TL;DR: Paradigmatic alief as discussed by the authors is defined as a mental state with associatively-linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated consciously or unconsciously by features of the subject's internal or ambient environment.
Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. Paradigmatic alief can be characterized as a mental state with associatively-linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated – consciously or unconsciously – by features of the subject’s internal or ambient environment. Alief is a more primitive state than either belief or imagination: it directly activates behavioral response patterns (as opposed to motivating in conjunction with desire or pretended desire.) I argue that alief explains a large number of otherwise perplexing phenomena and plays a far larger role in causing behavior than has typically been recognized by philosophers. I argue further that the notion can be invoked to explain both the effectiveness and the limitations of certain sorts of example-based reasoning, and that it lies at the core of habit-based views of ethics. O. Four Opening Examples In March 2007, 4000 feet above the floor of the Grand Canyon, a horseshoeshaped cantilevered glass walkway was opened to the public. Extending 70 feet from the Canyon’s rim, the Grand Canyon Skywalk soon drew hundreds of visitors each day, among them New York Times reporter Edward Rothstein, who filed the following dispatch: A visitor to these stark and imposing lands of the Hualapai Indians on the western rim of the Grand Canyon knows what sensation is being promised at the journey’s climax. After driving for a half-hour over bone-jolting dirt roads...you take a shuttle bus from the parking lot...You deposit all cameras at a security desk, slip on yellow surgical booties and stride out onto a horseshoe-shaped walkway with 1 I am grateful to the Yale faculty lunch group for comments on a very early draft of this paper, and to audiences at Princeton University (March 2007), the Central APA Chicago (April 2007), and the Mind & Language Pretense Conference at University College London (June 2007) for excellent questions, comments, objections and suggestions regarding the talk which served as its immediate predecessor. For more recent discussion and comments, I thank John Bargh, Paul Bloom, Carolyn Caine, Greg Currie, Andy Egan, Roald Nashi, Ted Sider, Jason Stanley, Zoltán Gendler Szabó and Jonathan Weinberg.
TL;DR: Tessman's Burdened Virtues as mentioned in this paper is a deeply original and provocative work that engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics.
Abstract: Lisa Tessman's Burdened Virtues is a deeply original and provocative work that engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, she addresses the ways in which devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities of flourishing. She describes two different forms of "moral trouble" prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them - traits that Tessman refers to as "burdened virtues." These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer's own well being. Tessman's work focuses on issues that have been missed by many feminist moral theories, and her use of the virtue ethics framework brings feminist concerns more closely into contact with mainstream ethical theory. This book will appeal to feminist theorists in philosophy and women's studies, but also more broadly, ethicists and social theorists.
TL;DR: In this article, Heinaman discusses post-Hegelian Aristotelian Ethics with Aristotles and the place of tragedy, reason, and regret in a post-hegelian setting.
Abstract: Introduction (Robert Heinaman. ) Acting as the Virtuous Person Acts (Bernard Williams. ) The Virtuous Agents Reasons: A Reply to Bernard Williams (Rosalind Hursthouse. ) The Twofold Natural Foundation of Justice According to Aristotle (Pierre Aubenque. ) Justice at a DistanceLess Foundational, More Naturalistic: A Reply to Pierre Aubenque (Truels Engberg-Pedersen. ) Testing the Limits: The Place of Tragedy in Aristotles Ethics (Jonathan Lear. ) Tragedy, Reason and Pity: A Reply to Jonathan Lear (Stephen Halliwell. ) Aristotelian Ethics and the Englargement of Thought (Sabina Lovibond. ) Pitfalls in Doing Post-Hegelian Ethics with Aristotle: A Reply to Sabina Lovibond (T. Engberg-Pedersen. ) Aristotle and Modern Realism (David Charles. ) Aristotle and the Explanation of Evaluation: A Reply to David Charles (Stephen Everson. ) Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotles Ethics (John McDowell. ) Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotles Ethics: A Reply to John McDowell (David Wiggins.)
TL;DR: Flourishing Ethics as discussed by the authors is a new ethical theory that has begun to coalesce from the works of several scholars in the international computer ethics community, including Taoism and Buddhism.
Abstract: This essay describes a new ethical theory that has begun to coalesce from the works of several scholars in the international computer ethics community. I call the new theory ?Flourishing Ethics' because of its Aristotelian roots, though it also includes ideas suggestive of Taoism and Buddhism. In spite of its roots in ancient ethical theories, Flourishing Ethics is informed and grounded by recent scientific insights into the nature of living things, human nature and the fundamental nature of the universe --- ideas from today's information theory, astrophysics and genetics. Flourishing Ethics can be divided conveniently into two parts. The first part, which I call ?Human-Centered FE,' is focused exclusively upon human beings --- their actions, values and characters. The second part, which I call ?General FE,' applies to every physical entity in the universe, including humans. Rather than replacing traditional ?great ethical theories,' Flourishing Ethics is likely to deepen and broaden our understanding of them.
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that what is needed for a clear view of the moral educational relevance of literature and the arts is a conception of moral education that does justice to the interplay between the cognitive and the affective in moral life, and that a non-relativist Aristotelian ethics of virtue holds out the best prospect for such a moral education of reason and feeling.
Abstract: This paper sets out to explore connections between a number of plausible claims concerning education in general and moral education in particular: (i) that education is a matter of broad cultural initiation rather than narrow academic or vocational training; (ii) that any education so conceived would have a key concern with the moral dimensions of personal formation; (iii) that emotional growth is an important part of such moral formation; and (iv) that literature and other arts have an important part to play in such emotional education. It is argued here that what is needed for a clear view of the moral educational relevance of literature and the arts is a conception of moral education that does justice to the interplay between the cognitive and the affective in moral life, and that a non-relativist Aristotelian ethics of virtue holds out the best prospect for such a moral education of reason and feeling.