TL;DR: Gergen as mentioned in this paper argued that the need for people to also construct something tended to be forgotten, and pointed out that people have a life to live, and institutions to build, and need to hold something as better, more true, or more reasonable, than something else.
Abstract: Kenneth J. Gergen: Relational Being. Beyond Self and Community Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, $ 45.00, pp. 448, ISBN 978-0-19-530538-8 While the belief in the power of science, even in the social field, reached a peak in the period after World War II, there also emerged a critique. Contributors like Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Toulmin, Polanyi and others directed their attacks against the tools of science, in particular such ideas as the objective language, the neutral observer, the unequivocal empirical observation, and the necessary logics. Their focus was on the discontinuities of science. They focused, however, less on the other major problem of discontinuity: that of the objects. In particular in the social field, those that are under investigation: people, groups, organizations, societies, are not stable, either. They are continuously on the move, continuously taking on new shapes and forms. How can this be handled from a research perspective? How can we create knowledge about phenomena that will, in all likelihood, have undergone change by the time the paper is published? One response to the challenges associated with "the double discontinuity" were trends like post-modernism, post-structuralism, deconstructivism, and similar. In spite of major contributions to the critique of concepts like absolute truth, unequivocal justice, universal reason and linear progress, it can be argued that the deconstruction aspect became so overriding that the need for people to also construct something tended to be forgotten. People have a life to live, and institutions to build, and need to hold something as better, more true, or more reasonable, than something else. The fact that the world is "on the move" needs a positive understanding, not only a tearing down of all forms of understanding. Furthermore, since the contributors to the various "post-schools" seem, with some exception for psycho-therapy, not to have any research-related practical experiences of their own, they tend to imagine that the world can be enlightened by texts alone, something that in a sense goes contrary to their own argument. The "post schools" would have to be followed by something that puts more emphasis on positive, in this sense "constructive", understanding and continuity without, however, falling back on the more traditional versions of universal reason. In everyday research, there are emergent trends representing, in different ways, responses to this challenge: First, rather than focusing on the structural properties of the phenomena, focus shifts towards the mechanisms that generate these properties. The generative forces are thought to be more stable than the patterns they create each and every time. Second, increased emphasis is put on the actor (or agent) perspective, at the expense of the "objective, path dependency" type reasoning often characterizing the traditional, structurally oriented kind of research. What people do, is decided more by their Intentions, perceptions and relationships, and less by "objective forces". Third, and in line with this, choice becomes more important than determinants. Fourth, more emphasis is placed on what people create in interaction with each other, at the expense of what the individual, often "rational player", is creating on his or her own. Concepts like community and joint learning gain in importance. Fifth, more emphasis is put on agreement between the actors concerned, as the foundation for whatever can be identified in terms of structural characteristics of, say, an organization, or a society, at the expense of internal or external forces. Sixth, an increased emphasis is put on practices, as the spearhead of the transactions between people. For instance, most learning takes place as a result of what happens when new efforts are made, new tools tried out, new plans put into action. Finally research itself is no exception from these trends. Research has to find its place as an actor in interaction with other people, not as an observer that in some way or other stands outside the human community. …
TL;DR: For instance, Edgeworth as mentioned in this paper rearticulated Burkean local attachment and philosophical cosmopolitanism to produce an understanding of the nation as neither tightly bordered (like nations based on historical premises such as blood or inheritance) nor borderless (like those based on rational notions of universal inclusion).
Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a great deal of attention to the emergence of nationalism in late-eighteenth-century Europe, and critics such as Seamus Deane have drawn particular attention to the way in which the new nationalist narratives tended to displace the older cosmopolitan narrative of universal subjects and universal reason. As Deane points out, Enlightenment forms of narrative (like the philosophical tale) were threatened by a "newly assertive nationalism, predicated on notions of national character."'1 The kind of national thinking-and narrative-that he has in mind is represented by a figure like Edmund Burke and his well-known argument anchoring national identity in attachment to one's "little platoon."2 But the same Anglo-Irish milieu that produced Burke also produced Maria Edgeworth, who offered a rather different reading of national identity in the same period. Her writing on Ireland, especially her early Irish tales, offers an important rearticulation of Burkean local attachment and philosophical cosmopolitanism to produce an understanding of the nation as neither tightly bordered (like nations based on historical premises such as blood or inheritance) nor borderless (like those based on rational notions of universal inclusion). This effort to rethink nationness makes Edgeworth more than the colonial writer who figures in current criticism.3 Having herself been both immersed in Continental Enlightenment thought and personally affected by the nationalist upsurge of the 1798 Rebellion, she used herwriting to reconsider the meaning of the denomination "AngloIrish."4 And through her interrogation she reinterpreted both cosmopolitan and national definitions of belonging so as to reconstitute "Anglo-Irish" less as a category than as an ongoing mediation between borders.
