Universal science

Abstract: Psychology has traditionally seen itself as the science of universal human cognition, but it has only recently begun seriously grappling with cross-cultural variation. Here we argue that the roots of cross-cultural variation often lie in the past. Therefore, to understand not only how but also why psychology varies, we need to grapple with cross-temporal variation. The traces of past human cognition accessible through historical texts and artifacts can serve as a valuable, and almost completely unutilized, source of psychological data. These data from dead minds open up an untapped and highly diverse subject pool. We review examples of research that may be classified as historical psychology, introduce sources of historical data and methods for analyzing them, explain the critical role of theory, and discuss how psychologists can add historical depth and nuance to their work. Psychology needs to become a historical science if it wants to be a genuinely universal science of human cognition and behavior.

Abstract: One.- I. Literary and Chronologicale Aspects of the Commentary.- 1. Medieval Latin versions of the Metaphysics.- 2. The chronology of the composition of the Commentary.- II. The Metaphysical Views of Avicenna, Averroes, and Albert.- 1. Avicenna's First Philosophy.- 2. The Commentary of Averroes.- 3. The Commentary of Albert.- III. The Prooemium to Aquinas' Commentary.- 1. The doctrine of the Prooemium.- 2. The idea of ens commune.- 3. The doctrine of the via resolutionis.- 4. The introduction to Albert's Commentary.- 5. The introductory book of Avicenna's Metaphysics.- 6. Aristotle's introduction.- 7. Conclusion of Part One.- Two.- IV. The Object of Metaphysics.- 1. The doctrine of Aquinas' Commentary on the objects of metaphysics.- A. In IV Meta., lectio 1.- B. In IV Meta., lectio 2.- 2. Aristotle, Averroes, Albert: the predecessors of Aquinas' In IV Meta., lectio 1.- A. Aquinas and Aristotle.- B. Aquinas versus Averroes and Albert.- 3. Aristotle, Averroes, Albert: the predecessors of Aquinas' In IV Meta., lectio 2.- A. Aquinas and Aristotle.- B. Aquinas versus Averroes and Albert.- 4. Avicenna's and Aquinas' expositions of the object of metaphysics.- A. Avicenna's metaphysics.- B. The fundamental criticisms of Avicenna given by Averroes, by Albert, and by Aquinas.- C. Aquinas' use of several less important aspects of Avicenna's metaphyscis.- 5. Conclusion.- V. The Relation of Metaphysics to the Other Sciences.- 1. The thought of Aquinas.- A. The "universal science" and the "first science".- B. The study of communia.- C. Metaphysics as the "lord" of sciences.- 2. "Universal science" and "first science" in the predecessors of Aquinas.- A. The "universal science" and the "first science" in Aristotle's thought.- B. Averroes and Albert on the identity of the "first science" and "universal science".- C. Avicenna's theory on "universal science" and "first philosophy".- 3. Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna, and Albert on metaphysics as the study of communia.- A. Aristotle's doctrine.- B. Avicenna and the study of communia.- C. Averroes and Albert on the study of communia.- 4. Aquinas' predecessors on metaphysics as the "lord" of all science.- A. Aristotle's view.- B. Avicenna on metaphysics as the ruling science.- C. Averroes and Albert on metaphysics as the first of the sciences.- 5. Conclusion.- VI. The Method of Metaphysics.- 1. The Commentary's metaphysics.- A. The birth of metaphysics.- B. Metaphysics and the investigation of predication.- C. The investigation of predication: the concept of "being".- D. The investigation of predication: the distinction of matter and form.- E. The discovery of the existence of God.- F. The human attempt to speak of God.- G. Conclusions.- 2. Aquinas and Aristotle.- A. Aristotle on the birth of metaphysics.- B. The necessity of using a logical method.- C. The investigation of predication: the concept of "being".- D. The investigation of predication: the distinction of matter and form.- E. The discovery of the existence of God.- F. The human attempt to speak of God.- G. Conclusion: Aquinas' Commentary on the Metaphysics.- 3. Conclusion of Part Two.- Three.- VII. The Basic Insight of Aquina's Commentary.- 1. The meaning of "is".- 2. Intellectual knowledge.- 3. The meaning of "being".- 4. The transcendental concepts.- 5. Metaphysics, the ruling science.- 6. Philosophical knowledge of God.- 7. Conclusion.- Conclusion.- Conclusion.- Index of Topics.- Index of Texts.

Abstract: HjCONomics has become the imperial social science. It is the only branch of social inquiry that enjoys a Nobel prize. It has been celebrated in a massive four-volume, 4-million word "dictionary," through which there runs, like an Ariadne's thread, the assumption that economics has finally escaped the parochial boundaries of its former kingdom of production and distribution, and can now lay claim to a realm that extends from family affairs to sports, from anthropology to political science.1 More to the point, economics has earned the flattery of imitation by its sister social sciences. Its formal mode of argument, mathematical apparatus, spare language, and rigorous logic have made it the model for the "softer" social sciences. Thus it is with the shock of recognition, not of surprise, that we read Jack Hirshleifer's tribute to the "expanding domain" of economics:

Abstract: Gersonides' commentary on the Metaphysics is no longer extant and we know almost nothing about it. I shall argue that the commentary was on Averroes's long commentary and that it was not completed, perhaps not continued beyond book Γ. What made Gcrsonides, who commented so systematically on Aristotle, abandon his project, just when he was commenting on the book, that is considered by many to be the climax of Aristotle's work? The answer suggested is: Gersonides considered his astronomy as a demonstrative science. As an astronomer he developed a method, which was structurally dialectical, while the testing of the hypotheses was mainly empirical. He could reconcile his method with Aristotle's method of demonstration by a suitable interpretation of the Posterior Analytics, but not with the conception of universal science presented in Metaphysics Γ.