School choice

Abstract: A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.

Abstract: Theory: In the literature on policy innovation diffusion, political scientists have paid little attention to how ideas for innovation gain prominence on government agendas. By considering the actions of policy entrepreneurs-political actors who promote policy ideas-we can gain important insights into the process of policy innovation and innovation diffusion. Hypotheses: Policy entrepreneurs constitute an identifiable class of political actors. Their presence and actions can significantly raise the probability of legislative consideration and approval of policy innovations. Methods: Event history analyses of the determinants of legislative consideration and approval of an idea for education reform-school choice-in the 48 contiguous United States from 1987 through 1992. The data set consists of unique information collected in a mail survey of members of the education policy elite in each state, augmented with published statistics. Results: Policy entrepreneurs were identified as advocates of school choice in 26 states. While controlling for rival hypotheses, the presence and actions of policy entrepreneurs were found to raise significantly the probability of legislative consideration and approval of school choice as a policy innovation. These results suggest policy entrepreneurs should be given more attention in the literature on policy innovation diffusion.

Abstract: Many school choice proposals would enable parents to choose among public school districts in their area, though not among private schools. Theory predicts three reactions to easier choice among public schools: increased sorting of students and parents among schools; easier choice will encourage competition among schools, forcing them into higher productivity (better student performance per input); easier choice among public schools will give parents less incentive to send their children to private schools. I examine easing choice among public schools using exogenous variation in the concentration of public school districts in metropolitan areas measured by a Herfindahl index on enrollment shares. The exogenous variation is generated by topography: I derive instruments for concentration from natural boundaries (rivers) that partially determine district size. I find evidence that easier choice leads to greater productivity. Areas with greater opportunities for choice among public schools have lower per-pupil spending, lower teacher salaries, and larger classes. The same areas have better average student performance, as measured by students' educational attainment, wages, and test scores. Performance improvements are concentrated among white non-Hispanics, males, and students who have a parent with at least a high school degree. However, student performance is not worse among Hispanics,African-Americans, females, or students who do not have a parent with a high school degree.Also, student performance improves at both ends of the educational attainment distribution and test score distribution.