Sultanism

Abstract: There have always been ambiguous political regimes: neither fully democratic nor clear-cut authoritarian These political systems can persistently resist moving toward either democracy or authoritarianism They live as if they were frozen in a certain temporal sequence of political change Contemporary political science has a distinct subfield of democratic transitology, which claims to explain different trajectories of political change However, even the most advanced fivefold categorization of modern political regime types' developed by such distinguished scholars of the transition school as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) has a serious discrepancy when it comes to uncertain political systems As a partial solution of the problem of incomplete transitions, they have introduced a new category of sultanism to be used in reference to extremely patrimonial regimes that coalesce around a highly personalistic and dynastic-prone ruler who exercises power at his own unrestricted discretionIn addition, Houchang E Chehabi and Juan J Linz devoted a special volume to sultanistic regimes, which was published in 1998 In Sultanistic Regimes, they predicted that sultanism's reemergence should not be ruled out However, they could not expect their prophecy to be so promptly self-fulfilling Five years later (October 2003), Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev succeeded in transferring presidential power to his son, Ilham Aliyev Dynasticism was the first sign that the perception of Azerbaijan transitioning to democracy was at least overly optimistic Some analysts (Roeder 1994; Mamed-zadeh 2001), took another extreme They proposed to locate Azerbaijan on the continuum of authoritarian regimes However, some peculiarities of Azerbaijani regime give us a solid ground to claim that it does not fit the pure authoritarian model2In the light of these events, how can we treat post-Soviet Azerbaijan? Which conceptual framework should we think of? Currently, these and similar questions are asked about analogous cases where the character of the political regime is ambiguous In fact, these regimes fall into the gray zone The concept of the gray zone was introduced as a solution to the problem of identifying the growing quantity of hybrid political systemsThe problem of defining the gray zone regimes remains one of the central themes in contemporary transition and democracy studies In recent years, many political scientists have tried to solve this problem3 However, there is still no consensus on how to name the hybrid regimes4 Most recently, Thomas Carothers (2002a) pointed to the uselessness of associating hybrid regimes with democracy no matter which qualifier accompanies it For him, these regimes are not necessarily transitioning to democracy as transitology simplistically assumes In fact, they may not undergo any political change at all Nor do they unavoidably follow the teleological path from authoritarianism toward consolidated democracy There are some other alternative directions they might choose to follow Moreover, hybrid regimes can choose not to choose any of the existing directions or, worse, not to move at allMarina Ottaway joins Carothers's end of transition perspective Her 2003 book is an attempt to support Carothers's search for a new framework that can fill some important gaps in conventional transitology Ottaway (2003) inaugurates semiauthoritarianism as an appropriate framework for investigating hybrid regimes To demonstrate the advantages of her innovative frame, she applies semiauthoritarianism to some real-world cases (Egypt, Venezuela, Senegal, Croatia, and Azerbaijan) Postcommunist Azerbaijan appears in her study as an example of decaying semiauthoritarianism that is moving in an authoritarian direction5Ottaway's contribution to Azerbaijani studies is immense given the poor state of research on Azerbaijan, despite the increasing interest in Azerbaijan in the Western media and academia concerning the recent developments (see, for example, Mydans 2003; Weir 2003; Holley 2003; BBC News 2003a; Mulvey 2003; and Cohen 2003) …

Abstract: This paper proposes that under President Berdimuhamedov, the government of Turkmenistan has begun to move away from the ‘sultanism’ of the Niyazov era. Instead, the new government exhibits characteristics and has pursued policy changes that prepare conditions for the further development and entrenchment of localized networks of elites based on kinship. Such changes suggest that the government of Turkmenistan may develop into a more classic neopatrimonial system of authoritarian governance similar to the other post-Soviet republics in Central Asia. This argument is advanced by examining changes between the governments of former President Niyazov and Berdimuhamedov with regard to three areas of the Turkmen state's relationship with its constituent regions: regional composition of the national cabinet; hakim (governor) policy; and regional development. This examination relies largely on a comprehensive survey of online Turkmen state-media sources, as well as numerous supportive secondary sources.

Abstract: Modern democracies - theoretical debates and political choices totalitarianism, fascism, sultanism and authoritarianism consolidating democratic societies and regimes - case studies centre-periphery relationships in national and trans-national democratic politics. (Part contents)

Abstract: This thesis investigates why extreme forms of personal rule arise and endure in the contemporary international system. More particularly, it seeks to answer the puzzle of why the regime of President Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi), in the Central Asian republic of Turkmenistan, has paradoxically proven to be one of the region's most stable states between 1992 and 2006, notwithstanding the fact that it is characterised by Niyazov's unchecked personal power, barely functional political institutions, endemic corruption and a pervasive cult of personality. The study develops the theoretical approach most commonly applied to this type of regime and produces an original empirical study of a strategically important gas-rich state that has hitherto received almost no attention from the academic community. Specifically, the thesis engages with two theories of sultanistic regimes advanced in 1990 by H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. The research findings demonstrate that, while the essential insights of the theories remain valid, they require careful revision and refinement if they are to successfully incorporate postcommunist regimes into their paradigm. The project uses a mixture of interviews, field observation, and primary and secondary documents to answer the research problem. It finds that the structural legacies of the pre Soviet and Soviet period, allied to a favourable strategic context, enabled Niyazov to secure power and sideline potential rivals. The thesis argues that a combination of different domestic control techniques, of which the cult of personality forms an essential part, has been deployed by Niyazov to maintain his position. Taken together, these techniques form a 'disciplinary-symbolic' nexus aimed at preventing the emergence of opposition groups, while simultaneously promoting Niyazov as the sole guarantor of national unity and prosperity. The thesis also explores popular responses to sultanism, concluding that Turkmen adopt a complex and contradictory web of personal strategies in their dealings with the regime, ranging from engagement, accommodation and indifference, through to covert resistance and outright opposition. Finally, the thesis assesses the interaction between sultanistic regimes and external actors. It finds that, far from exposing rulers to greater pressure from the international community, the end of the Cold War actually increased the autonomy of many sultanistic rulers. No longer shackled by the disciplines of superpower patronage, most sultanistic rulers, including Niyazov, have been able to function with minimal constraints on their domestic behaviour.