Stateless protocol

Abstract: We present Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR), a novel routing protocol for wireless datagram networks that uses the positions of routers and a packet’s destination to make packet forwarding decisions. GPSR makes greedy forwarding decisions using only information about a router’s immediate neighbors in the network topology. When a packet reaches a region where greedy forwarding is impossible, the algorithm recovers by routing around the perimeter of the region. By keeping state only about the local topology, GPSR scales better in per-router state than shortest-path and ad-hoc routing protocols as the number of network destinations increases. Under mobility’s frequent topology changes, GPSR can use local topology information to find correct new routes quickly. We describe the GPSR protocol, and use extensive simulation of mobile wireless networks to compare its performance with that of Dynamic Source Routing. Our simulations demonstrate GPSR’s scalability on densely deployed wireless networks.

Abstract: In this paper, we present a real-time communication protocol for sensor networks, called SPEED. The protocol provides three types of real-time communication services, namely, real-time unicast, real-time area-multicast and real-time area-anycast. SPEED is specifically tailored to be a stateless, localized algorithm with minimal control overhead End-to-end soft real-time communication is achieved by maintaining a desired delivery speed across the sensor network through a novel combination of feedback control and non-deterministic geographic forwarding. SPEED is a highly efficient and scalable protocol for sensor networks where the resources of each node are scarce. Theoretical analysis, simulation experiments and a real implementation on Berkeley motes are provided to validate our claims.

Abstract: An application layer protocol is provided on top of HTTP 1.0/1.1 to allow for COM Automation objects to be invoked over the Internet through IIS/ISAPI servers. The format essentially encodes the automation object's name, method to invoke, and any [in], [out], [in, out] parameters that the method signature requires, packages them up into a custom MIME type and marshals it to the ISAPI dynamic link library (DLL) on the IIS/HTTP server. There, the ISAPI DLL contains the logic to unpack the SOAP request, parses it, creates the Automation object, invokes the method with the marshaled parameters, and then returns any [out] parameters to the caller/client using the SOAP protocol. It is a stateless protocol, meaning that object lifetimes only extend to one method, and are recreated between multiple calls to the object.

Abstract: We deal with the problem of a center sending a message to a group of users such that some subset of the users is considered revoked and should not be able to obtain the content of the message. We concentrate on the stateless receiver case, where the users do not (necessarily) update their state from session to session. We present a framework called the Subset-Cover framework, which abstracts a variety of revocation schemes including some previously known ones. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantees the security of a revocation algorithm in this class. We describe two explicit Subset-Cover revocation algorithms; these algorithms are very flexible and work for any number of revoked users. The schemes require storage at the receiver of log N and 1/2 log2 N keys respectively (N is the total number of users), and in order to revoke r users the required message lengths are of r log N and 2r keys respectively. We also provide a general traitor tracing mechanism that can be integrated with any Subset-Cover revocation scheme that satisfies a "bifurcation property". This mechanism does not need an a priori bound on the number of traitors and does not expand the message length by much compared to the revocation of the same set of traitors. The main improvements of these methods over previously suggested methods, when adopted to the stateless scenario, are: (1) reducing the message length to O(r) regardless of the coalition size while maintaining a single decryption at the user's end (2) provide a seamless integration between the revocation and tracing so that the tracing mechanisms does not require any change to the revocation algorithm.