Topic
Satisficing
About: Satisficing is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1651 publications have been published within this topic receiving 62097 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
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Papers
TL;DR: A comparative examination of the models of adaptive behavior employed in psychology and economics shows that in almost all respects the latter postulate a much greater complexity in the choice mechanisms, and a much larger capacity in the organism for obtaining information and performing computations than do the former.
Abstract: A growing interest in decision making in psychology is evidenced by the recent publication of Edwards’ review article in the Psychological Bulletin (1) and the Santa Monica Conference volume, Decision Processes (7). In this work, much attention has been focused on the characterization of rational choice, and because the latter topic has been a central concern in economics, the theory of decision making has become a natural meeting ground for psychological and economic theory. A comparative examination of the models of adaptive behavior employed in psychology (e.g., learning theories), and of the models of rational behavior employed in economics, shows that in almost all respects the latter postulate a much greater complexity in the choice mechanisms, and a much larger capacity in the organism for obtaining information and performing computations, than do the former. Moreover, in the limited range of situations where the predictions of the two theories have been compared (see [7, Ch. 9, 10, 18]), the learning theories appear to account for the observed behavior rather better than do the theories of rational behavior. Both from these scanty data and from an examination of the postulates of the economic models it appears probable that, however adaptive the behavior of organisms in learning and choice situations, this adaptiveness falls far short of the ideal of “maximizing” postulated in economic theory. Evidently, organisms adapt well enough to “satisfice”; they do not, in general, “optimize.” If this is the case, a great deal can be learned about rational decision making by taking into account, at the outset, the limitations upon the capacities and complexity of the organism, and by taking account of the fact that the environments to which it must adapt possess properties that permit further simplication of its choice mechanisms. It may be useful, therefore, to ask: How simple a set of choice mechanisms can we postulate and still obtain the gross features of observed adaptive choice behavior? In a previous paper (6) I have put forth some suggestions as to the kinds of “approximate” rationality that might be employed by an organism possessing limited information and limited computational facilities. The suggestions were “hypothetical” in that, lacking definitive knowledge of the human decisional processes, we can only conjecture on the basis of our everyday experiences, our introspection, and a very limited body of psychological literature what these
5,922 citations
TL;DR: The authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making, and found that these fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: they neither look up nor integrate all information.
Abstract: Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: onereason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the authors held a competition between the satisficing "Take The Best" algorithm and various "rational" inference procedures (e.g., multiple regression). The Take The Best algorithm matched or outperformed all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result is an existence proof that cognitive mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical norms of rational inference.
3,504 citations
TL;DR: The authors proposed that when optimally answering a survey question would require substantial cognitive effort, some respondents simply provide a satisfactory answer instead, which can take the form of either (1) incomplete or biased information retrieval and/or information integration, or (2) no information retrieval or integration at all.
Abstract: This paper proposes that when optimally answering a survey question would require substantial cognitive effort, some repondents simply provide a satisfactory answer instead. This behaviour, called satisficing, can take the form of either (1) incomplete or biased information retrieval and/or information integration, or (2) no information retrieval or integration at all. Satisficing may lead respondents to employ a variety of response strategies, including choosing the first response alternative that seems to constitute a reasonable answer, agreeing with an assertion made by a question, endorsing the status quo instead of endorsing social change, failing to differentiate among a set of diverse objects in ratings, saying ‘don't know’ instead of reporting an opinion, and randomly choosing among the response alternatives offered. This paper specifies a wide range of factors that are likely to encourage satisficing, and reviews relevant evidence evaluating these speculations. Many useful directions for future research are suggested.
2,366 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a student asked whether it was conceivable that the practical procedures for decision-making implicit in rational theories of choice might make actual human decisions worse rather than better, and he asked whether human choice is improved by knowledge of decision theory or by application of various engineering forms of rational choice.
Abstract: conceptions of bounded rationality Recently, behavioral studies of choice have examined the second guess, the way preferences are processed in choice behavior These studies suggest possible modifications in standard assumptions about tastes and their role in choice This paper examines some of those modifications, some possible approaches to working on them, and some complications 1 The engineering of choice and ordinary choice behavior * Recently I gave a lecture on elementary decision theory, an introduction to rational theories of choice After the lecture, a student asked whether it was conceivable that the practical procedures for decisionmaking implicit in theories of choice might make actual human decisions worse rather than better What is the empirical evidence, he asked, that human choice is improved by knowledge of decision theory or by application of the various engineering forms of rational choice? I answered, I think correctly, that the case for the usefulness of decision engineering rested primarily not on the kind of direct empirical confirmation that he sought, but on two other things: on a set of theorems proving the superiority of particular procedures in particular situations if the situations are correctly specified and the procedures correctly applied, and on the willingness of clients to purchase the services of experts with skills in decision sciences The answer may not have been reasonable, but the question clearly was It articulated a classical challenge to the practice of rational choice, the possibility that processes of rationality might combine with properties of human beings to
2,192 citations
TL;DR: This paper found negative correlations between maximizing and happiness, optimism, self-esteem, and life satisfaction, and positive correlations between maximization and depression, perfectionism, and regret, and found that maximizers are less satisfied than non-maximizers with consumer decisions, and more likely to engage in social comparison.
Abstract: Can people feel worse off as the options they face increase? The present studies suggest that some people--maximizers--can. Study 1 reported a Maximization Scale, which measures individual differences in desire to maximize. Seven samples revealed negative correlations between maximization and happiness, optimism, self-esteem, and life satisfaction, and positive correlations between maximization and depression, perfectionism, and regret. Study 2 found maximizers less satisfied than nonmaximizers (satisficers) with consumer decisions, and more likely to engage in social comparison. Study 3 found maximizers more adversely affected by upward social comparison. Study 4 found maximizers more sensitive to regret and less satisfied in an ultimatum bargaining game. The interaction between maximizing and choice is discussed in terms of regret, adaptation, and self-blame.
1,568 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 22 |
| 2024 | 32 |
| 2023 | 53 |
| 2022 | 110 |
| 2021 | 73 |
| 2020 | 75 |