Abstract: Human beings are social animals. Yet despite vast amounts of research into political decision making, very little attention has been devoted to its social dimensions. In political science, social relationships are generally thought of as mere sources of information, rather than active influences on one's political decisions. Drawing upon data from settings as diverse as South Los Angeles and Chicago's wealthy North Shore, Betsy Sinclair shows that social networks do not merely inform citizens' behavior, they can - and do - have the power to change it. From the decision to donate money to a campaign or vote for a particular candidate to declaring oneself a Democrat or Republican, basic political acts are surprisingly subject to social pressures. When members of a social network express a particular political opinion or belief, Sinclair shows, others notice and conform, particularly if their conformity is likely to be highly visible. We are not just social animals, but social citizens whose political choices are significantly shaped by peer influence. "The Social Citizen" has important implications for our concept of democratic participation and will force political scientists to revise their notion of voters as socially isolated decision makers.

Abstract: The spatial model of elections identifies factors that motivate party elites to shift their policy positions, including changes in voters' policy preferences, rival parties' policy shifts, past election results, and changes in party elites' valence images with respect to dimensions of evaluation such as competence and integrity. I review empirical studies on multiparty elections, i.e., elections involving three or more major parties, that evaluate party elites' policy responses to these factors, along with empirical studies on the electoral consequences of parties' policy shifts. This review reveals a paradox: on the one hand, empirical studies conclude that parties systematically shift their policy positions in response to the factors that spatial modelers have identified. On the other hand, there is only weak and inconsistent empirical evidence that voters actually perceive parties' policy shifts, and/or that these shifts have significant electoral consequences. Thus the predictions of spatial theory ar...

Abstract: According to numerous studies, the election-year economy influences presidential election results far more than cumulative growth throughout the term. Here we describe a series of surveys and experiments that point to an intriguing explanation for voter behavior that runs contrary to the standard explanations political science has offered, but one that accords with a large psychological literature. Voters, we find, actually intend to judge presidents on cumulative growth. However, since that characteristic is not readily available to them, voters inadvertently substitute election-year performance because it is more easily accessible. This “end-heuristic” explanation for voters’ election-year emphasis reflects a general tendency for people to simplify retrospective assessments by substituting conditions at the end for the whole. The end heuristic explanation also suggests a remedy, a way to align voters’ actions with their intentions. Providing people with the attribute they are seeking — cumulative growth — eliminates the election-year emphasis.

Abstract: How do domestic political conditions shape when leaders get punished for backing down in international crises? We explore how three factors—the president’s partisanship, the reaction of other elites, and whether the president justifies his decision on the basis of new information—influence the size of domestic audience costs. While standard theories in American politics suggest that partisanship should exert a large effect over voter behavior, we offer an alternative theory explaining why the president’s unique informational advantage following a crisis will mute partisanship’s effect on audience costs. We argue that the president’s justification for why he backed down, however, will have a large effect on audience costs. Using a series of original survey experiments, we find strong support for our theoretical argument. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the role of partisanship, framing, and the audience costs literature more broadly.

Abstract: Competition in political debate is not always sufficient to neutralize the effects of political rhetoric on public opinion. Yet little is known about the factors that shape the persuasiveness of political arguments. In this article, I consider whether cognitive biases influence the perceived strength of political arguments, making some arguments more persuasive than others. Lessons from neurobiology and recent political psychology research on emotion lead to the expectation that individuals are more likely to be persuaded by political arguments that evoke loss aversion via a fearful response—even in the face of a counterargument. Evidence from two experiments corroborates this expectation. I consider the normative implications of these empirical findings and potential avenues for future research.

Abstract: Here, we advance the ideological migration hypothesis — individuals choose to live in communities with ideologies similar to their own to satisfy their need to belong. In Study 1, incongruity between personal and community ideology predicted greater residential mobility and attraction to more ideologically-congruent communities. In Study 2, participants who perceived their ideology to be at odds with their community’s displayed a decreased sense of belonging and an increased desire to migrate. In Studies 3 and 4, participants induced to view their current community as growing more incongruent with their own ideology expressed a decreased sense of belonging and an increased desire to migrate. Ideological migration may contribute to the rise in segregation and polarization of the American electorate.

