TL;DR: The Ponder language provides a common means of specifying security policies that map onto various access control implementation mechanisms for firewalls, operating systems, databases and Java.
Abstract: The Ponder language provides a common means of specifying security policies that map onto various access control implementation mechanisms for firewalls, operating systems, databases and Java. It supports obligation policies that are event triggered condition-action rules for policy based management of networks and distributed systems. Ponder can also be used for security management activities such as registration of users or logging and auditing events for dealing with access to critical resources or security violations. Key concepts of the language include roles to group policies relating to a position in an organisation, relationships to define interactions between roles and management structures to define a configuration of roles and relationships pertaining to an organisational unit such as a department. These reusable composite policy specifications cater for the complexity of large enterprise information systems. Ponder is declarative, strongly-typed and object-oriented which makes the language flexible, extensible and adaptable to a wide range of management requirements.
TL;DR: An extended deterrence theory model is presented that combines work from criminology, social psychology, and information systems and suggests that user awareness of security countermeasures directly influences the perceived certainty and severity of organizational sanctions associated with IS misuse, which leads to reduced IS misuse intention.
Abstract: Intentional insider misuse of information systems resources (i.e., IS misuse) represents a significant threat to organizations. For example, industry statistics suggest that between 50%--75% of security incidents originate from within an organization. Because of the large number of misuse incidents, it has become important to understand how to reduce such behavior. General deterrence theory suggests that certain controls can serve as deterrent mechanisms by increasing the perceived threat of punishment for IS misuse. This paper presents an extended deterrence theory model that combines work from criminology, social psychology, and information systems. The model posits that user awareness of security countermeasures directly influences the perceived certainty and severity of organizational sanctions associated with IS misuse, which leads to reduced IS misuse intention. The model is then tested on 269 computer users from eight different companies. The results suggest that three practices deter IS misuse: user awareness of security policies; security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs; and computer monitoring. The results also suggest that perceived severity of sanctions is more effective in reducing IS misuse than certainty of sanctions. Further, there is evidence that the impact of sanction perceptions vary based on one's level of morality. Implications for the research and practice of IS security are discussed.
TL;DR: Results of comparative qualitative studies in two information services Fortune 500 firms identify an approach that can effectively deal with systems risk, and this theory-based security program includes use of a security risk planning model, education/training in security awareness, and Countermeasure Matrix analysis.
Abstract: The likelihood that the firm's information systems are insufficiently protected against certain kinds of damage or loss is known as "systems risk." Risk can be managed or reduced when managers are aware of the full range of controls available and implement the most effective controls. Unfortunately, they often lack this knowledge, and their subsequent actions to cope with systems risk are less effective than they might otherwise be. This is one viable explanation for why losses from computer abuse and computer disasters today are uncomfortably large and still so potentially devastating after many years of attempting to deal with the problem. Results of comparative qualitative studies in two information services Fortune 500 firms identify an approach that can effectively deal with the problem. This theory-based security program includes (1) use of a security risk planning model, (2) education/training in security awareness, and (3) Countermeasure Matrix analysis.
TL;DR: Investigation of whether a management decision to invest in IS security results in more effective control of computer abuse indicates that security countermeasures that include deterrent administrative procedures and preventive security software will result in significantly lower computer abuse.
Abstract: Information security has not been a high priority for most managers. Many permit their installations to be either lightly protected or wholly unprotected, apparently willing to risk major losses from computer abuse. This study, based on the criminological theory of general deterrence, investigates whether a management decision to invest in IS security results in more effective control of computer abuse. Data gathered through a survey of 1,211 randomly selected organizations indicates that security countermeasures that include deterrent administrative procedures and preventive security software will result in significantly lower computer abuse. Knowledge about these relationships is useful for making key decisions about the security function.