The third party intervention in the WTO dispute settlement has specificities compared to that existing in other international jurisdictions. The first one include very frequent access of third parties in the consultations, in the panel and the Appellate Body proceedings. This frequency results from rather favorable procedural rules and an open judicial policy developed by WTO judge in favor of the third parties presence. Contrary to this, the procedural rights of third parties are still very limited. They are imprecise in the consultation phase and limited in the panel phase. In addition, third parties do not have certain rights (for example, the right to appeal) because of the absence of the binding effects of adopted reports on themselves. On the whole, these specificities allow third parties to play really an important role in this system. Their intervention can meet the judge’s information needs and contribute to the multilateralization and legitimacy of the system at a whole. It can also help to defend interests at various levels and thus becomes a procedural mean to build and strengthen the capacity and skills of developing country Members. Their intervention can sometimes involve risks and limitations on the implementation of the guaranties of due process, on certain developments of the system and on the protection of legitimate rights and interests of the main parties. However, these effects are either minimal or mitigated through certain strategies implemented by the parties to dispute or through the control of the WTO judge. Therefore, the results of the intervention which appear generally positive advocates the strengthening of third party’s rights.

L'intervention des tierces parties dans le règlement des différends à l'OMC / Ngoc Ha Nguyen ; préface de Marie-Pierre Lanfranchi

Whereas some researchers emphasize how World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement reduces complexity and clarifies legislation, others argue that dispute rulings promote co-operation by providing an enforcement mechanism. This article identifies empirical implications from these distinct arguments and tests them on WTO disputes from 1995 to 2006. The study's analytical approach combines a three-step coding of dispute escalation with a strategic bargaining model and statistical backwards induction to account for governments’ forward-looking behavior. It finds strong support for the argument that WTO dispute settlement primarily serves as an enforcement device. It finds much less support for the argument that dispute settlement reduces complexity and clarifies trade law. These results suggest that the role of WTO dispute settlement in generating information on acceptable trade policy standards is less relevant than proponents of the complexity argument tend to assume.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0007123413000136

Does WTO Dispute Settlement Enforce or Inform

Three, Four and More: A Study of Triplet and Higher-Order Births. Edited byBeverley J. Bolting, Alison J. McFarlane and Frances V. Price. HMSO: 1990. Pp. 246. Pbk £12.95.

Three's a crowd

Objective To note the frequency of discussions and disputes about tobacco control measures at the World Trade Organization (WTO) before and after the coming into force of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). To review trends or patterns in the positions taken by members of the WTO with respect to tobacco control measures. To discuss possible explanations for these observed trends/patterns. Methods We gathered data on tobacco-related disputes in the WTO since its establishment in 1995 and its forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), prior-FCTC and post-FCTC. We also looked at debates on tobacco control measures within the WTO more broadly. To this end, we classified and coded the positions of WTO member states during discussions on tobacco control and the FCTC, from 1995 until 2013, within the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Council. Results There is a growing interest within the WTO for tobacco-related issues and opposition to tobacco control measures is moving away from high-income countries towards low(er) income countries. Conclusions The growing prominence of tobacco issues in the WTO can be attributed at least in part to the fact that during the past decade tobacco firms have been marginalised from the domestic policy-making process in many countries, which has forced them to look for other ways and forums to influence decision-making. Furthermore, the finding that almost all recent opposition within the WTO to stronger tobacco regulations came from developing countries is consistent with a relative shift of transnational tobacco companies’ lobbying efforts from developed to developing countries.

/pdf/tobacco-control-and-the-world-trade-organization-mapping-4w9mcwghtw.pdf

Tobacco control and the World Trade Organization: mapping member states’ positions after the framework convention on tobacco control

Why do some WTO trade disputes endure and recur while others do not? States have difficulty resolving trade conflicts when they involve certain types of trade-restrictive domestic regulations. While such regulations vary in their extent of legitimacy—fulfilling non-trade domestic regulatory objectives and availability of less trade-restrictive options—complainant states cannot always distinguish legitimate barriers from illegitimate ones. In such scenarios of disguised protectionism, which I argue is most prevalent with policies involving WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, disputants confront difficulties concluding their disputes. Disputes last longer and are more likely to recur. I test the argument against a data set of WTO disputes structured in an innovative manner—one that links together related and recurring disputes into single conflicts. Both an event history analysis of conflict duration and a count analysis of conflict recurrence using this data strongly support this argument.

Enduring trade disputes: Disguised protectionism and duration and recurrence of international trade disputes

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most judicialized dispute settlement systems in international politics. While a general appreciation has developed that the system has worked quite well, research has not paid sufficient attention to the weakest actors in the system. This paper addresses the puzzle of missing cases of least-developed countries initiating WTO dispute settlement procedures. It challenges the existing literature on developing countries in WTO dispute settlement which predominantly focuses on legal capacity and economic interests. The paper provides an argument that the small universe of ‘actionable cases’, the option of free riding and the assessment of the perceived opportunity costs related to other foreign policy priorities better explain the absence of cases. In addition (and somewhat counterintuitively), we argue that the absence of cases is not necessarily bad news and shows how the weakest actors can use the dispute settlement system in a ‘lighter version’ or i...

Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?

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Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?