Universal prescriptivism

Abstract: Many recent discussions of universality tests, particularly those in English, are concerned either with what everybody wants done or with what somebody (usually the agent: sometimes an anonymous moral spectator) wants done either by or to everybody. This is true of the universality tests proposed in Singer’s Generalization Argument, in Hare’s Universal Prescriptivism and generally of various formulations of Golden Rules as well as of Rule Utilitarianism. Since universality tests of these sorts all make moral acceptability in some way contingent upon what is wanted (or, more circumspectly expressed, upon what is preferred or found acceptable or promises the maximal utility) they all form part of moral theories which are heteronomous, in Kant’s sense of that term. Such theories construe moral acceptability as contingent upon the natural phenomena of desire and inclination, rather than on any intrinsic or formal features of the agent or his intentions. If we rely on any of these proposed criteria of moral acceptability, there will be no types of act which would not be rendered morally acceptable by some change or changes in human desires.

Abstract: 1. INTRODUCTION The importance of providing IS users and professionals with a proper knowledge of ethics has been increasingly recognized. This is evident from the large number of frameworks for IS ethics education proposed by scholars (e.g., Kallman & Grillo, 1996; Maner, 1980; Martin & Huff, 1997; Tavani, 2001; Siponen and Vartiainen 2002; Vartiainen and Siponen 2010) and professional organizations such as ACM and IEEE. One of the main elements of these frameworks is the utilization of relevant theories of ethics. Although it is worthwhile to construct conceptual-analytical IS ethics frameworks (cf. Hare, 1981), there is an equal need for empirical research, specifically on the effects and implications of ethics theory when used in an IS context. In particular, it would be useful to know how students experience such theories, and what effect they have on their thinking and the development of their moral reasoning. This should confirm the practical value of the frameworks, which of course should be the ultimate goal of the training programs. Unfortunately, we find no IS studies that have studied the effects of theories of ethics on students' thinking. As a step towards remedying this gap in the literature, we test the effects of an education program based on the universality thesis. By teaching the universality thesis, we aim to encourage students to acquire more diverse viewpoints on ethical issues and thereby to develop them in reasoning in moral conflicts. Therefore, we assess the effects of three versions of the universality thesis on students' thinking in terms of integrative complexity (Suedfeld, Tetlock & Streufert, 1992), which represents individuals' cognitive styles and different ways of processing information. Integrative complexity is an established social science measurement tool, used to measure the effect of education in social and personality psychology, in addition to attitude change (e.g., Conway et al. 2008; Winter, 2007). In our study, we assess whether students progress in terms of integrative complexity during the educational intervention. Our study is a continuation of our efforts to develop ethics teaching in IS education using the approach of empirical research (e.g., Vartiainen and Siponen 2010 on students' intention to use theories of ethics). This paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the theoretical framework, and the third considers the research methods used. The results are presented in the fourth section, and their limitations and significance are discussed in the fifth. The final section reiterates the key findings. 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The theoretical framework of this study is twofold. First, given that in one study we are only able to test a limited number of theories, we first discuss the rationalizations as to why we selected the universality thesis to constitute the substance of the teaching intervention. To be more precise, we introduced three versions of this thesis to students during an IS ethics educational intervention program. Second, we applied the theory of integrative complexity in order to assess whether IS ethics teaching based on the three universality theories positively modified complexity of thought. The three theories are discussed next. 2.1 Three aspects of the universality thesis There are several alternative theories of ethics, including utilitarianism (Bentham, 1876; Mill, 1895), universal prescriptivism (Hare, 1981), Kant's theory (1993), intuitionism (Moore, 1966; Ross, 1930), and the theory of information ethics (Floridi, 1999). A common element is the so-called universality thesis. Hare (1981) defines this doctrine as follows: "If one judges that one's action in a particular situation is right, one must then acknowledge that a similar act by anybody else in a similar situation would also be right." The different versions of the universality thesis form the core element in Confucianism (Hansen, 1991), Judeo-Christian ethics (Outga, 1972), Kant's theory (1993), Mackie's theory (1981), Rawls' theory of justice (Rawls, 1971; Kukathas & Pettit, 1990), and universal prescriptivism (Hare, 1981), for example. …

Abstract: Universal prescriptivism is a recently developed moral decision-making theory that combines utilitarian and Kantian theories with two levels of moral thinking. A combined approach offers a creative solution to the weaknesses inherent in traditional moral theories. The paper describes the theory and discusses important implications for nursing education, practical ethical decision-making, and research. The relationship of an ethical theory of caring to traditional moral theory is discussed.

Abstract: In his recently reissued monograph An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, J. J. C. Smart claims that 'to some extent ... I shall be trying to present Sidgwick in a modern dress'.' His reservation here, as in the original edition, pertains to Sidgwick's cognitivist meta-ethic, which Smart rejects in favour of, e.g., Hare's non-cognitivist, universal prescriptivism. But a reading of his monograph reveals that this is not the only nor the only important part of Sidgwick that Smart rejects. In Book IV of The Methods of Ethics,2 Sidgwick is at pains to impress upon his readers not only that act-utilitarianism need not be a wholly negative and destructive force in normative ethics but also that it can often be used to provide support for parts of what he calls the morality of 'common sense', or what today we might call our 'ordinary moral convictions' or the moral views and convictions of the 'plain man'. (In what follows, I shall use these expressions interchangeably.) Of course, act-utilitarianism does not provide support for all such views and convictions, and to every last detail; and Sidgwick himself seeks the reform of much of 'commonsense morality'. But neither is act-utilitarianism going to be allowed to sweep aside just any of the views and convictions of the 'plain man'. Sidgwick's position appears to be that the application of act-utilitarianism will sometimes give results that warrant amending some parts of 'commonsense morality' but at other times will give results that warrant amending act-utilitarianism. These last occasions are or are likely to be those in which the application of the theory to particular cases produces results that to the 'plain man' are deeply counterintuitive, e.g., that punishing this innocent man is both right and justified; and any number of amendments to the theory can be (and have been) adopted to reduce the number and seriousness of clashes between the results of act-utilitarianism in particular cases and the views of the 'plain man' on these same cases. The point here is not which amendments Sidgwick was in favour of but that he thought amending the theory was an appropriate response in the light of at least some deeply counterintuitive results. Now there is nothing like this conservatism in Smart's monograph; indeed, it originally became well-known partly because of its uncompromising stance over clashes with 'ordinary moral convictions', of its radical tone of 'so much the worse for the views of the "plain man"', and this new edition, in spite of a certain hesitation in its final pages,3 is in the same vein. The more conservative stance of Sidgwick vis-a'-vis