Charles I concentrated his energies on the construction of a new royal palace at Whitehall. Designed in the classical style by John Webb, the new Whitehall was to be the fulallment of the king’s lifelong dream to replace the sprawling and obsolete palace that he had inherited from the Tudors with one that would match the splendor and majesty of the Louvre or the Escorial. Charles I desired nothing else than that his surroundings should reoect the magniacence of his rule: “Here, at last, would be a seat of government appropriate to the system of ‘Personal Rule’ Charles I had established since dispensing with Parliament in 1629. At least until 1639, it was from here that Charles could expect to govern his realms, resplendent amid Webb’s Baroque courtyards and colonnades, during the next decade and beyond.”1 In making such ambitious plans, Charles I displayed supreme conadence that his regime would not only survive but thrive well into the future. Unfortunately for the king, his reign did not last out the 1630s. If the conventional historical wisdom that “the collapse of Charles I’s regime during the 1630s appeared ‘inevitable’” is correct, then Charles obviously suffered from selfdelusion—an unreality all too characteristic of remote and isolated rulers.2 International politics, too, has seen many instances of this type of folly, where threatened countries have failed to recognize a clear and present danger or, more typically, have simply not reacted to it or, more typically still, have responded in paltry and imprudent ways. This behavior, which I call “underbalancing,” runs directly contrary to the core prediction of structural realist

Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing

1. Introduction 2. Fear, interest and honor 3. The spirit and its expression 4. The ancient world 5. Medieval Europe 6. From Sun King to Revolution 7. Imperialism and World War I 8. World War II 9. Hitler to Bush and beyond 10. General findings and conclusions.

/pdf/a-cultural-theory-of-international-relations-4bpcaeiy8z.pdf

A Cultural Theory of International Relations

During the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes. Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands. What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency (COIN) wars? We argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is primarily responsible for this shift. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations. This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population. Modern militaries may therefore inadvertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies. We test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies (1800–2005) and a paired comparison of two U.S. Army divisions in Iraq (2003–2004). We find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent's status as an occupier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat. By contrast, we find only partial support for conventional power- and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success.

/pdf/rage-against-the-machines-explaining-outcomes-in-47x7oa6zbo.pdf

Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars

I wish to thank Dale Copeland, Bernard Finel, Benjamin Frankel, Benjamin Miller, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, and the anonymous reviewers for International Security for comments on various drafts. I am responsible for any remaining errors or omissions. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 1999 annual meetings of the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association.

Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited

This article assesses the state of the art in military innovation research. It begins with a description of the field's four major schools of thought, summarizing their central tenets, key points of similarity and differentiation, and major empirical cases. It then addresses priorities for future research, observing that while much has been learned about innovation originating among senior officers and civilian policy-makers, far less is known about innovation originating in field formations. Recent empirical studies hint at the importance of such bottom-up innovation but little progress has been made in achieving a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon. Therein lies the next major challenge, and opportunity, for the field.

The future of military innovation studies

Introduction: on strategy Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley 1. Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War Donald Kagan 2. The strategy of a warrior state: Rome and the wars against Carthage, 264-201 BC Alvin H. Bernstein 3. Chinese strategy from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries Arthur Waldron 4. The making of strategy in Habsburg Spain: Philip II's 'bid for mastery', 1556-1598 Geoffrey Parker 5. The origins of a global strategy: England to 1713 William S. Maltby 6. A quest for glory: the formation of strategy under Louis XIV, 1661-1715 John A. Lynn 7. To the edge of greatness: the United States, 1783-1865 Peter Maslowski 8. Strategic uncertainties of a nation state: Prussia-Germany, 1871-1918 Holger H. Herwig 9. The weary titan: strategy and policy in Great Britain, 1890-1918 John Gooch 10. The strategy of the decisive weight: Italy, 1882-1992 Brian R. Sullivan 11. The road to ideological war: Germany, 1918-1945 Wilhelm Deist 12. The collapse of empire: British strategy, 1919-1945 Williamson Murray 13. The strategy of innocence? The United States, 1920-1945 Eliot A. Cohen 14. The illusion of security: France, 1919-1940 Robert A. Doughty 15. Strategy for class war: the Soviet Union, 1917-1941 Earl F. Ziemke 16. The evolution of Israeli strategy: the psychology of insecurity and the quest for absolute security Michael I. Handel 17. Strategy in the Nuclear Age: the United States, 1945-1991 Colin S. Gray Conclusion: continuity and revolution in the making of strategy MacGregor Knox.

/pdf/the-making-of-strategy-rulers-states-and-war-3i3a1owrb7.pdf

The Making of Strategy : Rulers, States, and War

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050

Introduction: war and revolution in Europe, 1789-1945 Part I. Origins and Dynamics: 1. Italy and Germany from unification to militant dictatorship, 1860-1933 2. Conquest, foreign and domestic, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany Part II. Foreign Policies and Military Instruments: 3. Fascism and Italian foreign polity: continuity and break 4. The Italian army at war, 1940-43: a study in combat effectiveness 5. The Prussian idea of freedom and the 'career open to talent': battlefield initiative and social ascent from Prussian reform to Nazi revolution, 1807-1944 Conclusion: expansionist zeal, fighting power, and staying power in the Italian and German dictatorships.

Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany

The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War.

Popular Tasks used by Researchers

How can I help with your research?

Get more enhanced response by uploading the PDFs you want me to reference.

No relevant PDFs in your library

SciSpace is the AI research assistant for academics. Run systematic literature reviews on 280M+ papers, and write papers with cited sources. Trusted by 1M+ students, PhDs & researchers.

SciSpace | AI for Research

We encountered an error while loading the panel. Please try refreshing the page.

Something went wrong

Analyze PDFs

Code & Manuscripts

Funding & Grants

Literature & Patents

Medical & Clinical Data

Systematic Review

Visualize & Present

Web & Data

Build a Google Scholar-like website for your research.

Build a website

Create charts and images for your research

Create a Chart

Write a paper for submission to a journal

Draft a manuscript

Patent Search

Design eye-catching scientific posters in minutes.

Scientific Poster Generation

Systematic Literature Review

Anyone with the link can view this chat. You can switch it back to private anytime.

One task is running at the moment. Your messages will be shown right after.

Drag and drop or click here to browse

Loved by <highlight>1 million+</highlight> researchers

Extract a list of specific topics and their sources from unstructured text

Topics

Compare and analyze relevant papers that matches with your search

Papers

Get insights from PDFs and bookmarked papers from your library

My library

Recent searches

Try searching for:

Catch AI-generated content in scholarly and non-scholarly content

{ai} Detector

Ai Writer

Get PDF Summaries, highlighted text explanations 

Chat with PDF

Effortlessly create in-text citations and bibliographies in APA and 2,500 other formats

Citation generator

Get explanations, summaries, and answers on academic papers

Ease up your research workflow with {scispace}'s cohort of exciting AI tools

Elevate your academic writing skills and convey your ideas the way you want

Paraphraser

Explore our range of reading and writing tools

Your file is being prepared and should be ready in a few minutes. If it's a large file, it might take a bit longer. You can close this window, and we'll email you the file when it's done.

You have reached a maximum limit of <strong>{limit}</strong> columns in the table. Remove at least <strong>1</strong> column to add or create another one.

MacGregor Knox

Author Tools

Chat about Author

Papers

The Making of Strategy : Rulers, States, and War

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050

Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany

The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War.

Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany