TL;DR: In this paper, an economic and financial analysis of the US federal and state level policies in states with solar-targeted policies that have solar renewable energy credits (SREC) markets is provided.
TL;DR: SRec, a system to animate recursion in Java programs is intended to assist in algorithm courses to better understand and analyze algorithm behavior and has been compared to other systems reported in the literature.
Abstract: In this paper we describe SRec, a system to animate recursion in Java programs. It is intended to assist in algorithm courses to better understand and analyze algorithm behavior. We make several contributions. Firstly, SRec exhibits a comprehensive set of animation and educational features. It provides three complem- entary, coordinated views of recursion: traces, the execution stack and activation trees. SRec allows the user constructing and modifying animations without effort. The animation can be played flexibly, both forward and backwards. It also provides facilities to integrate animations into courses. Secondly, the paper describes the educational features of the system and its use in algorithm courses. Thirdly, the system has been fully evaluated with respect to usability (using formative and summative methods) and has been compared to other systems reported in the literature. The results of both evaluations are highly positive.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose an original stochastic model called SMART-SREC to capture the behavior of participants given the rules that govern the market, and calibrate the model to the New Jersey market and backtest it, analyzing parameter sensitivity and demonstrating its ability to reproduce historical dynamics.
TL;DR: This paper proposes an alternative policy called Adjustable Dynamic Assignment of Penalties and Targets (ADAPT) that uses a sloped compliance penalty and a self-regulating requirement schedule, both designed to stabilize REC prices, helping to alleviate a common weakness of environmental markets.
Abstract: Currently, most Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) markets are defined based on targets that create an artificial step demand function resembling a cliff. This target policy produces volatile prices that can make investing in renewables a risky proposition. In this paper, we propose an alternative policy called Adjustable Dynamic Assignment of Penalties and Targets (ADAPT) that uses a sloped compliance penalty and a self-regulating requirement schedule, both designed to stabilize REC prices, helping to alleviate a common weakness of environmental markets. To capture market behavior, we model the market as a stochastic dynamic programming problem to understand how the market might balance the decision to use a REC now versus holding it for future periods (in the face of uncertain new supply). Then, we present and prove some of the properties of this market, and finally we show that this mechanism reduces the volatility of REC prices, which should stabilize the market and encourage long-term investment in r...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine experience in solar renewable energy certificate (SREC) markets in the United States and describe how SREC markets function, key policy design provisions, eligible technologies, state and regional eligibility rules, solar alternative compliance payments, measurement and verification methods, long-term contracting provisions, and rate caps.
Abstract: This paper examines experience in solar renewable energy certificate (SREC) markets in the United States It describes how SREC markets function--key policy design provisions, eligible technologies, state and regional eligibility rules, solar alternative compliance payments, measurement and verification methods, long-term contracting provisions, and rate caps It also examines the trends of SREC markets--trading volumes, sourcing trends, trends in the size of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems driven by these markets, and trends in price and compliance Throughout, the paper explores key issues and challenges facing SREC markets and attempts by policymakers to address some of these market barriers Data and information presented in this report are derived from SREC tracking systems, brokers and auctions, published reports, and information gleaned from market participants and interviews with state regulators responsible for SREC market implementation The last section summarizes key findings