Topic
Transferable utility
About: Transferable utility is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1107 publications have been published within this topic receiving 23194 citations.
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Papers
Book•
1 Oct 1977
TL;DR: In this article, a new approach to game theory and to the analysis of social behavior has been proposed, based on rational-choice models of social behaviour under certainty, risk, and uncertainty.
Abstract: Part I. Preliminaries: 1. Bargaining-equilibrium analysis: a new approach to game theory and to the analysis of social behavior 2. Rational-choice models of social behavior 3. Rational behavior under certainty, risk, and uncertainty 4. Morality and social welfare A constructive approach Part II. General principles: 5. Some basic concepts of game theory 6. Rationality postulates for game situations 7. The four basic problems facing the players of a game Part III. Solutions for specific classes of games: 8. Two-person simple bargaining games: the Nash solution 9. General two-person cooperative games 10. n-Person simple bargaining games 11. n-Person cooperative games with transferable utility: the modified Shapley value 12. n-person cooperative games: the general case 13. n-Person cooperative games: discriminatory solutions 14. Noncooperative and almost-noncooperative games.
1,302 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the problem of maximizing the expected utility of terminal wealth in the framework of a general incomplete semimartingale model of a financial market and showed that the necessary and sufficient condition on a utility function for the validity of several key assertions of the theory to hold true is the requirement that the asymptotic elasticity of the utility function is strictly less then one.
Abstract: The paper studies the problem of maximizing the expected utility of terminal wealth in the framework of a general incomplete semimartingale model of a financial market. We show that the necessary and sufficient condition on a utility function for the validity of several key assertions of the theory to hold true is the requirement that the asymptotic elasticity of the utility function is strictly less then one. (author's abstract)
1,191 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a real-valued function P is defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable utility, satisfying the following condition: in every game, the marginal contributions of all players (according to P) are efficient (i.e., add up to the worth of the grand coalition).
Abstract: Let P be a real-valued function defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable utility, satisfying the following condition: In every game, the marginal contributions of all players (according to P) are efficient (i.e., add up to the worth of the grand coalition). It is proved that there exists just one such function P--called the potential--and moreover that the resulting payoff vector coincides with the Shapley value. The potential approach yields other characterizations for the value; in particular, in terms of a new internal consistency property. Further results deal with weighted values and with the nontransferable utility case. Copyright 1989 by The Econometric Society.
834 citations
TL;DR: In this article, nonwmmetric Shapley values for coalitional form games with transferable utility were studied and axiomatically it is shown that two families of solutions of this type are possible.
Abstract: Nonwmmetric Shapley values for coalitional form games with transferable utility are studied. The nonsymmetries are modeled through nonsymmetric weight systems defined on the players of the games. It is shown axiomatically that two families of solutions of this type are possible. These families are strongly related to each other through the duality relationship on games. While the first family lends itself to applications of nonsymmetric revenue sharing problems the second family is suitable for applications of cost allocation problems. The intersection of these two families consists essentially of the symmetric Shapley value. These families are also char- acterized by a prObabilistic arrival time to the game approach. It is also demonstrated that lack of symmetries may arise naturally when players in a game represent nonequal size constituencies.
431 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting, and focus on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is sufficiently large.
Abstract: The authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is sufficiently large. It is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for some or all orders of proposer. However, efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as 'delta' approaches one. Strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high 'delta'.
414 citations
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| 2025 | 4 |
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| 2020 | 52 |