TL;DR: The reader is familiar with the ubiquity of information in the modern world and is sympathetic with the need for restricting rights to read, add, modify, or delete information in specific contexts.
Abstract: We assune that the reader is familiar with the ubiquity of information in the modern world and is sympathetic with the need for restricting rights to read, add, modify, or delete information in specific contexts. This need is particularly acute for systems having computers as significant components.
TL;DR: A structured view of research on information-flow security is given, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information- flow policies, and some important open challenges are identified.
Abstract: Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow. Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of information-flow policies. Previously, a promising new approach has been developed: the use of programming-language techniques for specifying and enforcing information-flow policies. In this paper, we survey the past three decades of research on information-flow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information-flow policies. We give a structured view of work in the area and identify some important open challenges.
TL;DR: The model provides a unifying view of all systems that restrict information flow, enables a classification of them according to security objectives, and suggests some new approaches to formulating the requirements of secure information flow among security classes.
Abstract: This paper investigates mechanisms that guarantee secure information flow in a computer system. These mechanisms are examined within a mathematical framework suitable for formulating the requirements of secure information flow among security classes. The central component of the model is a lattice structure derived from the security classes and justified by the semantics of information flow. The lattice properties permit concise formulations of the security requirements of different existing systems and facilitate the construction of mechanisms that enforce security. The model provides a unifying view of all systems that restrict information flow, enables a classification of them according to security objectives, and suggests some new approaches. It also leads to the construction of automatic program certification mechanisms for verifying the secure flow of information through a program.
TL;DR: A resurrecting duckling security policy model is presented, which describes secure transient association of a device with multiple serialised owners over the air in a short range wireless channel.
Abstract: In the near future, many personal electronic devices will be able to communicate with each other over a short range wireless channel. We investigate the principal security issues for such an environment. Our discussion is based on the concrete example of a thermometer that makes its readings available to other nodes over the air. Some lessons learned from this example appear to be quite general to ad-hoc networks, and rather different from what we have come to expect in more conventional systems: denial of service, the goals of authentication, and the problems of naming all need re-examination. We present the resurrecting duckling security policy model, which describes secure transient association of a device with multiple serialised owners.
TL;DR: In this article, a flow processing facility for inspecting payloads of network traffic packets detects security threats and intrusions across accessible layers of the IP-stack by applying content matching and behavioral anomaly detection techniques based on regular expression matching and self-organizing maps.
Abstract: A flow processing facility, which uses a set of artificial neurons for pattern recognition, such as a self-organizing map, in order to provide security and protection to a computer or computer system supports unified threat management based at least in part on patterns relevant to a variety of types of threats that relate to computer systems, including computer networks. Flow processing for switching, security, and other network applications, including a facility that processes a data flow to address patterns relevant to a variety of conditions are directed at internal network security, virtualization, and web connection security. A flow processing facility for inspecting payloads of network traffic packets detects security threats and intrusions across accessible layers of the IP-stack by applying content matching and behavioral anomaly detection techniques based on regular expression matching and self-organizing maps. Exposing threats and intrusions within packet payload at or near real-time rates enhances network security from both external and internal sources while ensuring security policy is rigorously applied to data and system resources. Intrusion Detection and Protection (IDP) is provided by a flow processing facility that processes a data flow to address patterns relevant to a variety of types of network and data integrity threats that relate to computer systems, including computer networks.