Hieu V. Phan
University of Massachusetts Lowell
42 Papers
77 Citations
Hieu V. Phan is an academic researcher from University of Massachusetts Lowell. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cash & Shareholder value. The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 35 publications. Previous affiliations of Hieu V. Phan include University of Massachusetts Boston.
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Papers
Policy Uncertainty and Mergers and Acquisitions
Nam H. Nguyen,Hieu V. Phan +1 more
TL;DR: The authors examined the relationship between policy uncertainty and mergers and acquisitions and found that policy uncertainty is negatively related to firm acquisitiveness and positively related to the time it takes to complete M&A deals.
Policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings
TL;DR: The authors examined the relation between government economic policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings and found evidence that policy uncertainty is positively related to firms' precautionary motives and, to a lesser extent, investment delays.
371
Carbon risk and corporate capital structure
Justin Hung Nguyen,Hieu V. Phan +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors exploit Australia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which mandates the country to reduce carbon emissions, thereby exposing Australian firms to increased carbon risk, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the causal effect of carbon risk on firm capital structure.
228
The influence of economic policy uncertainty on corporate trade credit and firm value
TL;DR: This article investigated the relationship between government economic policy uncertainty (EPUE) and trade credit and its value implication for U.S. public firms and found that firms curtail their receivables periods and face shorter payables periods from suppliers during high EPU.
145
Inside Debt and Mergers and Acquisitions
TL;DR: The authors empirically investigate the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and find evidence consistent with the agency theory's prediction of a negative relation between CEO inside debt holding and corporate risk taking, and they find evidence that acquirers restructure the postmerger composition of CEO compensation that mirrors their capital structure to alleviate incentives for wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders or vice versa.
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