Daniel Martin

TL;DR: The authors used laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that market forces can lead businesses to voluntarily provide information about the quality of their products, and they found that receivers are insufficiently skeptical about non-disclosed information, and as a consequence, senders do not always disclose their private information.

TL;DR: This article used laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that market forces can lead businesses to voluntarily provide information about the quality of their products, and they found that receivers are insufficiently skeptical about non-disclosed information, and as a consequence, senders do not always disclose their private information.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a new characterization of Bayesian expected utility maximization, and the signature of the resulting theory is the impossibility of raising utility by switching wholesale from one action to another.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the pricing strategy of a retailer that faces a consumer who is "rationally inattentive" to product quality, and show that rational inattention to quality produces two types of mixed strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria.