TL;DR: The present state of customary international law regarding expropriation of alien property has remained obscure in its basic aspects; this is true in particular for expropriations in the context of North-South relations, to which this article is primarily, but not exclusively, addressed as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The continuous stream of resolutions of the UN General Assembly and much academic writing on the subject notwithstanding, the present state of customary international law regarding expropriation of alien property has remained obscure in its basic aspects; this is true in particular for expropriations in the context of North-South (still better described as “West-South”) relations, to which this article is primarily, but not exclusively, addressed. International courts have had no occasion to rule on fundamental issues of expropriation law in the past decades, even though these issues have been relevant to various disputes settled out of court. Eventually, however, the courts will be confronted with cases involving expropriation of alien property: given the continuing and rising importance of foreign investment, the parties involved probably will not invariably prefer negotiated settlements. It must also be recalled here that customary law has occasionally served as a reference standard in treaties and contracts. If an expropriation case were brought before an international tribunal, it could not simply rule that the law governing expropriation of alien property is in dispute and therefore no law at all is applicable. The very notion of international law precludes an argument that acknowledges the existence of “gray areas” in that law: a court could not rule that some law exists, but that it cannot be identified by judicial means.
TL;DR: In this article, an empirical investigation of the mental health review tribunal decision-making process is presented, focusing on the interpretation and application of mental health legislation by individual tribunal members and the manner in which these individual approaches are qualified in the group context.
Abstract: This paper is concerned with the operation of the Mental Health Review Tribunal system and summarizes the findings of an empirical investigation of tribunal decision making. The tribunals constitute an independent body which reviews the necessity for the continued compulsory detention of patients in psychiatric hospitals. The research focuses on the interpretation and application of mental health legislation by individual tribunal members and the manner in which these individual approaches are qualified in the group context. The study comprises three stages: a self-report questionnaire, a national statistical analysis of decisions, and a simulation study of decision making using a videotape of a hypothetical case. The research establishes considerable inconsistency in tribunal decision making at both an individual and group level and attributes some of this inconsistency to individually based factors isolated by the research. The findings further indicate that these factors remain influential within the group decision-making context.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors apply theories of regulation to the study of Australian industrial relations and develop an activist model of tribunal decision-making, which balances the interests of the parties with their interpretations of what the problems of the moment require.
Abstract: Australian industrial relations research does not have a strong analytical or concep tual tradition. This paper applies theories of regulation to the study of Australian industrial relations. Theories of regulation are a new multi-disciplinary area of research which has developed in the last decade in North America. Public interest, life cycle, capture, bargaining, behavioural and jurisprudence theories are examined. The survival thesis is rejecied because of its assumption of passivity. An activist model of tribunal decision making is developed. Industrial tribunals balance the interests of the parties with their interpretations of what the problems of the moment require.
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that a religiously neutral adjudication is normally possible, making it unnecessary to pay the price of abstention, and that the alternative of a religiously-based adjudication one which favors a faction on the basis of its religious beliefs-is unlikely to meet constitutional requirements.
Abstract: Any organization may experience internal dissension. If the dispute continues, one faction may seek a judicial resolution. If the organization is a church, however, concern over the propriety of state intervention may cause a court to refrain from deciding the dispute. If the court decides that the religion clauses of the Constitution call for complete autonomy for the religious organization, it will refuse to hear the dispute, granting the organization immunity from judicial dispute resolution. The price of immunity, however, is denying church members ordinarily available remedies, solely on account of the religious nature of the organization in which the corporation, contract, or trust dispute arose. When a court refuses to adjudicate church disputes, it may sacrifice members' contractual interests and religious freedom. There is thus a tension between autonomy for the church and some of the very values that such autonomy might at first be assumed to further.This article suggests a resolution to this tension. In so doing, the Article assumes that the goal is a religiously neutral adjudication: one that neither advances nor retards a church faction on the basis of its religious views. The alternative of a religiously-based adjudication one which favors a faction on the basis of its religious beliefs-is unlikely to meet constitutional requirements. The only other alternative is to refuse to decide church disputes, an approach that would satisfy the goal of avoiding entanglement at the price of members' rights and church organizing ability. This article shows why a religiously neutral adjudication is normally possible, making it unnecessary to pay the price of abstention.
TL;DR: The Nuremberg Trials as discussed by the authors brought the principal surviving representatives of the Nazi regime to trial, including Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, Goebbels and Bormann.
Abstract: Just thirty-five years ago Europeans were settling down to enjoy their first summer of general peace since the outbreak of the second world war. By the time that the Pacific conflict ended in midAugust 1945 the task of dealing with the principal surviving representatives of the Nazi regime was already well in hand. Two days after the Hiroshima explosion the American, British, Soviet, and French governments completed the delicate negotiations which enabled them to sign in London an agreement aimed at bringing those Germans to trial before a court specially fashioned for the purpose. Towards the end of November the resulting four-power International Military Tribunal commenced its hearings, under the presidency of Lord Justice Geoffrey Lawrence. The venue was Nuremberg, city of Albrecht Diirer and Hans Sachs, but also the city of Hitler's party rallies and of Streicher the Jew-baiter. Among those who had not survived to be indicted were Himmler and Goebbels and, of course, the Fuhrer himself. The final tally of defendants came to twenty-two, including the missing Bormann who was prosecuted in absentia. At the head of those actually in the dock stood Goering, Hess, and Ribbentrop, together with two generals and two admirals. Overall, the prisoners had been selected as representing the major administrative groupings within the Nazi regime. Twelve men were charged under all four broad headings of indictment, and each of the others was accused under at least two. The first count covered the formulation or execution of 'a common plan or conspiracy'; the second, 'crimes against peace'; the third, 'war crimes'; and the fourth, 'crimes against humanity'. By devising this last category the makers of the London Agreement were seeking to convey that the Nazis had often gone beyond war crimes as conventionally understood, to another level of quite consciously
TL;DR: In this article, the impact of the Prices Justification Tribunal on firms' markup has been investigated and it is shown that although a statistically significant downward effect on firms" markup can be attributed to the tribunal, in numerical terms the effect has been very small.
Abstract: In 1973 the Prices Justification Tribunal was established and given certain powers over the price-setting practices of large firms in Australia. This paper addresses itself to the impact of that body on firms' markup. Using a large sample of Australian firms observed from 1969 to 1978, this paper establishes evidence that although a statistically significant downward effect on firms' markup can be attributed to the tribunal, in numerical terms the effect has been very small.
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that a religiously neutral adjudication is normally possible, making it unnecessary to pay the price of abstention, and that the alternative of a religiously-based adjudication one which favors a faction on the basis of its religious beliefs-is unlikely to meet constitutional requirements.
Abstract: Any organization may experience internal dissension. If the dispute continues, one faction may seek a judicial resolution. If the organization is a church, however, concern over the propriety of state intervention may cause a court to refrain from deciding the dispute. If the court decides that the religion clauses of the Constitution call for complete autonomy for the religious organization, it will refuse to hear the dispute, granting the organization immunity from judicial dispute resolution. The price of immunity, however, is denying church members ordinarily available remedies, solely on account of the religious nature of the organization in which the corporation, contract, or trust dispute arose. When a court refuses to adjudicate church disputes, it may sacrifice members' contractual interests and religious freedom. There is thus a tension between autonomy for the church and some of the very values that such autonomy might at first be assumed to further.This article suggests a resolution to this tension. In so doing, the Article assumes that the goal is a religiously neutral adjudication: one that neither advances nor retards a church faction on the basis of its religious views. The alternative of a religiously-based adjudication one which favors a faction on the basis of its religious beliefs-is unlikely to meet constitutional requirements. The only other alternative is to refuse to decide church disputes, an approach that would satisfy the goal of avoiding entanglement at the price of members' rights and church organizing ability. This article shows why a religiously neutral adjudication is normally possible, making it unnecessary to pay the price of abstention.
TL;DR: In this article, an empirical investigation of the mental health review tribunal decision-making process is presented, focusing on the interpretation and application of mental health legislation by individual tribunal members and the manner in which these individual approaches are qualified in the group context.
Abstract: This paper is concerned with the operation of the Mental Health Review Tribunal system and summarizes the findings of an empirical investigation of tribunal decision making. The tribunals constitute an independent body which reviews the necessity for the continued compulsory detention of patients in psychiatric hospitals. The research focuses on the interpretation and application of mental health legislation by individual tribunal members and the manner in which these individual approaches are qualified in the group context. The study comprises three stages: a self-report questionnaire, a national statistical analysis of decisions, and a simulation study of decision making using a videotape of a hypothetical case. The research establishes considerable inconsistency in tribunal decision making at both an individual and group level and attributes some of this inconsistency to individually based factors isolated by the research. The findings further indicate that these factors remain influential within the group decision-making context.
TL;DR: In this paper, a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of legislation which seeks to give employees protection against unfair dismissal is presented, based on the results of actual Tribunal cases, and the results are analyzed using the results from actual tribunal cases.
Abstract: Paul Lewis offers a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of legislation which seeks to give employees protection against unfair dismissal. In assessing the legislation, he analyses the results of actual Tribunal cases.
