Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate the hold-up problem, while investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner's promises, the latter are more credible.

TL;DR: The authors conducted field experiments in two multi-ethnic republics of Russia and found that responders employ varied strategies in an ultimatum game, with an unusually high proportion of 50/50 splits.

TL;DR: This paper aims to demonstrate the efforts towards in-situ applicability of EMMARM, which aims to provide real-time information about the response of the immune system to EMTs.

TL;DR: In this article, a hold-up experiment in which unilateral investment is followed by bilateral bargaining according to Nash's demand game was conducted, and it was shown that sellers (investors) do at least as well under buyer communication as under seller communication.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the payoff in the Ultimatum Game is such that responders are more apt to be noisy than proposers, and as a result the learning process readily leads to outcomes that are Nash equilibria but not subgame-perfect.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the limiting outcomes of a dynamic evolutionary process driven by stochastic learning and rare mutations, and showed that locally stable outcomes are subgame perfect and satisfy a forward induction property.

TL;DR: In the long run, typically one division will be observed almost all of the time as discussed by the authors, and if there is some mixing between the two populations, the stable division is fifty-fifty.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate an evolutionary process that is continually perturbed by "mutations" and show that the stochastically stable distribution will include weakly dominated strategies in many cases, and in some cases the outcome may include only weak dominated strategies.