Topic
Reverse auction
About: Reverse auction is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2757 publications have been published within this topic receiving 71204 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
TL;DR: Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.
Abstract: This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design problems.
7,009 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
Abstract: : In Section 2, we review some important results of the received auction theory, introduce a new general auction model, and summarize the results of our analysis. Section 3 contains a formal statement of our model, and develops the properties of affiliated random variables. The various theorems are presented in Sections 4-8. In Section 9, we offer our views on the current state of auction theory. Following Section 9 is a technical appendix dealing with affiliated random variables.
4,358 citations
Patent•
26 Aug 1996
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a method and system for providing rapid feedback of a reverse auction process and removing the user from the process once an indication to purchase has been received.
Abstract: An auction system is disclosed which allows users to participate using their own computers suitably connected to the auction system. Preferably, this connection uses INTERNET. The invention involves a method and system for providing rapid feedback of a reverse auction process and removes the user from the process once an indication to purchase has been received. Rapid feedback in combination with security of information is achieved with the method and auction system.
913 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles, and discuss the current 3G spectrum auctions in Germany and the Netherlands.
Abstract: The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction – a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circumstances of the recent UK mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal. We also discuss the current 3G spectrum auctions in Germany and the Netherlands. Auction design is a matter of ‘horses for courses’, not ‘one size fits all’.
813 citations
TL;DR: The design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory as discussed by the authors, and auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously, should the government allow bids for combinations of licenses, or should it accept only single-license bids? How should the auction be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms?
Abstract: The design of the FCC spectrum-license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as: Should an open auction or a sealed-bid auction be used? Should the licenses be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously? Should the government allow bids for combinations of licenses, or should it accept only single-license bids? How should the auction be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms? Should the government impose royalties or reserve prices? How much should the bidders be informed about their competition?
782 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 7 |
| 2024 | 12 |
| 2023 | 25 |
| 2022 | 48 |
| 2021 | 38 |
| 2020 | 66 |