About: Standard model (cryptography) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1927 publications have been published within this topic receiving 54967 citations. The topic is also known as: Plain model & Bare model.
TL;DR: In this article, a Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing, model selection, and accounting for model uncertainty is presented, which is straightforward through the use of the simple and accurate BIC approximation, and it can be done using the output from standard software.
Abstract: It is argued that P-values and the tests based upon them give unsatisfactory results, especially in large samples. It is shown that, in regression, when there are many candidate independent variables, standard variable selection procedures can give very misleading results. Also, by selecting a single model, they ignore model uncertainty and so underestimate the uncertainty about quantities of interest. The Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing, model selection, and accounting for model uncertainty is presented. Implementing this is straightforward through the use of the simple and accurate BIC approximation, and it can be done using the output from standard software. Specific results are presented for most of the types of model commonly used in sociology. It is shown that this approach overcomes the difficulties with P-values and standard model selection procedures based on them. It also allows easy comparison of nonnested models, and permits the quantification of the evidence for a null hypothesis of interest, such as a convergence theory or a hypothesis about societal norms.
TL;DR: In this paper, a quantitative comparison of five alternative models for the small open economy model with incomplete asset markets is presented, and the main finding of the comparison is that all models deliver virtually identical dynamics at business cycle frequencies, as measured by unconditional second moments and impulse response functions.
TL;DR: A new methodology for realizing Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Encryption (CP-ABE) under concrete and noninteractive cryptographic assumptions in the standard model is presented.
Abstract: We present a new methodology for realizing Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Encryption (CP-ABE) under concrete and noninteractive cryptographic assumptions in the standard model Our solutions allow any encryptor to specify access control in terms of any access formula over the attributes in the system In our most efficient system, ciphertext size, encryption, and decryption time scales linearly with the complexity of the access formula The only previous work to achieve these parameters was limited to a proof in the generic group model
We present three constructions within our framework Our first system is proven selectively secure under a assumption that we call the decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (PBDHE) assumption which can be viewed as a generalization of the BDHE assumption Our next two constructions provide performance tradeoffs to achieve provable security respectively under the (weaker) decisional Bilinear-Diffie-Hellman Exponent and decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions
TL;DR: The first secure IBE scheme without random oracles was presented in this article, where the adversary must commit ahead of time to the identity that it intends to attack, whereas in the standard model the adversary is allowed to choose this identity adaptively.
Abstract: We construct two efficient Identity Based Encryption (IBE) systems that are selective identity secure without the random oracle model. Selective identity secure IBE is a slightly weaker security model than the standard security model for IBE. In this model the adversary must commit ahead of time to the identity that it intends to attack, whereas in the standard model the adversary is allowed to choose this identity adaptively. Our first secure IBE system extends to give a selective identity Hierarchical IBE secure without random oracles.
TL;DR: The first proof-of-retrievability schemes with full proofs of security against arbitrary adversaries in the strongest model, that of Juels and Kaliski, are given.
Abstract: In a proof-of-retrievability system, a data storage center convinces a verifier that he is actually storing all of a client's data. The central challenge is to build systems that are both efficient and provably secure--that is, it should be possible to extract the client's data from any prover that passes a verification check. In this paper, we give the first proof-of-retrievability schemes with full proofs of security against arbitrary adversaries in the strongest model, that of Juels and Kaliski. Our first scheme, built from BLS signatures and secure in the random oracle model, has the shortest query and response of any proof-of-retrievability with public verifiability. Our second scheme, which builds elegantly on pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and is secure in the standard model, has the shortest response of any proof-of-retrievability scheme with private verifiability (but a longer query). Both schemes rely on homomorphic properties to aggregate a proof into one small authenticator value.