About: Self-preservation is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 8 publications have been published within this topic receiving 89 citations. The topic is also known as: survival instinct.
TL;DR: The central tenet of terror management theory (TMT) is that the psychological ramifications of this most basic of all human dilemmas go far and deep as discussed by the authors, and it is argued that the fear of death is the wellspring from which human motivation flows, and that the problem of death lies at the root of many of the motives that social psychologists have studied throughout this century.
Abstract: No sensible person would deny that the inevitability of death poses a rather serious problem for humankind. Poets, novelists, theologians, philosophers, and artists have pondered this dilemma at great length, and provided dramatic depictions of the human quest to cope with this unfortunate reality. It seems rather odd, then, that empirically oriented psychologists have devoted so little attention to the psychological ramifications of the uniquely human awareness of death. Could it be that, as Mikulincer and Florian suggest, this lack of interest in the problem of death by those in the business of explaining social behavior is "the result of a cognitive-emotional barrier that social psychologists build against the threat of their own mortality"? The central tenet of terror management theory (TMT) is that the psychological ramifications of this most basic of all human dilemmas go far and deep. In the target article, we argued that an instinctive desire for life is the wellspring from which human motivation flows, and that the problem of death lies at the root of many of the motives that social psychologists have studied throughout this century. It was extremely gratifying to read the thoughtful commentary of our colleagues in response to TMT and research. Whereas 10 years ago, our claim that the fear of death provides the impetus for the need for self-esteem and cultural affiliations was sometimes seen as patently absurd and unworthy of scholarly consideration, today most observers seem to agree that this argument merits serious debate. This is not to say that a consensus on the validity of our approach has been reached. Whereas Muraven and Baumeister lament the rampant reductionism inherent in our approach and conclude that the theory is "simply wrong," Snyder takes the opposite tack, arguing that TMT has become too complex and that "a shave from Occam's razor" is needed. More to our liking, Baron commends the "integrative power, parsimony, ... and unique predictions" of TMT, and Paulhus and Trapnell describe TMT as "a theory of monumental scope, trenchant explicatory power, and scintillating creativity" (thanks guys, the checks should be in the mail any day now .. .). Clearly, TMT provokes widely varying reactions among different readers. However, even our staunchest critics seem willing to grant that the fear of death plays some role in the commitment to cultural beliefs and values. Of course our argument goes a few steps farther than that, and this is where the debate gets interesting. Although we would like to provide detailed responses to all of the provocative questions and ideas raised by our colleagues, space limitations force us to confine our comments to what we see as the most challenging and interesting common themes that emerged in theircommentaries.
TL;DR: Hobbes argued that the pursuit of power is part of human nature, a second aspect of self-interest: "I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death" as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Scholars generally reference Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan for theories in international politics. Specifically, scholars subscribe to the concept of international anarchy and the pursuit of survival to explain state behavior. Since Hobbes lived through the English Civil War (1642-1651), his observations arguably could be a reflection of insurgency warfare rather than interstate conflict. (1) In fact, the relevant passages in Leviathan to which this article refers connote a concern with domestic conflict vice external threats. With this frame of reference, this article will focus on the effect of insurgency on human behavior. According to Hobbes, "fear of violent death and desirous peace" are the compelling reasons man forms a society. (2) In making this a priori argument, Hobbes advances the idea that individual self-preservation is the primary motivating factor behind the formation of society and not, as Aristotle contends, because man by nature is a social animal. This motivational factor also has tremendous implications for individuals suffering through an insurgency. If the population is the centerpiece of any insurgency and counterinsurgency struggle, as prominent scholars on insurgency contend, then Hobbes's insights are crucial to understanding how individuals caught up in an insurgency behave. This article will address the following questions: * Why do subsequent generations accept the covenant rather than returning to the state of nature? * Why do some individuals reject the covenant? * How do insurgencies take root? * What are the cascading effects when the covenant is broken? * Why do citizens fail to assist the government upon liberation from the insurgents? The answers to these questions will help explain why Hobbes's notion of self-preservation compels the general population to remain noncommittal to either side during an insurgency. Naturally, human behavior is not the only variable in an insurgency, but it is an important variable; and it is one often underappreciated by governments conducting a counterinsurgency. The General Acceptance of the Covenant by Subsequent Generations Hobbes argues that the social contract promises to protect the individual from the threat of oppression, death, and injury prevalent in the state of nature. Released from the need for constant vigilance against threats, the individual can pursue private interests and happiness that benefit him and society. (3) Hobbes's analytical framework for the formation of society is logical, but it does not address why subsequent generations accept the covenant. Born into an established society, the individual makes no conscious decision to renew the social contract. Never having experienced political anarchy, he might even take security for granted. As the individual matures to adulthood, one could say his behavior is derived more from social norms than a conscious rational choice. Because security under a common power is nonexclusive, everyone enjoys the collective good automatically whether cognizant of its benefits or not. It could be argued that the individual becomes so accustomed to the order brought by the common power that he does nothing when rebel activity begins, expecting the government will resolve the matter. When Hobbes speaks of acceptance, he is alluding to the majority of the population. The essential tendency of the citizenry is to accept some restrictions on liberty in exchange for the benefits. Nonetheless, Hobbes makes the case for a common power precisely because not all citizens will accept the covenant, and these individuals represent the greatest danger to society. The Rejection of the Covenant by the Few Hobbes recognizes that a small sector of society will never be satisfied under a sovereignty in which they are not in charge. Hobbes contends that the pursuit of power is part of human nature, a second aspect of self-interest: "I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. …
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine Hobbes's account of self-preservation in the Leviathan and show that it is justified in only the most strictly delineated contexts, such as when the individual's own judgment of threats to her personal safety is justified.
