Allan Muir
City University London
13 Papers
96 Citations
Allan Muir is an academic researcher from City University London. The author has contributed to research in topics: Bayesian game & Sequential equilibrium. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 13 publications.
Chat about Author
Papers
On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the possible implementation of Radner equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium, private core, weak fine core, and weak fine value as perfect Bayesian or sequential equilibria of non-cooperative dynamic formulations.
An extensive form interpretation of the private core
TL;DR: In this article, the private core of an economy with differential information is defined as the set of all state-wise feasible and private information measurable allocations which cannot be dominated, in terms of ex ante expected utility functions, by statewise feasible or private information net trades of any coalition.
33
Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
TL;DR: In this article, the authors point out several conceptual difficulties of the rational expectations equilibrium concept and show that such an equilibrium need not be incentive compatible and need not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and conclude that private core is a more appropriate concept to capture the idea of contracts under asymmetric information.
Nash equilibria with Knightian uncertainty; the case of capacities
Dionysius Glycopantis,Allan Muir +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the tensor product for a 2×2 game with Knightian uncertainty is calculated and the Nash equilibria are derived in terms of tensor products of capacities.
15
On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that a non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium may not be coalitionally Bayesian incentive compatible, may not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not belong to the weak fine core.
11