About: Server Name Indication is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 28 publications have been published within this topic receiving 277 citations. The topic is also known as: SNI.
TL;DR: In this article, a transparent proxy coupled to a plurality of non-configured clients and coupled to one or more servers is proposed to intercept a request for a secured connection to a first server of the one or multiple servers, including a server name indication extension.
Abstract: Various systems, apparatus, and methods include an apparatus comprising a transparent proxy coupled to a plurality of non-configured clients and coupled to one or more servers, the transparent proxy operable to intercept a request for a secured connection to a first server of the one or more servers, the request from a first non-configured client of the plurality of non-configured clients and including a server name indication extension, and to supply a proper certificate to the first non-configured client including the server name indication extension as a common name in the proper certificate.
TL;DR: It is shown that SNI has two weaknesses, regarding (1) backward compatibility and (2) multiple services using a single certificate, which can be practically used to bypass firewalls and monitoring systems relying on SNI.
Abstract: Encrypted Internet traffic is an essential element to enable security and privacy in the Internet. Surveys show that websites are more and more being served over HTTPS. They highlight an increase of 48% of sites using TLS over the past year, justifying the tendency that the Web is going to be encrypted. This motivates the development of new tools and methods to monitor and filter HTTPS traffic. This paper handles the latest technique for HTTPS traffic filtering that is based on the Server Name Indication (SNI) field of TLS and which has been recently implemented in many firewall solutions. Our main contribution is an evaluation of the reliability of this SNI extension for properly identifying and filtering HTTPS traffic. We show that SNI has two weaknesses, regarding (1) backward compatibility and (2) multiple services using a single certificate. We demonstrate thanks to a web browser plug-in called “Escape” that we designed and implemented, how these weaknesses can be practically used to bypass firewalls and monitoring systems relying on SNI. The results show positive evaluation (firewall's rules successfully bypassed) for all tested websites.
TL;DR: In this article, a technique for destination domain extraction for secure protocols is described, where the destination domain is extracted from the server name indication (SNI) of a client hello message sent from the client to the remote server.
Abstract: Techniques for destination domain extraction for secure protocols are disclosed. In some embodiments, destination domain extraction for secure protocols includes monitoring network communications between a client and a remote server; determining if the client sends a request to create a secure connection with the remote server (e.g., in which the network communications are initiating a setup for a secure protocol-based connection); and extracting a destination domain from the request to create the secure connection with the remote server. In some embodiments, the secure protocol is a secure sockets layer (SSL) protocol or transport layer security (TLS) protocol, and the destination domain is extracted from the server name indication (SNI) of a client hello message sent from the client to the remote server. In some embodiments, destination domain extraction for secure protocols further includes applying a policy (e.g., a security policy) based on the destination domain to filter traffic using a security device.
TL;DR: In this paper, a reverse lookup using an IP:Port-to-hostname table to identify a hostname when only an IP address and port is present in an SSL hello connection is presented, which may occur, for example, when a non-SNI-capable client initiates the SSL hello.
Abstract: Embodiments disclose a reverse lookup using an IP:Port-to-hostname table to identify a hostname when only an IP address and port is present in an SSL hello connection, which may occur, for example, when a non-SNI-capable client initiates the SSL hello. Once the hostname is successfully looked up, a naming convention is used to simplify the management and identification of SSL certificates. Different types of SSL certificates are supported. Multiple hostname matches may be associated with a given IP address and port in the IP:Port-to-hostname table. In such case, the first-matching hostname is always used with the naming convention to identify related SSL certificates. The naming convention is applied in such a way that it will first look for the most matching file name to the least matching file name.