Abstract: The degree to which Hobbes's citizenry retains its right to resist sovereign power has been the source of a significant debate. It has been argued by a number of scholars that there is a clear avenue for legitimate rebellion in Hobbes's state, as described in the Leviathan – in this work, Hobbes asserts that subjects can retain their natural right to self-preservation in civil society, and that this represents an inalienable right that cannot, under any circumstances, be transferred to the sovereign. The conclusion frequently drawn from this feature of Hobbes's account is that it places a considerable limit on sovereign authority. The right to self-preservation has been taken as proof that Hobbes sought to ensure that the sovereign's power relies upon the continual consent of the individuals that make up his or her constituency. I want to examine Hobbes's account of this civil right in Leviathan in order to show that this line of interpretation is ultimately unfounded. While self-preservation results from the individual's own judgment of threats to her personal safety, it is justified in only the most strictly delineated contexts. Judgments regarding the overall peace and security of the state do not, and cannot, fall to individual experiences and judgments. Hobbes is quite adamant that individuals are not appropriate judges of right and wrong action in matters the sovereign legislates.
TL;DR: In this article, Tariq Ali's 1992 novel Shadows of the Pomegranate Tree, the first in his Islam Quintet series, is set in the aftermath of the fall of Granada in the 15th century, and tells of the struggles of Muslims trying to preserve Islamic culture and their own material well-being in the face of the Inquisition.
Abstract: Tariq Ali’s 1992 novel Shadows of the Pomegranate Tree, the first in his Islam Quintet series, is set in the aftermath of the fall of Granada in the 15th century, and tells of the struggles of Muslims who were trying to preserve Islamic culture and their own material well-being in the face of the Inquisition. This article sees the novel as exploring the idea that during social upheavals, any previous power-sharing arrangements, based on a social contract or covenant, are often replaced by realpolitik. Thus, in Shadows, Muslims, formerly well integrated with their Catholic neighbors, become the enemy within. The article draws on Michael Ignatieff’s study of modern conflict between Serbs and Croats to show how abstract, conceptual and ideological hatred can vanquish concrete moments of identification. In such cases, perceived threats create fear which then governs behavior – the Hobbesian trap – and a doomsday spiral is set in motion, as war comes to seem a legitimate precaution. In exploring how it...
TL;DR: For example, fear is one of the most primitive instincts of animal life as discussed by the authors, and the feeling of anxiety is a primitive primitive instinct of human beings as well as a primal instinct of survival.
Abstract: THE causation of all psychopathic diseases can be referred to one fundamental instinct, the instinct of fear with its concomitant manifestation, the feeling of anxiety. Fear is one of the most primitive instincts of animal life. As Kipling puts it, "Fear walks up and down the jungle by day and by night." Our life is so well guarded by the protective agencies of civilization that we hardly realize the extent, depth, and overwhelming effect of the emotion of fear. Fear is rooted down deep in the very organization of animal existence, it takes its root in what is the very essence of life,―the instinct of selfpreservation. Primus in orbe Deus fecit timor. "We lead,” says Galton, “for the most part such an easy and carpeted existence, screened from the stern realities of life and death, that many of us are impelled to draw aside the curtain now and then and gaze for a while behind it.”1 “The progress from brute to man," says James, "is characterized by nothing so much as by the decrease in frequency of proper occasion for fear. In civilized life in particular it has at last become possible for large numbers of people to pass from the cradle to the grave without ever having had a pang of genuine fear. Many of us need an attack of mental disease to teach us the meaning of the word. Hence the possibility of so much blindly optimistic philosophy and religion. The atrocities of life become ‘like a tale of little meaning though the words are strong'; we doubt if anything like us ever really was within the tiger's jaws, and conclude that the horrors we hear of are but a sort of painted tapestry for the chambers in which we lie so comfortably at peace with ourselves and the world. Be this as it may, fear is a genuine instinct and one of the earliest shown by the human child."2