TL;DR: The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides Gregory Vlastos 13 The Third Man Again P. T. Geach 14 Postscript to the Third Man: a Reply to Mr Geach G.E. Owen as discussed by the authors 15 A Proof in the Peri Ideon G. E. Owen 16.
Abstract: Preface. Introduction 1. The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas H. F. Cherniss 2. Logos and Forms in Plato R. C. Cross 3. Logos and Forms in Plato: a Reply to Professor Cross R. S. Bluck 4. Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues R.E. Allen 5. Mathematics and Dialectic in the Republic VI-VII F. M. Cornford 6. Plato's Parmenides Gilbert Ryle 7. Plato's Parmenides W. G. Runciman 8. Knowledge and Forms in Plato's Theaetetus Winifred F. Hicken 9. Symploke Eidon J. L. Akrill 10. Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-9 J. L. Akrill 11. Plato's Description of Division A. C. Lloyd 12. The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides Gregory Vlastos 13 The Third Man Again P. T. Geach 14 Postscript to the Third Man: a Reply to Mr Geach Gregory Vlastos 15 A Proof in the Peri Ideon G.E.L. Owen 16. The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues G. E. L. Owen 17. The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues H. F. Cherniss 18. The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus Gregory Vlastos 19. Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's Timaeus Glenn R. Morrow 20. Plato's Theism R. Hackforth. Index Locorum
TL;DR: In this paper, a way of understanding the self-predication premise of the third man argument which Plato used against himself is proposed, which fulfills some of the desiderata for a good interpretation of Plato: it is not unreasonable by itself; it is formally consistent with the other premises of the three men, singly and jointly; it could have seemed that the argument containing the premise was a serious threat to the theory of forms, as Plato evidently feared.
Abstract: I PROPOSE a way of understanding the self-predication premise of the third man argument which Plato used against himself. The way I propose fulfills some of the desiderata for a good interpretation of Plato: it is not unreasonable by itself; it is formally consistent with the other premises of the third man, singly and jointly;' it could have seemed that the argument containing the premise was a serious threat to the theory of forms, as Plato evidently feared (Parmenides I 35A-B). I do not, however, intend to say that therefore my proposal gives what Plato meant. Section VI explains what I do intend.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an alternative account of the Third Man Argument (TMA) and argue that it is unlikely that the theory of predication and the categories developed as a result of reflection on the TMA.
Abstract: In his British Academy lecture, "The Platonism of Aristotle", Professor G.E.L. Owen provides an account of how Aristotle arrived at his theory of predication and the categories.' He argues that both developed as a result of Aristotle's criticism of Plato, in particular as a result of his reflection on the Third Man Argument (TMA). In this paper I present an alternative account of Aristotle's response to the TMA. If this account is correct, it is unlikely that Aristotle's theory of predication and the categories developed as a result of reflection on the TMA.