Abstract: Spatial characterizations of agents’ preferences lie at the heart of many theories of political competition. These give rise to explicitly dimensional interpretations. Parties define and differenti...

Abstract: Eventually, you will very discover a extra experience and expertise by spending more cash. nevertheless when? do you acknowledge that you require to acquire those every needs bearing in mind having significantly cash? Why dont you attempt to get something basic in the beginning? Thats something that will lead you to understand even more in relation to the globe, experience, some places, with history, amusement, and a lot more?

Abstract: Growing experimental evidence in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics is shaping the way political science scholars think about how humans make decision in areas of high complexity, uncertainty and risk. Nearly all those studies utilize convenience samples of university students, but insights from that work may not be directly applicable to decisions that are made by political elites. We survey the nascent empirical literature on elite decision-making and look at six areas where the insights of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics are particularly relevant for political behavior and where evidence suggests that experienced elites differ from convenience samples. These differences suggest testable implications for theories of political decision making, which we illustrate in one major area of political science theory — crisis bargaining.

Abstract: Africa’s urban poor increasingly represent a key constituency for electoral mobilization. Opposition parties, which are pivotal for democratic consolidation, have nevertheless exhibited disparate success at obtaining votes from this constituency. To explain why, this study focuses on the case of Zambia and draws on interviews with political elites as well as a survey of informal sector workers in Lusaka. Instead of vote buying, ethnic alignments, or economic voting, these data show that the urban poor’s voting decisions are related to the strategies used by political parties to incorporate them into the political arena. Opposition parties that employ populist strategies are more likely to win support from the urban poor than parties reliant on alternative modes of mobilization. The advantages of a populist strategy include greater differentiation from the myriad of purely personalistic parties in Africa and greater congruence with the policy priorities of the urban poor, including service delivery and jobs.

Abstract: Previous research suggests that voting in elections is influenced by appearance-based personality inferences (e.g., whether a political candidate has a competent-looking face). However, since voters cannot objectively evaluate politicians’ personality traits, it remains to be seen whether appearance-based inferences about a characteristic continue to influence voting when clear information about that characteristic is available. The authors examine the impact of appearance-based inferences for a characteristic that is well known about candidates: their political affiliation. Across two studies, the authors show that U.S. candidates facing conservative electorates benefit from looking more stereotypically Republican than their rivals (controlling for gender, ethnicity, and age). In contrast, no relationship between political facial stereotypes and voting is found for liberal electorates (using identical controls). The authors further show that this contrast between liberal and conservative electorates has more to do with individual-level differences between liberal and conservative voters than with macro-level differences between liberal and conservative states.

Abstract: What are the main factors that allow presidents and prime ministers to enact policy through acts of government that carry the force of law? Or, simply put, when does a government actually govern? I argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, variations in legislative passage rates are the consequences of differences in uncertainty, not partisan support. The empirical evidence supports this view: chief executives’ legislative success rates depend on the predictability of legislators’ voting behavior and whether buying votes is a feasible option. From a normative standpoint, an important implication of my theory is that governability is best served when the opposition has realistic chances of occasionally defeating the executive in the legislative arena.

Abstract: This brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study, entitled Conditional cash transfers, political participation, and voting behavior, conducted between 2001 and present in Colombia. The study observed the impact of enrollment in a large scale anti-poverty program in Colombia, Familias en Accion (FA), on intent to vote, turnout, and electoral choice on the voter-level. FA increased the likelihood of registering to vote by 1.6 to 2.5 percent. A standard deviation increase in the proportion of FA beneficiaries at each booth results in a 1.6 to 1.8 percent increase in the probability of casting a ballot and a 1.5 percent increase in the probability of voting for the incumbent party. The effect is stronger for women who are the direct recipients of FA.

Abstract: Political communication has a powerful influence in shaping public awareness and opinion. However, this in itself can be seen as a carefully constructed discourse. This book examines both the complex practice of political messaging and the mouthpiece through which it is voiced. In examining the shifting tenor of this discourse, the authors ponder one particular glaring area within the debate. Has the communication of politics become professionalized? Who are these so-called 'professionals' and what part do they play in the political process? Following this enquiry, the authors develop a framework for understanding the changing accent of the political dialect in various contexts, such as governmental campaigns and elections. The effect of professionalization upon political debate is candidly explored across various European countries and their respective political systems. A valuable insight into the evolving practice of political communication. This is volume 3 in the "Changing Media, Changing Europe" book series, supported by the European Science Foundation.

