Reification (knowledge representation)

Abstract: I. On what there is II. Two dogmas of empiricism III. The problem of meaning in linguistics IV. Identity, ostension, and hypostasis V. New foundations for mathematical logic VI. Logic and the reification of universals VII. Notes on the theory of reference VIII. Reference and modality IX. Meaning and existential inference Origins of the essays Bibliographical references Index

Abstract: What is the nature of emotion? Mandler (1975) cautions not to ask this question, fearful it may lead to reification and delude us into thinking that emotions exist. If Mandler means to alert us to the fact that all experience is private and can only be studied using various indicators, etc., we should indeed heed his cautionary statement. But if he means to single out emotion from thought and/or perception, and argue against the existence of emotion as a discrete form of mental experience, then I must take exception to his warning. My emotions existed well before my thoughts and certainly well before I was aware of the problem of reification; I suspect the same was true for Professor Mandler.

Abstract: Since the beginning of the 20th century, intelligence has been conceptualized as a qualitatively unique faculty (or faculties) with a relatively fixed quantity that individuals possess and that can be tested by conventional intelligence tests. Despite the logical errors of reification and circular reasoning involved in this essentialistic conceptualization, this view of intelligence has persisted until the present, with psychologists still debating how many and what types of intelligence there are. This paper argues that a concept of intelligence as anything more than a label for various behaviors in their contexts is a myth and that a truly scientific understanding of the behaviors said to reflect intelligence can come only from a functional analysis of those behaviors in the contexts in which they are observed. A functional approach can lead to more productive methods for measuring and teaching intelligent behavior.

Abstract: Effective argumentation in international politics is widely conceived as a matter of persuasion. In particular, the ‘logic of arguing’ ascribes explanatory power to the ‘better argument’ and promises to illuminate the conditions of legitimate normative change. This article exposes the self-defeating implications of the Habermasian symbiosis between the normative and the empirical force of arguments. Since genuine persuasion is neither observable nor knowable, its analysis critically depends on what scholars consider to be the better argument. Seemingly, objective criteria such as universality only camouflage such moral reification. The paradoxical consequence of an explanatory concept of arguing is that moral discourse is no longer conceptualized as an open-ended process of contestation and normative change, but has recently been recast as a governance mechanism ensuring the compliance of international actors with pre-defined norms. This dilemma can be avoided through a positivist reification of valid norms, as in socialization research, or by adopting a critical and emancipatory focus on the obstacles to true persuasion. Still, both solutions remain dependent on the ‘persuasion vs. coercion’ problem that forestalls an insight into successful justificatory practices other than rational communication. The conclusion therefore pleas for a pragmatic abstention from better arguments and points to the insights to be gained from pragmatist norms research in sociology.