TL;DR: The authors empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members, finding that the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence.
Abstract: I empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members. Consistent with moral hazard in monitoring, the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate information asymmetry problems. SYNDICATED LOANS ARE A LARGE and increasingly important source of corporate finance. Nonfinancial U.S. businesses obtain almost $1 trillion in new syndicated loans each year, which represents approximately 15% of their aggregate debt outstanding, and of the largest 500 nonfinancial firms in the Compustat universe in 2002, almost 90% obtained a syndicated loan between 1994 and 2002. Indeed, according to the American Banker, syndicated lending represents 51% of U.S. corporate finance originated, and generates more underwriting revenue for the financial sector than both equity and debt underwriting (Weidner (2000)). The market for syndicated loans has also experienced strong growth, going from $137 million in 1987 to over $1 trillion today. However, despite the importance of syndicated loans, research on their role in U.S. corporate finance is limited. A syndicated loan is a loan whereby at least two lenders jointly offer funds to a borrowing firm. The “lead arranger” establishes a relationship with the firm, negotiates terms of the contract, and guarantees an amount for a price range.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments and provide initial evidence on the evolution of VC networks.
Abstract: Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm's-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments. VC firms that enjoy more influential network positions have significantly better fund performance, as measured by the proportion of investments that are successfully exited through an IPO or sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better-networked VC firms are significantly more likely to survive to subsequent financing and to eventual exit. Finally, we provide initial evidence on the evolution of VC networks.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define a syndicate to be a group of individual decision makers who must make a common decision under uncertainty, and who, as a result, will receive jointly a payoff to be shared among them.
Abstract: WE SHALL DEFINE a syndicate to be a group of individual decision makers who must make a common decision under uncertainty, and who, as a result, will receive jointly a payoff to be shared among them. Our concern is to analyze the decision process of a syndicate when the members have diverse risk tolerances and/or diverse probability assessments of the uncertain events affecting the payoff. Of particular interest is the possiblity of constructing a surrogate "group utility function" and a surrogate "group probability assessment." Such constructions potentially have a role in the theory of finance; e.g., for determining the forms of organizational charters and financial instruments, as well as the modes of delegating the group decision process to professional managers. The present treatment, however, is confined to tractable features embodying only a small measure of the complexity of practical situations. Of comparable importance are the ramifications for welfare theory; in particular, we shall be able to specify conditions under which Pareto optimal behavior by the group satisfies the Savage axioms [15] foy consistent decision making under uncertainty, and to isolate the inconsistent characteristics in the contrary case. Arrow's original treatise [1] has been the source of most of the work on group decision theory. Marschak [13], Radner [17], and Bower [6] have considered the case of a team, in which there is a joint utility function for the members. Harsanyi [9] and Theil [16] have considered the criterion that the group decisions satisfy the Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, and others. Madansky [12] has imposed the "external Bayes axiom" in the case of a common utility function but differing probability assessments among the members. Christenson [7] has constructed an axiomatic system for the case of an investment banking syndicate that is a special case of the present study, except for certain institutional factors. Borch [3, 4, 5]
TL;DR: This article examined three rationales for the syndication of venture capital investments, using a sample of 271 private biotechnology firms, and argued that the results are consistent with the proposed explanations.
Abstract: This paper examines three rationales for the syndication of venture capital investments, using a sample of 271 private biotechnology firms. Syndication is commonplace, even in the first-round investments. Experienced venture capitalists primarily syndicate first-round investments to venture investors with similar levels of experience. In later rounds, established venture capitalists syndicate investments to both their peers and to less experienced capita) providers. When experienced venture capitalists invest for the first time in later rounds, the firm is usually doing well. Syndication also often insures that the ownership stake of the venture capitalist stays constant in later venture rounds. I argue that the results are consistent with the proposed explanations.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors estimate the cost arising from information asymmetry between the lead bank and members of the lending syndicate and find that it accounts for approximately 4% of the total cost of credit.