Consistent voting systems

TL;DR: In this paper, a core of a simple game with ordinal preferences on a set of alternative outcomes is considered and necessary and sufficient conditions for such games to have a nonempty core are given.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors test whether the amount and/or quality of financial statement information affects the financial structure of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Belgian SMEs are used, because there are important differences in disclosure and audit requirements among them.

TL;DR: The social choice problem as discussed by the authors deals with methods of marshalling information, particularly those relating to the people involved, to arrive at correct social judgments or acceptable group decisions, but the natures of the possible informational inputs vary, as do the required outputs of judgments, decisions or the required means of settlement.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide evidence that the presence of technical expertise in firm governance structure reduces reliance on contractual incentives to control the potential agency problem for executives whose responsibilities require specialized knowledge, and they find that firms with financial expertise in the form of a board finance committee, or a chief executive officer with a financial background, tend to use lower levels of incentive-based compensation for their chief financial officers.

TL;DR: A theory of noncooperative and cooperative games, which makes no use of utility theory, is outlined in this paper, where the following definition seems suitable for our purpose (see, e.g., [3, § 5]).