Ringfencing

Abstract: Investment return on a liquid or illiquid asset is increased by granting the right to pledge the asset to an entity that can deploy the asset more efficiently than its owner. Using the committed assets—and the resulting ability of the entity to pledge those assets and borrow capital at advantageous rates—the entity can transact for greater profits than the asset owner could otherwise earn. The entity's credit rating may be based, at least in part, on a third-party guarantee of the asset's value. The credit rating may also be based on other characteristics of the entity. The entity may obtain pledges of multiple assets from multiple owners, all of whom share in the profits of the transactions. If there are losses, the pledged assets can be sold, or the owners can contribute to the entity to pay off the losses.

Abstract: This working paper examines the impact of imposing multiple ring-fencing regimes on bank safety, including a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ effect that can arise from host country incentives. It discusses these issues first on a qualitative basis to establish intuition, and then quantifies the risk of different structures via a Merton-style option model. The results suggest that there is a material advantage (i.e. reduced probability of local failure) for a jurisdiction that ring-fences its subsidiary if other jurisdictions do not match that decision. This host jurisdiction benefits from both (i) local capital and (ii) the ability to tap a large central reserve. However, if other jurisdictions adopt similar ring-fencing policies, then the benefit of a pooled ‘central reserve’ capital is voided and all jurisdictions become worse off. Under our model, we find that failure risk increases by a large multiple if ring-fencing becomes pervasive. In some cases, the increase in risk is 5x or more, compared to a structure where internal capital is fully mobile. This is caused by ‘misallocation risk’ – the risk that a bank has enough capital resources overall, but cannot get those resources to the right subsidiary in time to avoid a local failure. The paper concludes with suggestions on possible policy alternatives that could mitigate these issues. We consider a few hybrid cases, which suggest that a ‘partly ring-fenced bank’ can mitigate a substantial amount of misallocation risk if the central reserve is significant and not committed too early. We then explore alternatives which build on the Financial Stability Board’s post-crisis bank resolution architecture. Large amounts of ‘bail-in’ capital are now being issued by the biggest global banks, and these resources can fund an alternative to the hard legal entity bankruptcies (or emergency bail-outs) seen in the 2008 crisis – events that appear to motivate many of the recent ring-fencing initiatives. We conclude with a ‘straw man’ proposal that aims to produce a more resilient overall outcome for the group while addressing legitimate host concerns. We believe the paper is relevant for the ongoing policy debates on bank structure, capital allocation and resolution.

Abstract: This paper formally examines the implications of an electricity utility’s diversification into an unregulated industry. In our framework, the electricity utility is the most efficient provider in the unregulated industry (up to a particular capacity) and, as such, there is no question about the desirability of allowing it to operate in that market. Nevertheless, the risk faced by a diversified utility is greater than the risk faced by a utility that operates only in a regulated market. This additional risk can potentially affect the diversified utility’s credit rating and, therefore, increase the cost of capital for the regulated business that will be recovered from ratepayers. We show that by allowing a regulated firm to diversify into an unregulated market, the energy regulator faces a trade-off: a lower cost in the unregulated market versus a higher cost in the regulated market. If the regulator only cares about welfare in the regulated market, then a ring-fencing requirement is optimal subject to implementation costs not being substantial. Of course, the ring-fencing requirement effectively prevents the firm from achieving a lower cost in the unregulated market. Therefore, if the regulator cares about welfare in both regulated and unregulated markets, ringfencing may no longer be optimal. JEL Classification: L51 Key-words: multi-utility regulation; utility diversification; ring-fencing; risk rating # This paper is part of Fernando Camacho’s PhD project at The University of Queensland, which investigates the relationship between regulation and investment. Camacho acknowledges the financial assistance from The University of Queensland and Menezes the support from the Australian Research Council (ARC Grants DP 0557885 and 0663768).