TL;DR: For instance, Manoilesco's confident prediction could easily be dismissed as yet another example of the ideological bias, wishful thinking and overinflated rhetoric of the thirties, an evenementielle response to a peculiar environment and period.
Abstract: Until recently, Manoilesco's confident prediction could easily be dismissed as yet another example of the ideological bias, wishful thinking and overinflated rhetoric of the thirties, an evenementielle response to a peculiar environment and period. With the subsequent defeat of fascism and National Socialism, the spectre of corporatism no longer seemed to haunt the European scene so fatalistically. For a while, the concept itself was virtually retired from the active lexicon of politics, although it was left on behavioral exhibit, so to speak, in such museums of atavistic political practice as Portugal and Spain.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors sketch a theory of justified belief, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified, and they do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, e. g., ‘Cartesian’, accounts.
TL;DR: For example, this article found that 90 percent confidence limits for the estimates of various general knowledge questions and the correct answers will lie within the limits less than 70 percent of the time.
Abstract: Responding to a request for a forecast is especially tricky for someone like me, who specializes in other people’s biases. Research in psychology suggests that certain biases are very likely to creep into my forecasts about the future of economics (or anything else). 1. Optimism (and wishful thinking). We all tend to be optimistic about the future. On the first day of my MBA class on decision-making at the University of Chicago, every single student expects to get an above-the-median grade, yet half are inevitably disappointed. This optimism will induce me to predict that economics will become more like I want it to be. 2. Overconfidence. In a related phenomenon, people believe they are better forecasters than they really are. Ask people for 90 percent confidence limits for the estimates of various general knowledge questions and the correct answers will lie within the limits less than 70 percent of the time. Overconfidence will induce me to make forecasts that are bolder than they should be. 3. The False Consensus Effect. We tend to think others are just like us. My colleague, George Wu, asked his students two questions: Do you have a cell phone? What percentage of the class has a cell phone? Cell phone owners thought 65 percent of the class had mobile phones, while the immobile phoners thought only 40 percent did. (The right answer was about halfway in between.) The false consensus effect will trap me into thinking that other economists will agree with me—20 years of contrary evidence notwithstanding. 4. The Curse of Knowledge. Once we know something, we can’t imagine ever thinking otherwise. This makes it hard for us to realize that what we know may be less than obvious to others who are less informed. The curse of knowledge will lead
TL;DR: The first book to give us a true picture of the reality on the ground, through the words of the people there - from commanders to intelligence officers, army doctors to ordinary soldiers as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Cutting through the headlines and spin, this is the first book to give us a true picture of the reality on the ground, through the words of the people there - from commanders to intelligence officers, army doctors to ordinary soldiers. Providing eye-witness accounts that contradict the official stories and figures, they give a chilling picture of the deceit, stupidity, wishful thinking, lack of forward planning and total intellectual failure of those behind the invasion. The result is an extraordinary new insight into the plight of ordinary soldiers doing nightmarish jobs, and the real nature of the fighting in Iraq.
TL;DR: The authors reviewed existing concepts of resilience and critically reviewed dominant neoliberal concepts of regional development, arguing that these must have a lighter environmental footprint and involve a greater degree of regional closure in and regionalisation of economic activities.
Abstract: What might a resilient region look like in the face of an uncertainty about the global economy and environment? To begin to answer this question, the article first reviews existing concepts of resilience and critically reviews dominant neoliberal concepts of regional development. This forms the basis for seeking to specify the characteristics of resilient regions, arguing that these must have a lighter environmental footprint and involve a greater degree of regional closure in and regionalisation of economic activities. The final concluding section evaluates the limits to regional resilience in the face of global change.