradition; and his claim that certain entities, including particulars, are bare, is, as I shall argue, as traditional and commonplace as any philosophical doctrine could possibly be. I also do not regard Berg-

Abstract: S OF COMMENTS A. by STANLEY MUNSAT I am in agreement with what Malcolm has said in criticism of the role of images or some such "representation" of the past in theories of memory. A slightly different perspective on the motivations behind the requirement for (something like) an image in memory is this-we recognize that the behavior (such as a nod of the head) by which one manifests his remembering something contains nothing on the fact of it to connect it with the remembered item. By bringing in a memory image as the medium for the memory content and seeing the behavior as somehow issuing from the image this connection appears to be established. The crucial issue is not merely (as one might suppose from Malcolm's discussion) that the image theory is factually mistaken in large numbers of instances. Rather, in being forced to admit that the theory is factually mistaken we are then in a position to recognize that the image theory had all along only relocated the real problem. For what has a piece of behavior like nodding one's head or pointing got to do with the image one has in his head of the remembered item? Once that question is answered, we will find that we no longer need the image to connect the memory behavior with the remembered item. For the answer to that question will enable us to establish the connection directly. Then what does make e.g. nodding one's head a "case" of "remembering" that such and such happened? The answer (as we now recognize) is to be found in the "situation" or the "context" in which the behavior takes place, though that involves many different sorts of things. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.170 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 05:10:30 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Abstract: By means that meet the standards of nominalism set by Nelson Goodman (in [1], section II, 3; and in [2]) we can define relations that behave in many ways like the membership relation of set theory. Though the agreement is imperfect, these pseudo-membership relations seem much closer to membership than to its usual nominalistic counterpart, the part-whole relation. Someone impressed by the diversity of set theories might regard the theories of these relations as peculiar set theories; someone more impressed by the non-diversity of the more successful set theories-ZF and its relatives-might prefer not to. This verbal dispute does not matter; what matters is that the gap between nominalistic and set-theoretic methods of construction is narrower than it seems.

Abstract: In a recent note ([3]), Feyerabend has modified his earlier views (cf.: [1], pp. 29, 59; [2], p. 36) and suggested another criterion of meaning change. In that note, Feyerabend admits that not every change of theory involves change of meaning. He cites as an example a case of two theories T, classical mechanics, and T, like T except for a slight change in the strength of the gravitation potential. He maintains that T and Y

Abstract: The Sophist is one of Plato's most constructive dialogues, and one of the most cleverly constructed. Feigning pursuit of the essential sophist, Plato analyzes in turn (a) 8vaRtg as the mark of what is, (b) collection and division as the source of "the free man's knowledge," (c) the modes of combination among the forms, (d) Difference as the nature of "that which is not" and, in culmination, (e) the distinction between false and true judgment which separates the sophist from the philosopher. These results surpass in their solidity any positive contribution of the Phaedo or the Republic. Yet they are achieved with a more austere conception of the forms than any found in these earlier dialogues. The structure of this more mature conception, I believe, is best illustrated in Plato's analysis of true and false discourse. My purpose in this paper is (1) to recapitulate what I take to be Plato's analysis of truth and falsehood in the Sophist, (2) to contrast the theory of forms presupposed by this analysis with the theory of the Phaedo and the Republic, and (3) to sketch against this background the theory of participation which seems to be implicit in the Sophist and other late dialogues. My contention, in preview, is that a form in this later context is a kind

Abstract: First, in order to clear up some misconceptions which his paper might leave in the mind of the unwary reader, we shall outline his development. His habitual example is biological taxonomy which is characterized by Morton Beckner3 as "a finite (and small) number of classes of classes [taxonomic categories] . . . arranged in serial order from 1 to n. . .. The members of each category, called taxa, are classes of organisms. . . . Every [taxon Tj of the jth taxonomic category] (j < n) is included in a Tj+1; Tn is included in no taxon; no taxa are included in a T1." Thus biological taxonomic structures are rooted trees of a simple type wherein each of the paths from the root, Tn, to a terminal node, a taxon in T1, has the same length, i.e. comprise the same number of nodes. The justification of Thomason's axioms is, presumably, that in philosophy it is necessary to consider hierarchical systems which are more complex. In his development, he first observes that in any taxonomy