TL;DR: Navarro as discussed by the authors was a member of the Tribunal on El Salvador which met in Mexico City on February 9-11, and since there was a total blackout in the U.S. media on the work of this Tribunal, and even on its very existence, we are taking the unusual course of publishing this summary report by one of its members on the hearings and findings of the tribunal.
Abstract: As explained in the report which follows, Dr. Navarro, Professor of Public Health at The Johns Hopkins University, was a member of the Tribunal on El Salvador which met in Mexico City on February 9-11. The full report of the Tribunal, together with supporting documents and legal argumentation, will be published by the secretariat of the Tribunal, but unfortunately this will take time and money. Meanwhile, the situation in El Salvador both domestically and internationally becomes graver with every day that passes. In these circumstances, and since there was a total blackout in the U.S. media on the work of the Tribunal, and even on its very existence, we are taking the unusual course of publishing this summary report by one of its members on the hearings and findings of the Tribunal. Correspondence concerning the Tribunal and its activities should be addressed to: Permanent Tribunal of the Peoples, Via Dogana Vecchia 5, 00186 Rome, Italy. Dr. Navarro closes his report with an urgent appeal to readers to make known its contents as widely as possible and to do everything within their power to halt the genocide now taking place in El Salvador. We strongly support this appeal and call attention to the recently formed Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). National headquarters are in Washington (P.O. # 12056, Washington, D.C. 20005. Tel.: 1-202-887-5019). The New York Committee is located at 853 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10011. Tel.: 1-212-473-4848. At the time of writing in early March over 100 local committees have been formed around the country. For further information contact the Washington office. —The EditorsThis article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.
TL;DR: Bell v Flaming Steer Steak House (1980) was the first sexual harassment decision issued by a human rights tribunal in Canada as discussed by the authors, and the decision is critiqued for its insufficient analytical insight into a complex subject matter.
Abstract: Bell v Flaming Steer Steak House (1980) was the first sexual harassment decision issued by a human rights tribunal in Canada. Ontario adjudicator Owen Shime decided that sexual harassment constituted sex discrimination as prohibited by the Ontario Human Rights Code. This case comment examines the process by which the tribunal reached its conclusion, and discusses the legal problems raised by sexual harassment complaints. The decision is critiqued for its insufficient analytical insight into a complex subject matter. The author calls for legislation that specifically addresses sexual exploitation rather than diffusing the focus with questions of the link between sexual harassment and sex discrimination.
TL;DR: The legal profession has for so long been accustomed to the idea of decisions being able to be reviewed through a hierarchy of courts that it has come to regard this practice as ordained as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The legal profession has for so long been accustomed to the idea of decisions being able to be reviewed through a hierarchy of courts that it has come to regard this practice as ordained. It is true that some limitations on appeals are included in legislation but these are in the main based on monetary limits and are less concerned with the nature of the subjectmatter under appeal. There is a pervading notion that ultimately a \"right\" decision will be given by an appellate court. If all cases could only reach the final appeal court, correct decisions would always be obtained. This pursuit of the grail of the right decision will, in fairness, be affected by the view of a litigant's legal adviser as to whether or not an appeal is likely to succeed. But the bringing of an appeal is as likely to be affected by the depth of the client's pocket and the effect that the delays encountered in the appeal process will have on him. The wealthy litigant whose affairs are not disadvantaged by the need to resolve speedily the issue between him and his opponent has available the luxury of multiple opportunities to attempt the resolution of a dispute. The possibility of litigation advancing through a series of courts with the consequent burden of costs is often a deterrent to action being brought. The courts may be open to all but they are really only available to those who can afford to pay or who can so arrange their affairs as to be able to afford to lose. Whether it is right that multiple avenues of appeal should be provided litigants in the courts is a question not relevant to this article. The issue here is whether it is appropriate that tribunals should become an adjunct to this system. Should a person who seeks review of a governmental decision by a tribunal find himself caught in a series of appeals from that tribunal decision? It will be submitted that he should not be subject to this risk because the tribunal is there to provide a function different from that which has resulted in the perceived need for there to be a hierarchy of courts. The role of the courts is not only to resolve the dispute before it but also to state the relevant law correctly. In many areas the courts will be themselves making the law-a law that has been developed and moulded by them over many years without legislative intervention. But more likely nowadays is that the courts will be involved in the interpretation of a statute and, in fulfilling this duty, the courts will be indicating to members of the community how they should go about organizing their affairs to comply with the directives of the legislature. Our society thus has a system whereby experts in the law specify what the law is and apply that law so expounded to the facts that have brought the dispute before the court. The function of tribunals is very different. At the federal level a tribunal cannot