About: Tobin tax is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 322 publications have been published within this topic receiving 6842 citations. The topic is also known as: currency transaction tax.
TL;DR: Tobin this paper argued that the main problem today is not the exchange rate regime, whether fixed or floating, but the excessive international mobility of private financial capi- tors.
Abstract: a system of pegged parities that relied on the debts in reserve currencies, mostly dollars, to meet growing needs for official reserves. Trif fin and his followers saw the remedy as the internationalization of reserves and reserve assets; their ultimate solution was a world central bank. Others diagnosed the problem less in terms of liquidity than in the inadequa cies of balance of payments adjustment mech anisms in the modern world. The inadequa cies were especially evident under the fixed parity gold-exchange standard when, as in the 1960s, the reserve currency center was struc turally in chronic deficit. These analysts sought better and more symmetrical "rules of the game" for adjustments by surplus and deficit countries, usually including more flexi bility in the setting of exchange parities, crawling pegs, and the like. Many economists, of whom Milton Friedman was an eloquent and persuasive spokesman, had all along advocated floating exchange rates, deter mined in private markets without official interventions. By the early 1970s the third view was the dominant one in the economics profession, though not among central bankers and private financiers. And all of a sudden, thanks to Nixon and Connally, we got our wish. Or at least we got as much of it as anyone could reasonably have hoped, since it could never have been expected that governments would eschew all intervention in exchange markets. Now after five to seven years?depending how one counts?of unclean floating there are many second thoughts. Some economists share the nostalgia of men of affairs for the gold standard or its equivalent, for a fixed anchor for the world's money, for stability of official parities. Some economists, those who emphasize the rationality of expectations and the flexibility of prices in all markets, doubt that it makes much difference whether exchange rates are fixed or flexible, provided only that government policies are predictable. Clearly, flexible rates have not been the pana-, cea which their more extravagant advocates had hoped; international monetary problems have not disappeared from headlines or from the agenda of anxieties of central banks and governments. I believe that the basic problem today is not the exchange rate regime, whether fixed or floating. Debate on the regime evades and obscures the essential problem. That is the excessive international?or better, inter currency?mobility of private financial capi tal. The biggest thing that happened in the world monetary system since the 1950s was "This paper is Prof. Tobin's presidential address at the 1978 conference of the Eastern Economic Association, Wash. D C.
TL;DR: The incompatibility of pegged exchange rates, international capital mobility and national monetary autonomy is a basic postulate of open economy macroeconomies as discussed by the authors, and the case can be made for "throwing sand in the wheels" of international finance.
Abstract: The incompatibility of pegged exchange rates, international capital mobility and national monetary autonomy is a basic postulate of open economy macroeconomies. In the present environment of high capital mobility and political uncertainty, even the possibility that governments may utilize their policy autonomy can defeat efforts to peg the exchange rate. This leaves two possibilities. One is to fix the exchange rate irrevocably through monetary unification. The other is to live with floating rates. Either way, a case can be made for "throwing sand in the wheels" of international finance. Where monetary unification is not an option, this is a may to make distinct national currencies tolerable and international money and capital markets compatible with modest national autonomy in monetary and macroeconomic policy. For. EU counties striving to create a monetary union, it is the only politically and economically feasible way of completing the transition to Stage III of the Maastricht process.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors make a systematic analysis of the Tobin tax proposal for foreign exchange transactions and examine the economic desirability of such a levy, its technical and political feasibility, its revenue potential, the possible uses of that revenue, and related administrative and institutional aspects.
Abstract: In his 1972 Janeway Lectures at Princeton, James Tobin, the 1981 Nobel Prize winner for economics, submitted a proposal for a levy on international currency transactions. The idea was not greeted with enthusiasm, as the 1970s were a period of optimism and confidence in floating exchange rages. Yet, whenever currency crises erupted during the past decades, the proposal for a levy on international currency transactions would once again arise. In the 1990s, two additional facts have sharpened interest in the Tobin tax proposal. First is the growing volume of foreign exchange trading. Second, interest is coming not only from policymakers and experts concerned with the smooth functioning of financial markets. It is shared by those concerned with public financing of development-the fiscal crisis of the state as well as the growing need for international cooperation on problems such as the environment, poverty, peace and security. This work makes a systematic analysis of the proposal for a foreign exchange transactions levy. Its chapters examine the economic desirability of such a levy, its technical and political feasibility, its revenue potential, the possible uses of that revenue, and related administrative and institutional aspects.
TL;DR: This article developed a model in which boundedly rational agents apply technical and fundamental analysis to identify trading signals in two different speculative markets and found that an ongoing evolutionary competition between the trading strategies causes complex price dynamics which closely resembles the behavior of actual speculative prices.
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of a Tobin tax on foreign exchange markets have been investigated and the results confirm the hitherto undisputed issues: a tax reduces trading volume, shifts market share to untaxed markets and leads to negligible tax revenues if tax havens exist.
Abstract: The effects of a Tobin tax on foreign exchange markets have long been disputed. We present an experiment with currency trading on two markets, where either none, one, or both markets are taxed. Our results confirm the hitherto undisputed issues: a tax reduces trading volume, shifts market share to untaxed markets, and leads to negligible tax revenues if tax havens exist. Concerning the controversial issues we find that (i) volatility effects depend on the existence of tax havens and on market size, (ii) market efficiency decreases in taxed markets when tax havens exist, and (iii) short-term speculation is reduced.