Sudden stop

Abstract: In this paper we present evidence that capital account reversals have become more severe for emerging markets. Because policy options are limited in the midst of a capital market crisis and because so many countries have already had crises recently, we focus on some of the policies that could reduce the incidence of crises in the first place, or at least make the sudden stop problem less severe. In this regard, we consider the relative merits of capital controls and dollarization. We conclude that, while the evidence suggests that capital controls appear to influence the composition of flows skewing flows away from short maturities, such policies are not likely to be a long-run solution to the recurring problem of sudden capital flow reversals. Yet, because fear of floating, many emerging markets are likely to turn to increased reliance on controls. Dollarization would appear to have the edge as a more marketoriented option to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the sudden stop problem.

Abstract: Using a sample of 32 developed and developing countries we analyze the empirical characteristics of Sudden Stops in capital flows and the relevance of balance sheet effects in the likelihood of their materialization. We find that large real exchange rate (RER) fluctuations coming hand in hand with Sudden Stops are basically an emerging market (EM) phenomenon. Sudden Stops seem to come in bunches, grouping together countries that are different in many respects. However, countries are similar in that they remain vulnerable to large RER fluctuations - be it because they could be forced to large adjustments in the absorption of tradable goods, and/or because the size of dollar liabilities in the banking system (i.e., domestic liability dollarization, or DLD) is high. Openness, understood as a large supply of tradable goods that reduces leverage over the current account deficit, coupled with DLD, are key determinants of the probability of Sudden Stops. The relationship between Openness and DLD in the determination of the probability of Sudden Stops is highly non-linear, implying that the interaction of high current account leverage and high dollarization may be a dangerous cocktail.

Abstract: We construct housing price indices for 120 major cities in China in 2003-2013 based on sequential sales of new homes within the same housing developments. By using these indices and detailed information on mortgage borrowers across these cities, we find enormous housing price appreciation during the decade, which was accompanied by equally impressive growth in household income, except in a few first-tier cities. While bottom-income mortgage borrowers endured severe financial burdens by using price-to-income ratios over eight to buy homes, their participation in the housing market remained steady and their mortgage loans were protected by down payments commonly in excess of 35 percent. As such, the housing market is unlikely to trigger an imminent financial crisis in China, even though it may crash with a sudden stop in the Chinese economy and act as an amplifier of the initial shock.

Abstract: The 1990s emerging-markets crises were characterized by sudden reversals in inflows of foreign capital followed by unusually large declines in current account deficits, private expenditures, production, and prices of nontradable goods relative to tradables. This paper shows that these Sudden Stops can be the outcome of the equilibrium dynamics of a flexible-price economy with imperfect credit markets. Foreign debt is denominated in units of tradables and a liquidity constraint links credit-market access to the income generated in the nontradables sector and the relative price of nontradables. Sudden Stops occur when real shocks of foreign or domestic origin, or policy-induced shocks make this constraint binding. Sudden Stops are not reflected in long-run business cycle statistics but still they entail nontrivial welfare costs. These results question crises-management policies seeking to impose direct controls on private capital flows and favor those that work to weaken credit frictions.