Targeting

Abstract: Targeting is used in military doctrine to describe a military operational way, using (military) means to influence a target (or addressee) in order to achieve designated political and/or military goals. The four factors italicized are used to analyse non-kinetic targeting, complementing our knowledge and understanding of the kinetic prevalence. Paradoxically, non-kinetic targeting is not recognized as a separate concept: kinetic and non-kinetic are intertwined facets of targeting.Kinetic targeting refers to the targeted application of military force based on the release or concentration of kinetic energy against opposing forces or objects with (primarily) lethal effects in the physical domain, whereas non-kinetic targeting describes the targeted application of (other military and non-military) capabilities against addressees to generate (additional) non-kinetic effects in the non-physical and physical domain.This chapter attempts to provide a better demarcation between kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, first by reviewing recent developments in military operations and targeting and introducing a ‘full spectrum approach’. It then enumerates and analyses a number of typical non-kinetic capabilities: information activities, key leader engagement, lawfare, criminal legal action, security detention, assets freezes and cyber operations.The chapter concludes that although non-kinetic targeting does not exist as a stand-alone concept, it is vitally important in contemporary military operations. It provides opportunities to engage and affect additional target audiences (including supporters) with less devastating effects including constructive effects), by offering additional means to conduct operations, stressing the crucial role of non-kinetic elements like information, perception, cohesion, understanding and will.

Abstract: : Joint targeting is a process that synchronizes all operational level targeting activities in support of the theater commander. The centerpiece of operational targeting is the joint targeting cycle, which is a six-step problem-solving methodology designed to derive rational targeting solutions from the theater commander's objectives and guidance. The purpose of this study is to expose the recurring deficiencies that pervade the joint targeting cycle so that meaningful steps may be undertaken to improve the process. This study analyzes the joint targeting cycle from the perspective of three distinct scenarios: (1) major theater war (DESERT STORM), (2) limited theater war (DELIBERATE FORCE), and (3) a small-scale contingency operation (DESERT STRIKE). Following a brief overview of the targeting architectures in each scenario, the investigation takes aim at the deficiencies that degraded the effectiveness of the joint targeting cycle. The evidence uncovered in the three case studies leads to the following conclusions: first, the inability to translate objectives and guidance into congruent targeting activities is a recurring deficiency within the joint targeting process; second, target analysis inadequately supports the joint targeting process; last, combat assessment does not provide meaningful and timely bomb damage assessment (BDA). Given the overwhelming military advantage the US currently enjoys, these joint targeting deficiencies, though serious, do not seem to be catastrophic. However, as the military "build down" continues to erode force structure, US military strength will become less of joint targeting deficiencies. Therefore, if the US is to preserve its military pre-eminence well into the next century, the problems that currently plague the joint targeting process must necessarily be confronted.

Abstract: : A hot topic in aerospace discussions today is targeting -- what, where, how, and when to do it to achieve the desired effects. This article argues that today the dominant mechanism and measurement for targeting is industrial-age utility and that in the future an equally important method should be targeting based on adversary leaders' values, depriving or holding at risk their ability to fulfill human needs. Our hypothesis is a simple one. We argue that today the dominant mechanism and measurement for targeting is industrial-age (or "second wave") utility and that in the information-age (or "third wave") future, an equally important method should be targeting based on value. Today we target infrastructure to deny warfighting utility. Tomorrow we should target to deprive leaders of the capacity to meet their needs: things that leaders must value.

Abstract: MILITARY THEORY provides valuable guidance on how to effectively exploit new technologies through its explanation of cause-and-effect relationships. Given the importance of air power to U.S. military strategy, air power targeting theory should play a key role in transformation decisions. U.S. Air Force leaders are advocating a targeting theory called effects-based operations (EBO) that is very similar to the functionally oriented targeting theory that airmen applied during World War II strategic bombing campaigns.1 As the name implies, functionally oriented targeting is designed to create effects that make it impossible for a specific system to perform a function that is vital to an enemy's ability or will to continue effective resistance. It calls for achieving systemwide functional effects without destroying a significant part of the entire system. Compared to attrition-oriented targeting that relies on achieving objectives through causing massive destruction, a functional orientation has the potential to provide many important advantages. These advantages are derived from the potential to achieve desired objectives faster and with far fewer casualties, whether those casualties are friendly, civilian, or enemy. Much of the current interest in the functionally oriented targeting theory can be traced to the ability of stealth and precision-guided munitions technologies to overcome the problems of high losses and poor accuracy that handicapped strategic attacks during World War II.2 Many air power supporters believe these technologies explain the dramatic outcome of Operation Desert Stom.3 They also assert that using the B-2 bomber and the global positioning system (GPS)-guided joint direct attack munition (JDAM) made a decisive contribution to Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.4 Although Air Force EBO discussions focus almost exclusively on the advantages associated with strategic targeting, recent developments in technology make it necessary to consider the advantages of a functional, rather than an attrition, orientation when targeting fielded land forces.5 Targeting Requirements To understand the transformation potential of functionally oriented targeting, it is necessary to apply a perspective to requirements that extends well beyond the survivability of attacking aircraft and the accuracy with which they can deliver their payloads. This wider perspective reveals that the viability of functionally oriented targeting, regardless of whether the target set is a strategic system or fielded land force, depends on meeting a set of five requirements, each of which is essential to success. Target identification. The first step in target identification is identifying the political, economic, and military systems that perform functions that are critical to a specific enemy's ability or will to resist. The next step is to identify critical elements, subsystems, or nodes that define a particular system. Identifying which specific elements make suitable targets requires analyzing how attacks against these elements will contribute to achieving the desired functional effects on the entire system. It also requires determining whether targeting specific elements could be counterproductive to the overall objective. For example, depending on the objective, it may not be acceptable to risk inflicting large numbers of civilian casualties even though targeting a specific element would render an entire vital system functionally ineffective. Target location. Once specific elements are identified as suitable targets, they must be located reliably and precisely; in darkness and adverse weather; despite enemy camouflage, concealment, and deception measures. Precision requires timely information when targets are mobile or relocatable. Effectiveness requires the ability to pass target location information directly to attacking weapon systems. Attack system survivability. The theory's feasibility requires that weapon systems, especially manned aircraft and uninhabited combat air vehicles, be able to deliver their munitions at an acceptably low risk of loss from an enemy's air defenses. …