TL;DR: In this paper, Rorty's distinct brand of positivism is explored in relation to action research and it is argued that action researchers must find new language to describe their work, rather than be caug...
Abstract: Richard Rorty's distinct brand of positivism is explored in relation to action research. Rorty's opposition toward the dualisms which haunt western philosophy is briefly described, his nonfoundationalist, anti-metaphysical pragmatics and his views on the contingency of the language that we use outlined. Since we can neither appeal to universal reason nor to an external reality as foundations for our claims, argument must move through a process of redescription. It is argued that just as Rorty is redescribing philosophy, so action researchers are redescribing inquiry. Rorty's ideas are compared with five basic characteristics of action research: practical knowing, democracy and participation; ways of knowing; human and ecological flourishing; and emergent form. Finally, Rorty's notion of the ironist is compared with the action researchers as reflective practitioner. The stimulating quality of Rorty's thought suggests that action researchers must find new language to describe their work, rather than be caug...
TL;DR: In this paper, Johnson argues that the standards for the kinds of person we should be and how we should treat one another are in fact frequently subject to change and that we should adapt our standards according to given needs, emerging problems, and social interactions.
Abstract: What is the difference between right and wrong? This is no easy question to answer, yet we constantly try to make it so, frequently appealing to some hidden cache of cut-and-dried absolutes, whether drawn from God, universal reason, or societal authority. Combining cognitive science with a pragmatist philosophical framework in Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science, Mark Johnson argues that appealing solely to absolute principles and values is not only scientifically unsound but even morally suspect. He shows that the standards for the kinds of person we should be and how we should treat one another-which we often think of as universal-are in fact frequently subject to change. And we should be okay with that. Taking context into consideration, he offers a remarkably nuanced, naturalistic view of ethics that sees us creatively adapt our standards according to given needs, emerging problems, and social interactions. Ethical naturalism is not just a revamped form of relativism. Indeed, Johnson attempts to overcome the absolutist-versus-relativist impasse that has been one of the most intractable problems in the history of philosophy. He does so through a careful and inclusive look at the many ways we reason about right and wrong. Much of our moral thought, he shows, is automatic and intuitive, gut feelings that we follow up and attempt to justify with rational analysis and argument. However, good moral deliberation is not limited merely to intuitive judgments supported after the fact by reasoning. Johnson points out a crucial third element: we imagine how our decisions will play out, how we or the world would change with each action we might take. Plumbing this imaginative dimension of moral reasoning, he provides a psychologically sophisticated view of moral problem solving, one perfectly suited for the embodied, culturally embedded, and ever-developing human creatures that we are.
TL;DR: Mack argues that the redefinition of the Jews as irrational, oriental Others forms the very cornerstone of German idealism, including Kant's conception of universal reason as mentioned in this paper. But their respective philosophies all ran aground on the belief that the worldly proved incapable of transforming itself into this otherworldly ideal.
Abstract: In German Idealism and the Jew, Michael Mack uncovers the deep roots of anti-Semitism in the German philosophical tradition. While many have read German anti-Semitism as a reaction against Enlightenment philosophy, Mack instead contends that the redefinition of the Jews as irrational, oriental Others forms the very cornerstone of German idealism, including Kant's conception of universal reason.
Offering the first analytical account of the connection between anti-Semitism and philosophy, Mack begins his exploration by showing how the fundamental thinkers in the German idealist tradition—Kant, Hegel, and, through them, Feuerbach and Wagner—argued that the human world should perform and enact the promises held out by a conception of an otherworldly heaven. But their respective philosophies all ran aground on the belief that the worldly proved incapable of transforming itself into this otherworldly ideal. To reconcile this incommensurability, Mack argues, philosophers created a construction of Jews as symbolic of the "worldliness" that hindered the development of a body politic and that served as a foil to Kantian autonomy and rationality.
In the second part, Mack examines how Moses Mendelssohn, Heinrich Heine, Franz Rosenzweig, and Freud, among others, grappled with being both German and Jewish. Each thinker accepted the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, in varying degrees, while simultaneously critiquing anti-Semitism in order to develop the modern Jewish notion of what it meant to be enlightened—a concept that differed substantially from that of Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Wagner. By speaking the unspoken in German philosophy, this book profoundly reshapes our understanding of it.