TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse throughout two distinct periods, the classical and the Justinian periods of the Roman Law, the regime of solidary obligations as obligations characterized by the existence of a plurality of subjects, and more specifically, a regime of solidarity within the locationconductio operarum as a contract of consensual nature which some authors consider the genesis of the modern work contract.
Abstract: O atual direito portugues reflete, em muitos dos seus institutos e figuras juridicas, a influencia profunda do direito romano Este artigo pretende analisar, em dois periodos distintos da historia do direito romano, ou seja, o periodo classico e o periodo justinianeu, o regime das obrigacoes solidarias, enquanto obrigacoes que se caracterizam pela existencia de uma pluralidade de sujeitos, e, mais especificamente, o regime da solidariedade no âmbito da locatio-conductio operarum, enquanto contrato de natureza consensual que alguns autores consideram ser a genese do contrato de trabalho moderno Solidarity Within the Locatio-Conductio Operarum Portuguese law reflects in many juridical instances the profound influence of the Roman law This article aims to analyse throughout two distinct periods, the classical and the Justinian periods of the Roman Law, the regime of solidary obligations as obligations characterized by the existence of a plurality of subjects, and more specifically, the regime of solidarity within the location-conductio operarum as a contract of consensual nature which some authors consider the genesis of the modern work contract Keywords: Roman Law, obligations law, solidary obligations, location contract, location-conductio operarum
TL;DR: It is argued that health care systems that are grounded in solidarity have the right to penalise some users who are responsible for their poor health because solidary systems involve both rights and obligations and, in some cases, those who avoidably incur health burdens violate obligations of solidarity.
Abstract: Some healthcare systems are said to be grounded in solidarity because healthcare is funded as a form of mutual support. This article argues that health care systems that are grounded in solidarity have the right to penalise some users who are responsible for their poor health. This derives from the fact that solidary systems involve both rights and obligations and, in some cases, those who avoidably incur health burdens violate obligations of solidarity. Penalties warranted include direct patient contribution to costs, and lower priority treatment, but not typically full exclusion from the healthcare system. We also note two important restrictions on this argument. First, failures of solidary obligations can only be assumed under conditions that are conducive to sufficiently autonomous choice, which occur when patients are given 'Golden Opportunities' to improve their health. Second, because poor health does not occur in a social vacuum, an insistence on solidarity as part of healthcare is legitimate only if all members of society are held to similar standards of solidarity. We cannot insist upon, and penalise failures of, solidarity only for those who are unwell, and who cannot afford to evade the terms of public health.