Abstract: The prediction of voting behavior of undecided voters poses a challenge to psychologists and pollsters. Recently, researchers argued that implicit attitudes would predict voting behavior particularly for undecided voters whereas explicit attitudes would predict voting behavior particularly for decided voters. We tested this assumption in two studies in two countries with distinct political systems in the context of real political elections. Results revealed that (a) explicit attitudes predicted voting behavior better than implicit attitudes for both decided and undecided voters, and (b) implicit attitudes predicted voting behavior better for decided than undecided voters. We propose that greater elaboration of attitudes produces stronger convergence between implicit and explicit attitudes resulting in better predictive validity of both, and less incremental validity of implicit over explicit attitudes for the prediction of voting behavior. However, greater incremental predictive validity of implicit over explicit attitudes may be associated with less elaboration.

Abstract: Political Communication: an Integrated Approach H Kriesi The Context of the Campaigns H Kriesi & L Bernhard Design of the Study: an Integrated Approach R Hanggli , C Schemer & P Rademacher Coalition Formation L Bernhard & H Kriesi Construction of the Frames R Hanggli , L Bernhard & H Kriesi Message Delivery L Bernhard Media Organizations in Direct Democratic Campaigns P Rademacher , M A Gerth & G Siegert Coverage of the Campaigns in the Media M A Gerth , U Dahinden , & G Siegert Key Factors in Frame-building R Hanggli The Role of Predispositions H Kriesi The Role of Knowledge H Bonfadelli & T N Friemel When Campaign Messages meet Ideology The Role of Arguments for Voting Behavior W Wirth, J Matthes , & C Schemer The Impact of Positive and Negative Effects in Direct-Democratic Campaigns W Wirth , C Schemer , R Kuhne & J Matthes Conclusion H Kriesi Bibliography

Abstract: Though African party systems are said to be ethnic, there is little evidence for this claim. The few empirical studies rarely rely on individual data and are biased in favour of Anglophone Africa. ...

Abstract: Electoral institutions can affect the voting behavior of legislators who are elected through those institutions. In this article, the authors apply social network theory to study patterns of legislative choices under different primary election systems, and this approach leads the authors to study how electoral institutions affect legislative behavior differently than most previous research—that is, they focus on how electoral institutions affect the interactions between legislators. The authors use data on legislative voting behavior from the California State Assembly and exploit the changes that have been implemented in California’s primary elections process over the past two decades. Specifically, they hypothesize that legislators who were elected during the years in which a nonpartisan blanket primary was used in California (1998 and 2000) will be more centrally networked and more likely to compromise with other legislators. They find evidence to support their hypothesis: legislators elected under the nonpartisan blanket primary are more likely to agree with other legislators. Electoral institutions, especially primary elections, have important effects on legislative behavior. The authors’ results have implications for highly polarized state legislatures.

Abstract: This paper uses the unique social structure of Arab communities to examine the effect of social identity on voter turnout. We first show that voters are more likely to vote for a candidate who shares their social group (signified by last name) as compared to other candidates. Using last name as a measure of group affiliation, an inverted U-shaped relationship between group size and voter turnout has been found (borderline significant) which is consistent with theoretical models that reconcile the paradox of voting by incorporating group behavior.

Abstract: Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament’s voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives’ incentives to adhere to citizens’ revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences.

Abstract: As teachers of political theory, our goal is not merely to help students understand the abstract reasoning behind key ideas and texts of our discipline We also wish to convey the historical contexts that informed these ideas and texts, including the political aims of their authors But the traditional lecture-and-discussion approach tends to obscure the historical and political dimensions of political theory Reacting to the Past historical simulations provide a powerful tool for remedying these shortcomings The simulations foster three kinds of lessons that are difficult to impart with more traditional approaches First, they help students see the intimate and reciprocal connections between politics, history, and political philosophy Second, the simulations bring to light the inherently political dimensions of interpreting key political ideas Finally, drawing upon the ideas of Hannah Arendt, we argue that the simulations educate students about the nature of freedom and political action

