About: Underlying representation is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 129 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2942 citations.
TL;DR: Here it is confirmed that naming a drawing of an object takes much longer than reading its name, but it is shown that deciding whether the object is in a given category such as ‘furniture’ takes slightly less time for a drawing than for a word, a result that seems to be inconsistent with the second view.
Abstract: WHEN an object such as a chair is presented visually, or is represented by a line drawing, a spoken word, or a written word, the initial stages in the process leading to understanding are clearly different in each case. There is disagreement, however, about whether those early stages lead to a common abstract representation in memory, the idea of a chair1–4, or to two separate representations, one verbal (common to spoken and written words), and the other image-like5. The first view claims that words and images are associated with ideas, but the underlying representation of an idea is abstract. According to the second view, the verbal representation alone is directly associated with abstract information about an object (for example, its superordinate category: furniture). Concrete perceptual information (for example, characteristic shape, colour or size) is associated with the imaginal representation. Translation from one representation to the other takes time, on the second view, which accounts for the observation that naming a line drawing takes longer than naming (reading aloud) a written word6,7. Here we confirm that naming a drawing of an object takes much longer than reading its name, but we show that deciding whether the object is in a given category such as ‘furniture’ takes slightly less time for a drawing than for a word, a result that seems to be inconsistent with the second view.
TL;DR: Ponapean, Catalan and English provide strong evidence that the Coronal node must be absent in underlying representation, and thus the NAC does not force the presence of a Coronal nodes.
Abstract: Ponapean, Catalan and English provide strong evidence that the Coronal node must be absent in underlying representation. In none of these languages are coronals distinguished by a secondary content node, and thus the NAC does not force the presence of a Coronal node. As expected, phonological processes separate the coronals from the other places of articulation in these languages.
TL;DR: It is shown that an optimization approach, couched within Optimality Theory (Prince and Smolensky 1993), results in the use of underspecification only when there are alternant surface forms all of which are predictable from context or grammatical defaults.
Abstract: This paper* argues for a theory in which underlying representation is determined solely by optimization with respect to the grammar, not by imposing any type of constraints directly on underlying representation. This approach has important consequences for underspecification, changing the way in which this and other properties of underlying structure are deployed. In particular, I show that an optimization approach, couched within Optimality Theory (Prince and Smolensky 1993), results in the use of underspecification only when there are alternant surface forms all of which are predictable from context or grammatical defaults.
TL;DR: The authors provided a case study of the fossilized endstate L2 English grammar of an adult native speaker of Turkish, focusing on verbal and nominal inflection and associated syntactic properties; data from a number of other tasks are also presented.
Abstract: This paper provides a case study of the fossilized endstate L2 English grammar of an adult native speaker of Turkish. Results are presented from production data (over 3400 utterances, gathered over 2 time periods 18 months apart), concentrating on verbal and nominal inflection and associated syntactic properties; data from a number of other tasks are also presented. A high level of accuracy in suppliance of English tense and agreement morphology was found. In contrast, suppliance of definite and indefinite articles was significantly lower but nevertheless appropriate. Syntactic correlates (such as verb placement, presence of overt subjects, case assignment, definiteness effects) were all completely accurate, suggesting no underlying impairment to functional categories or features. There is some evidence for influence from the L1, which has rich inflection but lacks articles, but this appears to be an effect on suppliance of overt morphology and not on underlying representation, which shows properties appropriate to the L2.
TL;DR: It is proposed that this scale-invariant representation of temporal stimulus history could serve as an underlying representation accessible to higher-level behavioral and cognitive mechanisms and sketch applications using minimal performance functions to problems in classical conditioning, interval timing, scale-Invariant learning in autoshaping, and the persistence of the recency effect in episodic memory across timescales.
Abstract: We propose a principled way to construct an internal representation of the temporal stimulus history leading up to the present moment. A set of leaky integrators performs a Laplace transform on the stimulus function, and a linear operator approximates the inversion of the Laplace transform. The result is a representation of stimulus history that retains information about the temporal sequence of stimuli. This procedure naturally represents more recent stimuli more accurately than less recent stimuli; the decrement in accuracy is precisely scale invariant. This procedure also yields time cells that fire at specific latencies following the stimulus with a scale-invariant temporal spread. Combined with a simple associative memory, this representation gives rise to a moment-to-moment prediction that is also scale invariant in time. We propose that this scale-invariant representation of temporal stimulus history could serve as an underlying representation accessible to higher-level behavioral and cognitive mechanisms. In order to illustrate the potential utility of this scale-invariant representation in a variety of fields, we sketch applications using minimal performance functions to problems in classical conditioning, interval timing, scale-invariant learning in autoshaping, and the persistence of the recency effect in episodic memory across timescales.