About: Sunset provision is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 182 publications have been published within this topic receiving 1386 citations. The topic is also known as: sunset clause.
TL;DR: Howard's "In Search of Excellence" as mentioned in this paper is a polemic against the excess of regulation in the U.S. legal system, and it is not clear whether Howard's book is a harangue against regulation or not.
Abstract: If Howard plays his cards right, he may be on the brink of creating his own intemal industry along the lines of Peters and Waterman's, "In Search of Excellence." There appears to be a broad range of acceptance of his views on the excesses of regulation. President Clinton recently shared the same stage with Howard when he aligned himself with the popular intention of reducing big govemment. Senator Dole and the democratic Govemor of Florida, Lawton Chiles, have also embraced Howard's book. Even outside the United States, other countries seem to be changing course toward a reduction in govemment and regulation. For example, France elected conservative, Jacques Chirac, and a conservative recently won office in a Canadian province. It is not clear whether Howard's book is a harangue against regulation or the U.S. legal system. Does the latter lead to the excess of the former? Because Howard is a corporate lawyer, his polemic is all the more compelling. Howard proposes the notion of a "regulatory budget" (pp. 9, 26). This has been seen before under the mbric of "sunset laws," in which regulations are evaluated periodically according to certain criteria to justify the continuation of the regulations. Howard notes lawmakers' zest for promulgating regulations, but their lack of enthusiasm for reducing them. Evaluating regulations may be currently revived in the proposed legislation in the Senate, which would require cost/benefit analysis to be undertaken before any proposed regulations can be adopted. At the heart of Howard's concem is the seemingly wrong tum the United States has taken in trying to solve every national problem with detailed regulations. It would be better to allow the nation's administrators to use a little common sense, judgment, and discretion. Indeed, the common law is based on such a premise; namely, past experience with legal matters accumulated over time in the form of legal precedent provides the guidelines for evaluating future legal issues. The situation is further exacerbated by the deluge of regulations, as well as the ridiculousness of so many of them. According to the author, if only Americans could rely on lawyer friendly terms of art, such as the reasonable man standard and good faith (pp. 23, 24), society would be better served. Yet, Howard also expresses fmstration with those administrators in the school systems who "knew, or reasonably should have known" (p. 128) that their disciplinary actions were violating the constitutional rights of students. His embracing of the reasonable man standard is difficult to fit with its application in reality. Anyone who has attempted to study antitmst law in which the mle of reason standard is applied, knows the frustration in trying to apply a standard (1) when the plaintiff has the burden to show that the conduct in question is more anticompetitive than procompetitive in the relevant geographic and product markets and (2) when the defendant has not employed the least restrictive competitive altemative in restraining trade. Howard correlates the regulatory mess the United States is in to trends or political eras. Prior to the tum of the century, the United States was relatively free of regulations and statutes. Rules and regulations began to replace the common law around the late 1800s, with tmst-busting legislation and laws dealing with child labor. The New Deal, under President Franklin Roosevelt, put the United States on the road to a regulated economy. President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, with Medicare, work safety, and civil rights laws, capped the progression (pp. 24-28).
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that when used in response to flawed elections, power sharing agreements adversely affect government performance and democratization, and suggest that the drawbacks of inclusive institutions can be moderated by options such as sunset clauses, evenhanded prosecution of human rights violations, and by strengthening checks on executive authority.
Abstract: Power sharing agreements have been widely used in Africa as paths out of civil war. However the research focus on conflict mitigation provides an inadequate guide to recent cases such as Kenya and Zimbabwe. When used in response to flawed elections, pacts guaranteeing political inclusion adversely affect government performance and democratization. Political inclusion in these cases undermines vertical relationships of accountability, increases budgetary spending, and creates conditions for policy gridlock. Analysis using three salient dimensions highlights these negative effects: origin distinguishes extra-constitutional pacts from coalitions produced by more stable institutions, function contrasts post-war cases from scenarios where the state itself faces less risk, and time horizon refers to dilemmas which weigh long term costs versus short term benefits. The conclusion suggests that the drawbacks of inclusive institutions can be moderated by options such as sunset clauses, evenhanded prosecution of human rights violations, and by strengthening checks on executive authority.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a critical review of the ladder-of-investment approach by setting out its two underlying assumptions and discussing their validity with references to the related industrial organization literature.
Abstract: The “ladder of investment†is a regulatory approach proposed by Cave (2006), which has been widely embraced by national regulatory authorities in the European telecommunications sector. The approach entails providing entrants, successively, with different levels of access—the “rungs†of the investment ladder, while inducing them to climb the ladder by setting an access charge that increases over time or by withdrawing access obligations after some pre-determined date (i.e., by setting sunset clauses). Proponents of the ladder of investment approach claim that such regulatory measures would make service-based entry and facility-based entry complements—albeit they have been traditionally viewed as substitutes—in promoting competition. The regulators, thus, have shown a strong interest in this approach. The paper provides a critical review of the ladder of investment approach by setting out its two underlying assumptions and discussing their validity with references to the related industrial organization literature.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine some of the key aspects of treaty law as they relate to the termination of international investment agreements (IIAs) and examine the consequences of sunset clauses, introduced because of the long-term nature of foreign investments, which can make it harder for States to extract themselves from investment obligations.
Abstract: Recent developments in relation to the termination of international investment agreements (IIAs) raise a number of issues at the intersection of treaty law and investment law. This article examines some of the key aspects of treaty law as they relate to the termination of IIAs. The article addresses recent state practice in relation to the denunciation of or withdrawal from multi-party treaties related to investment including the ICSID Convention and the Energy Charter Treaty, leading to complicated questions about the effective date of termination and the implications for new or ongoing investment claims. The article also examines the unilateral termination of bilateral treaties, for example by South Africa and Indonesia, and the mutual termination of such treaties, for example within the European Union and as a result of conclusion of newer treaties such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In this regard, the article considers the consequences of sunset clauses, introduced because of the long-term nature of foreign investments, which can make it harder for States to extract themselves from investment obligations. These developments highlight the importance of clarity in drafting termination clauses and agreeing to terminate an IIA, so as to avoid disputes about the impact of a survival clause or its interaction with general treaty law.
TL;DR: For example, this paper found that stock option plans have diverse "sunset" policies for modifying terms of options held by managers who exit the firm, and that these forfeiture, vesting, and expiration provisions are less generous in companies characterized by fast growth, dependence on skilled human capital, and high strategic interaction with competitors.