Abstract: There is a large body of literature analyzing the relationship between objective economic conditions and voting behavior, but there is very little evidence of how perceived economic insecurity impacts on political preferences. Using seventeen years of household panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we examine whether job loss fears impact on individuals' party identification. Consistent with the deprivation theory, we find strong and robust evidence that subjective job loss fears foster affinity for parties at the far right-wing of the political spectrum. The effects are broadly comparable in direction and magnitude with the ones from objective unemployment and being out of the labor force. However, our empirical estimates do not suggest that job loss fears result in people withdrawing their support from political parties altogether or increasingly identify with extremist left-wing parties.

Abstract: Election data represent a precious source of information to study human behavior at a large scale. In proportional elections with open lists, the number of votes received by a candidate, rescaled by the average performance of all competitors in the same party list, has the same distribution regardless of the country and the year of the election. Here we provide the first thorough assessment of this claim. We analyzed election datasets of 15 countries with proportional systems. We confirm that a class of nations with similar election rules fulfill the universality claim. Discrepancies from this trend in other countries with open-lists elections are always associated with peculiar differences in the election rules, which matter more than differences between countries and historical periods. Our analysis shows that the role of parties in the electoral performance of candidates is crucial: alternative scalings not taking into account party affiliations lead to poor results.

Abstract: Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) proliferate across Europe and beyond. By matching the political offer with voters’ preferences, these internet applications assist voters in their decisions. However, despite the growing number of VAA users in several European polities, little is still known about the profile of a typical VAA user, let alone about the impact of VAA usage on individual level attitudes and behavior. Dominant research in this field offers contradictory evidence for it suffers from poor data quality, relies on descriptive analysis and fails to tap causality. To remedy these problems this thesis systematically investigates the patterns of VAA usage and its impact on voting preferences, vote choice and electoral turnout. In so doing I employ data from cross sectional election studies, panel surveys and a large N field experiment. First, I demonstrate that VAA usage is more frequent among the young, educated citizens from urban areas. However, additionally to these baseline properties, VAA users appear to be considerably more active in political life, they are interested in political issues and they are available to electoral competition. Second, using an experimental research design, I demonstrate that VAAs are more likely to affect the young and the less educated. Findings show that VAAs indeed influence users’ political preferences, vote choice and motivate voters to participate in elections. More specifically, VAAs help young voters to distinguish between political parties and the less educated are likely to change their vote choice as compared to the previously intended one as a consequence of VAA usage. Taken together, the findings confirm theories of political socialization and the life cycle effects by which one’s susceptibility to political information slows down with advancing age. However, the patterns of usage and impact appear to cancel each other out, in that those who most frequently use VAAs are least likely to be affected by their vote advice. Conversely, among those groups where the impact appears to be greatest, the likelihood of VAA usage is lowest. By implication, while the VAA effects can be found on an individual level, the mechanism by which the influence is exercised prevents large changes at the aggregate level. Therefore, much like the boat sailing against the tide covers little distance over ground, VAAs do influence individual level attitudes and behavior, but fail to bring about aggregate change.

Abstract: A vast literature suggests that voters in new democracies “sell” their vote to patrons providing private or small-scale club goods, or alternatively, that such goods are distributed along ethnic lines to reinforce ethnic voting. In either case the outcome is undermining democratic accountability. This study finds that citizens in one new democracy – Ghana – expect (and get) the patronage but at the same time engage in economic voting. 85% of citizens first and foremost expect their legislators to supply private or small-scale ‘club’ goods. This acts as a very strong incentive for politicians to actually supply such goods, which is confirmed by participants observational data and more than 250 interviews conducted by the author. Despite this, citizens do not vote based on how well or poorly incumbent MPs provide clientelistic goods. A multivariate analysis reveals that voting for the opposition or the incumbent is determined by evaluations of the state of the national economy and of the government’s policies. What the literature has portrayed as an “either-or” is “both” and this is perfectly rational: Extract as much one can in terms of private and small club goods but vote based on economic factors. The literature suggests that clientelism dominate elections in newer democracies and thus undermine democracy. The findings from this study suggest that while distribution of clientelistic goods is common, this does not necessarily undermine the mechanism of democratic accountability in elections.