Abstract: 1. In this note I will not be concerned with the curious philosophical arguments which have been offered by Aristotle, Kant, and others as proof that the universe is or necessarily is infinite, or contrarily, finite. The question of whether the universe in some of its aspects is finite or infinite is not one which can be settled by philosophy. On the other hand, the question is not a straightforward empirical one as some have suggested.' In the first place, the question of whether the universe is as a matter of empirical fact spatially closed is ill-formulated as it stands, and even under a much more sophisticated formulation it may have no simple answer. Secondly, a number of relevant mathematical and physical results are known, but they can be brought to bear on certain aspects of our problem only after one settles certain other questions which call as much for a kind of clarification which is typically philosophical as for empirical data. The contribution I hope to make in this note is a modest one. I want to show what is involved in providing a coherent and meaningful formulation of the question of whether the universe is finite; and I want to point out some of the more interesting conclusions which follow from the proposition that the universe is finite. Though modest, this task turns out to be more complicated than one might suspect at first glance.

Abstract: These premisses do validly yield the conclusion that it is not possible to obey a rule privately. (II) seems to be asserted as if it were obvious without argument. But it has been doubted by reasonable people, by Judith Jarvis Thomson [31 and H.-N. Castafieda [21, for instance, who have offered rules that they regard as counter-examples to the principle that for any rule it must be possible that a person should think he is following it and not in fact be following it. My principal aim in this paper is to demonstrate (II) and deal with these alleged counter-examples. But first I want to say enough

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Abstract: It is commonly held that rights "correlate" with duties.2 By this is usually meant at least that rights imply duties (even if not all duties imply rights) and also that claims of individual rights need not be recognized unless backed by proof that corresponding obligations obtain. Such a doctrine of correlativity also forms part of the view that rights must be understood or analyzed in terms of duty or obligation.3 I shall examine this doctrine, beginning with a clear case of "correlativity," turning then to cases that diverge from it significantly. I argue that it is at best misleading to say that rights generally "correlate" with duties.4 For the implications between them

Abstract: 1. There is a classical distinction, which has now and then been raised into a metaphysical principle, between two human attitudes toward the world. The distinction is that between the contemplative and the active. Often these poles are personified: Socrates, the seeker after truth; Alexander, the man of action. In more contemporary terms, the contrast is between Thought and Action. It is of course true that we all partake of both of these principles, the contemplative and the active. Nevertheless, there are times and places when they can be encountered in fairly pure form. The mathematician in his study devising the proof of a theorem comes close to the contemplative pole, and the director of a sales campaign managing his staff seems to come close to the active pole. There are relatively few activities which can be approached both by the thinker and the activist with equal authority. The practise of statistics is such a rare activity. There both the man oriented toward thought and contemplation, and the man oriented toward action and decision can play a vigorous role in the development of a vitally important branch of knowledge. This would be fine and dandy, except for one thing. They contradict each other. Statisticians don't generally see it this way, of course. The way they mostly see it, statistics is a field that abounds in healthy controversy and argument, and any apparent contradiction is mere appearance, resulting from the presence within statistics of a number of different but by no means contradictory points of view. In a sense I guess this is true, though the exact relationship between the various points of view has never been spelled out, except in question begging ways, so it is hard to tell whether or not they are compatible. There are instances, however, in which it certainly appears that

Abstract: Grice concedes (on p. 151 of [3]) that the definiendum of primary interest is (A): "By uttering x U meant that p." Nevertheless he devoted most of the 1957 paper and a considerable portion of the present one to a treatment of (B), "By uttering x U meant something." Then, elaborating on that treatment he proceeds to an analysis of (A). For the moment I shall deal with (B) and I shall discuss the initial unrefined definiens (taken over from the 1957 paper) because my objections will apply equally to the refined versions. The initial definition is (more or less, p. 151 of [3]):