Horse trading

Abstract: Why does development progress in some places but not others? Very often, the distinguishing factor is not a lack of financial resources or of knowledge about the right technical solution Governments may decide to allocate agricultural services to their core supporters or to key swing voters and to deny them to others, thereby reducing the incentive for farmers to seek increases in productivity Social health insurance benefits may be extended ahead of elections, but removed once elections have taken place At the same time, political incentives play a powerful role not only in frustrating development efforts, but also in shaping opportunities for change Often, there are various stakeholders-within government, in the private sector, and in civil society-who want to change what government does for the better However, in many situations, advice based on technically optimal solutions is not that helpful for potential reformers because such solutions may not be politically feasible nor may even backfire and have unintended negative consequences The general problem that political incentives are frequently at odds with a technocratic approach to development has long been recognized Politicians prefer policies and seek institutional changes that support their current needs, including exigencies such as horse trading when negotiating over policies with other powerful stakeholders or designing intergovernmental relations with a view to maintaining some form of centralized control, rather than optimizing service delivery At the same time, the interests of politicians can also broadly converge with development objectives, such as seeking to deliver growth, jobs, or social protection benefits as a way to secure legitimacy or reelection This book is a result from a systematic effort at taking stock of what the World Bank has learned from its efforts to mainstream Political Economy Analysis (PEA) The effort included an open invitation to staff members active in the area to submit their work for presentation and discussion at a 2012 review conference The goal was to identify work that was strong analytically and that provided practical recommendations that resulted in action The book is thus intended to illustrate (and reflect on) what the Bank has been able to achieve in this area so far and to help others learn more about how PEA perspectives can be effectively integrated into development approaches

Abstract: A strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that authoritarian legislatures constrain executive decisions and reduce the threat of expropriation. Although the empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic evidence that authoritarian parliaments are able to restrain the actions of state leaders, reverse activities they disagree with, or remove authoritarian leaders who violate the implied power-sharing arrangement. This article shows that authoritarian legislatures, by providing a forum for horse trading between private actors, are better at generating corporate governance legislation that protects investors from corporate insiders than they are at preventing expropriation by governments. The statistical analysis reveals that the strength of authoritarian legislatures is associated with corporate governance rules and not expropriation risk.

Abstract: Part 1: Linking tea and horses - geopolitics and horse supply during the Northern Song - horses and defense, geography and horse supply, the frontier marketing system, reshaping horse procurement market segregation and the structure of the Sichuanese tea industry on the eve of the tea and horse trade - Sichuan and the dissemination of tea culture, the structure of the Sichuanese tea industry on the eve of the tea monopoly bureacracy, social mobilization, and the political integration of Sichuan - Sichuan's magnate society, magnate society under former and later Shu, rebellion and political mobilization during the Song. Part 2: Introduction to part two - Wang Anshi's theory of bureaucratic entrepreneurship - the entrepreneurial leap - attributes of the intendants, the tea market enterprise autonomy, risk reduction, and entrepreneurial expansion - autonomy and the neutralization of rivals, risk reduction through personnel control, agency influence over County Magistrates, boundary spanning and agency control of subsidiary markets, motivating personnel the impact of bureaucratic power on the Sichuan tea economy - reversing the entrepreneurial leap, trimming the Agency's sails - from entrepreneur to manager, the THA and the Sichuan tea industry the limits of bureaucratic power in the tea and horse trade - exchanging tea for horses, losing control of the trade, flying dragons in rocks and mud. Appendices: Northern Song tea and horse agency chiefs, co-intendants, and assistant intendants by years Southern Song tea and horse agency intendants sources on careers of the Northern and Southern Song tea and horse agency intendants tea and horse agency revenues and subventions paid to other agencies, 1074-1115.

Abstract: In this article the authors raise historical and legal status questions concerning the audiovisual dossier as discussed within the framework of the World Trade Organization. This implies an overview, first, of the rules applying directly to the audiovisual sector; second, of the liberalization agreements concerning telecommunications; and third, of the rules concerning copyright (TRIPs). In anticipation of the discussions in the new multilateral negotiation round - launched at the end of last year - the main argument of the article is that the interference of the WTO in the audiovisual and related sectors is irreversible, but also partly unpredictable.