Topic
Strict liability
About: Strict liability is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 3995 publications have been published within this topic receiving 34998 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
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Papers
Book•
1 Jan 1990TL;DR: In Roman law, the concept of a contract is defined as a formal obligation and its implications: obligatio - conceptual and systematic foundations stipulatio alteri, representation, cession as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Part 1 Introduction - the concept of an obligation and its implications: obligatio - conceptual and systematic foundations stipulatio alteri, representation, cession. Part 2 Verbal obligations: stipulatio stipulatio poenae - conventional penalties suretyship. Part 3 Real obligations: mutuum - loan for consumption commodatum, depositum, pignus - loan for use, deposit, pledge. Part 4 Consensual obligations: emptio venditio I - sale (basic requirements) emptio venditio II - sale (main effects) emptio venditio III - sale (warranty of title and of proper quality) locatio conductio I - mainly lease locatio conductio II - contract of employment, contract for work mandatum - mandate excursus - negotiorum gestio societas - partnership. Part 5 Arrangements outside the contractual scheme of classical Roman law: donatio pacta and innominate real contracts. Part 6 General principles of contractual liability: formation of contract error - mistake interpretation of contracts metus and dolus - duress and fraud invalidity and reasons for invalidity condicio and dies - conditions and time clauses termination of obligations breach of contract. Part 7 Obligations arising neither from contract nor from delict: unjustified enrichment. Part 8 The law of delicts: delict in general furtum - theft Lex Aquilia I Lex Aquilia II actio iniuriarum - infringements of personality rights strict liability.
816 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compared strict liability and negligence rules on the basis of the incentives they provide to "appropriately" reduce accident losses, and showed that under the negligence rule, restaurants will decide to avoid liability by taking appropriate precautions to prepare meals under sanitary conditions.
Abstract: This chapter compares strict liability and negligence rules on the basis of the incentives they provide to "appropriately" reduce accident losses. Under strict liability, the outcome is efficient, and again the reasoning is a little different from that in the last subcase. Under the negligence rule, restaurants will decide to avoid liability by taking appropriate precautions to prepare meals under sanitary conditions. The unilateral case is studied for two reasons. First, it is descriptive of situations in which whatever changes in the behavior of victims that could reasonably be expected to result from changes in liability rules would have only a small influence on accident losses. The second reason is pedagogical; it is easier to understand the general bilateral case after having studied the unilateral case. In the bilateral case, two additional liability rules are considered, strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence and the negligence rule with that defense.
665 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formalized the analysis of the economic effects of liability rules and analyzed the effects of decentralizing the problem and using only liability rules to solve it in terms of a two-person non-cooperative game.
Abstract: RECENTLY there have appeared a number of important articles by both lawyers and economists analyzing the economic effects of liability rules.? This paper formalizes the analysis of these effects. When two parties, the injurer and the victim, can both take measures to reduce the likelihood of accidents, and the measures are costly for both, the standard theory of production with two inputs and one output yields the conditions for the socially optimal amount of each accident avoidance measure. The effects of decentralizing the problem and using only liability rules to solve it can then be analyzed in terms of a two-person noncooperative game. I first show that there is a complete symmetry within each of the following pairs of liability rules: no liability and strict liability; the negligence rule and strict liability with contributory negligence; and the negligence rule with contributory negligence and strict liability with what I call dual contributory negligence. An analysis of the legal standards for negligence follows. I show that there is an important ambiguity in the so-called "Learned Hand Rule" for determining the level of avoidance effort below which a party is adjudged negligent. Two of the formulations of the rule lead to inefficient results.
647 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are (ex post ) limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a risk-neutral agent.
614 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the possibility that individuals who cause personal injury or property damage may be found to be "judgment proof", that is, unable to pay fully the amount for which they have been found legally liable.
520 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 19 |
| 2024 | 28 |
| 2023 | 82 |
| 2022 | 107 |
| 2021 | 52 |
| 2020 | 71 |