TL;DR: A new 128-bit block cipher called Square, which concentrates on the resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis, and the publication of the resulting cipher for public scrutiny is published.
Abstract: In this paper we present a new 128-bit block cipher called Square. The original design of Square concentrates on the resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis. However, after the initial design a dedicated attack was mounted that forced us to augment the number of rounds. The goal of this paper is the publication of the resulting cipher for public scrutiny. A C implementation of Square is available that runs at 2.63 MByte/s on a 100 MHz Pentium. Our M68HC05 Smart Card implementation fits in 547 bytes and takes less than 2 msec. (4 MHz Clock). The high degree of parallellism allows hardware implementations in the Gbit/s range today.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied the security of 128-bit key 10-round AES against the boomerang attack and showed attacks on AES reduced to 5 and 6 rounds, much faster than the exhaustive key search.
Abstract: In this note we study security of 128-bit key 10-round AES against the boomerang attack. We show attacks on AES reduced to 5 and 6 rounds, much faster than the exhaustive key search and twice faster than the “Square” attack of the AES designers. The attacks are structural and apply to other SPN ciphers with incomplete diffusion.
TL;DR: In this article, the question of what happens if we replace all the constants in Rijndael, including the irreducible polynomial, the coefficients of the MixColumn operation, the affine transformation in the S box, etc.
Abstract: In this paper we ask the question what happens if we replace all the constants in Rijndael, including the replacement of the irreducible polynomial, the coefficients of the MixColumn operation, the affine transformation in the S box, etc. We show that such replacements can create new dual ciphers, which are equivalent to the original in all aspects. We present several such dual ciphers of Rijndael, such as the square of Rijndael, and dual ciphers with the irreducible polynomial replaced by primitive polynomials. We also describe another family of dual ciphers consisting of the logarithms of Rijndael.We then discuss self-dual ciphers, and extend our results to other ciphers.
TL;DR: In this article, the question of what happens if we replace all the constants in Rijndael, including the irreducible polynomial, the coefficients of the MixColumn operation, the affine transformation in the S box, etc.
Abstract: In this paper we ask the question what happens if we replace all the constants in Rijndael, including the replacement of the irreducible polynomial, the coefficients of the MixColumn operation, the affine transformation in the S box, etc. We show that such replacements can create new dual ciphers, which are equivalent to the original in all aspects. We present several such dual ciphers of Rijndael, such as the square of Rijndael, and dual ciphers with the irreducible polynomial replaced by primitive polynomials. We also describe another family of dual ciphers consisting of the logarithms of Rijndael.We then discuss self-dual ciphers, and extend our results to other ciphers.
TL;DR: It is proved that the entire 256-bit user key for 6 rounds of Crypton can be recovered with a complexity of 256 encryptions, whereas for SQUARE 272 encryptions are required to recover the 128- bit user key.
Abstract: In this paper we present an attack on a reduced round version of Crypton. The attack is based on the dedicated Square attack. We explain why the attack also works on Crypton and prove that the entire 256-bit user key for 6 rounds of Crypton can be recovered with a complexity of 256 encryptions, whereas for SQUARE 272 encryptions are required to recover the 128-bit user key.