Alfred Endres

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze two countries negotiating emission reductions in a world with "typical" institutional restrictions and show that in such a second-best world an agreement under a cost-inefficient quota regime may be superior to an efficient tax agreement with respect to ecological and welfare criteria.

TL;DR: In this article, the economic principle is presented as the strategy best suited to deal with the problem of scarcity, and consumers and firms are assumed to be agents who act economically, such that there is no waste of resources.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of pollution.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the cost effectiveness, ecological accuracy and dynamic incentives of the EU-emissions trading approach, which constitutes an important shift in the paradigm of environmental policy, from command and control to a market based approach.