TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of explaining the rarity of workers' control in the context of economic systems and propose several strategies to solve the problem: 1.1 The theory of the firm 5.2 The nature of authority 5.3 The locus of control 5.4 Why firms cannot be owned 5.5 Asset ownership 5.6 Residual claims 6.7 Path dependence 6.8 Cultural explanations 6.9 The strategy to be pursued 7.1 What do labor-managed firms maximize? 7.6 What does the evidence say?
Abstract: 1. Introduction: 1.1 Economic systems 1.2 The control dimension 1.3 Looking for clues 1.4 A projected synthesis 1.5 The plan of the book 2. Normative perspectives: 2.1 Why care about workers' control? 2.2 Equality 2.3 Democracy 2.4 Property 2.5 Dignity 2.6 Community 2.7 The author shows his cards 3. Workers' control in action (I): 3.1 Surveying the terrain 3.2 The Plywood cooperatives 3.3 The Mondragon cooperatives 4. Workers' control in action (II): 4.1 The Lega cooperatives 4.2 Employee stock ownership plans 4.3 Codetermination 5. Conceptual foundations: 5.1 The theory of the firm 5.2 The nature of authority 5.3 The locus of control 5.4 Why firms cannot be owned 5.5 Asset ownership 5.6 Residual claims 6. Explanatory strategies: 6.1 The symmetry principle 6.2 The replication principle 6.3 Transaction costs 6.4 Optimal contracting 6.5 Adverse selection 6.6 Repeated games 6.7 Path dependence 6.8 Cultural explanations 6.9 The strategy to be pursued 7. A question of objectives: 7.1 What do labor-managed firms maximize? 7.2 The Illyrian firm 7.3 Membership markets and labor markets 7.4 Membership markets and stock markets 7.5 Imperfect membership markets 7.6 What does the evidence say? 7.7 Some lessons 8. Views from economic theory I: 8.1 Explaining the rarity of workers' control 8.2 Asset ownership: incentives and information 8.3 Asset ownership: bargaining and information 8.4 Can asset specificity explain the rarity of workers' control? 8.5 Work incentives without risk aversion 8.6 Work incentives with risk aversion 8.7 Can work incentives explain the rarity of workers' control? 9. Views from economic theory (II): 9.1 Capital constraints 9.2 Debt financing 9.3 Equity financing 9.4 Can capital constraints explain the rarity of workers' control? 9.5 Portfolio diversification 9.6 Can portfolio diversification explain the rarity of workers' control? 9.7 Collective choice 9.8 Can collective choice explain the rarity of workers' control? 10. Transitions and clusters: 10.1 Organizational demography 10.2 Formation rates 10.3 Worker takeovers 10.4 Degeneration 10.5 Investor takeovers 10.6 Survival rates 10.7 Business cycles 10.8 Clusters 11. Toward a synthesis: 11.1 The causal tapestry 11.2 Credible commitment toward labor 11.3 Credible commitment toward capital 11.4 The composition of control groups 11.5 The commodification of control rights 11.6 Intellectual history and current debates 11.7 Is workers' control a unitary phenomenon? 12. Getting there from here: 12.1 Practical considerations 12.2 A modest proposal 12.3 Reassuring shareholders 12.4 Governing firms 12.5 Trading jobs 12.6 Sample calculations 12.7 The long and winding road.
TL;DR: Workers' control of machine production in the nineteenth century has been studied in this paper, where the authors discuss the transformation of workers' consciousness in America, 1909-22 and the New Deal Formula Bibliographical essay.
Abstract: Preface Introduction 1. Workers' control of machine production in the nineteenth century 2. Immigrant workers and managerial reform 3. Machinists, the Civic Federation, and the Socialist Party 4. The 'new unionism' and the transformation of workers' consciousness in America, 1909-22 5. Whose standards? Workers and the reorganization of production in the United States, 1900-20 6. Facing layoffs 7. American workers and the New Deal Formula Bibliographical essay.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider whether workers who provide their services through online platforms, such as Handy and Uber, should be classified as independent contractors or employees, and explore the extent to which an intermediate classification of workers between employees and independent contractors may lead to better outcomes.
Abstract: We consider whether workers who provide their services through online platforms, such as Handy and Uber, should be classified as independent contractors or employees. Using a formal economic model, we show how being too strict or too liberal in classifying workers as independent contractors (relative to the actual degree of control workers have) can be detrimental, not just to firms and welfare, but sometimes to the workers themselves. We also use the model to explore the extent to which an intermediate classification of workers between employees and independent contractors may lead to better outcomes. The intermediate classification is meant to apply to firms that retain control of some actions while their workers control others, as is the case for many online platforms.
TL;DR: The Princeton Legacy Library as mentioned in this paper uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press, preserving the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions.
Abstract: In this dramatic story of the making and unmaking of Portugal's agrarian reform, Nancy Bermeo probes the origins and effects of the workers' actions. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.