Topic
Strict conditional
About: Strict conditional is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 180 publications have been published within this topic receiving 6646 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
1 Jan 1968
TL;DR: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is truth function of those propositions as mentioned in this paper, which has given rise to a number of philosophical problems.
Abstract: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is a truth function of those propositions I may know the truth values of “Willie Mays played in the American League” and “Willie Mays hit four hundred” without knowing whether or not Mays, would have hit four hundred if he had played in the American League This fact has tended to puzzle, displease, or delight philosophers, and many have felt that it is a fact that calls for some comment or explanation It has given rise to a number of philosophical problems; I shall discuss three of these
1,979 citations
Book•
1 Jan 1975TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that P.C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in the sense that if the antecedent became known, some of the previously asserted premises would have to be withdrawn.
Abstract: The standard use of the propositional calculus ('P.C.’) in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be ‘safely’ used. An alternative analysis of criteria of reasonableness of inferences in terms of conditions of justification rather than truth of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P. C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in the sense that if the antecedent became known, some of the previously asserted premises would have to be withdrawn.
982 citations
TL;DR: The truthful speaker wants not to assert falsehoods, wherefore he is willing to assert only what he takes to be very probably true as discussed by the authors, where assertability goes by subjective probability.
Abstract: The truthful speaker wants not to assert falsehoods, wherefore he is willing to assert only what he takes to be very probably true. He deems it permissible to assert that A only if P(A) is sufficiently close to 1, where P is the probability function that represents his system of degrees of belief at the time. Assertability goes by subjective probability.
944 citations
Book•
19 Jun 2003
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the subjectivity of Indicative Conditionals and their relation to the need for worlds and the necessity for worlds in the context of the references index of persons index of topics.
Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. The Material Condition: Grice 3. The Material Condition: Jackson 4. The Equation 5. The Equation Attacked 6. The Subjectivity of Indicative Conditionals 7. Indicative Conditionals Lack Truth Values 8. Uses of Indicative Conditionals 9. The Logic of Indicative Conditionals 10. Subjunctive Conditionals - First Steps 11. The Competition for 'Closest' 12. Unrolling from the Antecedent Time 13. Forks 14. Reflections on Legality 15. Truth at the Actual World 16. Subjunctive Conditionals and Probability 17. 'Even If...' 18. Backward Subjunctive Conditionals 19. Subjunctive Conditionals and Time's Arrow 20. Support Theories 21. The Need for Worlds 22. Relating the Two Kinds of Conditional 23. Unifying the Two Kinds of Conditional References Index of Persons Index of Topics
708 citations
Book•
1 Jan 1981
TL;DR: The Stalnaker-Lewis Theory of Conditionals has been studied extensively in the literature as discussed by the authors, including in the context of branching time and conditional probability theory of decision-making.
Abstract: 1: Introduction.- A Sketch of Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Conditionals.- 2: The Classic Stalnaker-Lewis Theory of Conditionals.- A Theory of Conditionals.- Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility.- A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.- 3. Conditionals and Subjective Conditional Probability (The Ramsey Test Paradigm).- Probability and Conditionals.- Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.- 4: Conditionals for Decision Making (Another Paradigm).- Letter to David Lewis.- Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.- 5: Indicative vs. Subjunctive Conditionals.- Indicative Conditionals.- Two Recent Theories of Conditionals.- Indicative Conditionals and Conditional Probability.- Indicative Conditionals and Conditional Probability: Reply to Pollock.- 6: Chance, Time, and the Subjunctive Conditional.- The Prior Propensity Account of Subjunctive Conditionals.- A Subjectivisms Guide to Objective Chance.- A Theory of Conditionals in the Context of Branching Time.- A Temporal Framework for Conditionals and Chance.
242 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 4 |
| 2019 | 1 |
| 2017 | 10 |
| 2016 | 5 |
| 2015 | 6 |
| 2014 | 7 |