Reasonable doubt

Abstract: The reality of anthropogenic climate change has been established ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ by leading scientists worldwide. Applying a systematic literature review process, we analysed existing lit...

Abstract: Models of the enforcement-compliance relationship have assumed that both the probability and magnitude of fines are independent choice variables of policy makers. These models indicate that it may be optimal to monitor with lowfrequency but to inflict uniformly maximal penalties for all infractions detected. This article shows that if the judicial system is built on the "reasonable doubt test," then the penalty and the probability of conviction are not independent. In particular, as the penalty increases, the probability of conviction falls. As a result, uniformly maximal penalties may actually encourage crime rather than deter it. This article shows that optimal fines should rise with the severity of the infraction, that is, the penalty should 'fit the crime." * Models of the enforcement-compliance relationship generally treat both the probability and magnitude of fines as independent choice variables of the government. This approach has led Becker ( 1968) and others' to conclude that it is optimal to set uniformly maximal penalties for all crimes, and to set the probability of conviction at the minimum level necessary to enforce compliance with the law. While this normative prescription is natural and intuitive, there still remains a larger positive question of why in most nations of the world penalties are not uniformly high, but rather rise with the severity of the crime. One possible resolution of the positive and normative questions may lie in the fact that penalties and probabilities of conviction are not generally independent. Convictions are typically determined by judges or jurors who are instructed to convict only if the evidence convinces them "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the accused is guilty. Psychologists, however, have found that a juror's willingness to convict may be influenced by more than just the evidence. Jurors are very sensitive to the potential penalties that defendants may pay,

Abstract: Contrary to standard assumptions, reasoning is often an emotional process. Emotions can have good effects, as when a scientist gets excited about a line of research and pursues it successfully despite criticism. But emotions can also distort reasoning, as when a juror ignores evidence of guilt just because the accused seems like a nice guy. In Hot Thought, Paul Thagard describes the mental mechanisms -- cognitive, neural, molecular, and social -- that interact to produce different kinds of human thinking, from everyday decision making to legal reasoning, scientific discovery, and religious belief, and he discusses when and how thinking and reasoning should be emotional. Thagard argues that an understanding of emotional thinking needs to integrate the cognitive, neural, molecular, and social levels. Many of the chapters employ computational models of various levels of thinking, including HOTCO (hot cognition) models and the more neurologically realistic GAGE model. Thagard uses these models to illuminate thinking in the domains of law, science, and religion, discussing such topics as the role of doubt and reasonable doubt in legal and other contexts, valuable emotional habits for successful scientists, and the emotional content of religious beliefs. Identifying and assessing the impact of emotion, Thagard argues, can suggest ways to improve the process of reasoning.

Abstract: Examined the concept of reasonable doubt as both an individual and group decision criterion. Previous research indicates that neither criterion has an effect on verdicts. A reexamination of this research suggested that such effects might occur for cases producing maximum disagreement. An experiment was performed in which 606 mock jurors reached individual and group verdicts for such a case. The decision criteria for individuals (judge's definition of reasonable doubt) and groups (assigned decision rule) were varied in a factorial design. As predicted, mock juries assigned a unanimity decision rule were significantly less likely to reach a verdict than juries assigned a majority rule. Minority members of juries assigned a majority decision rule were particularly dissatisfied with group deliberation. Definitional variations in reasonable doubt significantly affected both individual and group verdicts. The effects of the independent variables for the group decision-making process were also examined using a model-fitting approach to J. H. Davis's.