Topic
Quantifier variance
About: Quantifier variance is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 37 publications have been published within this topic receiving 539 citations.
Papers
Book•
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31 Oct 2014
TL;DR: The Forgotten Easy Approach as mentioned in this paper is an ontology approach to answer existence questions that relies on trivial inferences to answer ontological questions, and it has been shown that these inferences give us problematic ontological commitments.
Abstract: Introduction: The Forgotten Easy Approach 1. The historical back story 2. The rise of neo-Quineanism 3. The easy approach to ontology: a preliminary sketch 4. The plan of this book Part 1: Developing Easy Ontology 1) Whatever Happened to Carnapian Deflationism? 1. Carnap's approach to existence questions 2. Quine and the ascendency of ontology 3. Putnam takes deflationism on an unfortunate turn 4. 'Exists' as a formal notion: a brief history 5. Is Carnap committed to quantifier variance? 6. Conclusion 2) The Unbearable Lightness of Existence 1. A core rule of use for 'exists' 2. What are application conditions? 3. Do application conditions for 'K' include that Ks exist? 4. Answering existence questions easily 5. Against substantive criteria of existence 6. Lines of reply 3) Easy Ontology and its Consequences 1. Using trivial inferences to answer existence questions 2. Three forms of easy ontology 3. First result: simple realism 4. Second result: Meta-ontological deflationism 4) Other ways of being Suspicious 1. Denying that ontological disputes are genuine disputes 2. Denying that we can know the answers 3. Denying that there are answers to know 4. Understanding hard ontology 5) Fictionalism versus Deflationism 1. Motives for fictionalism 2. The fictionalist's case against easy arguments 3. A problem for the fictionalist's analogy 4. How the fictionalist incurs a debt 5. A reply for the fictionalist 6. The deflationary alternative 7. Conclusion Part II: Defending Easy Ontology 6) "Easy arguments give us problematic ontological commitments" 1. Unwanted ontological commitments? 2. Why easy arguments require no magic 3. Do we get the objects we wanted? 4. Conclusion 7) "Easy arguments rely on the questionable idea of conceptual truths" 1. Why easy ontology needs conceptual truths 2. Williamson's attack on epistemic analyticity 3. How easy inferences survive 4. Caveats and conclusions 8) "Easy arguments rely on principles that keep bad company" 1. The bad company challenge for the easy approach 2. Avoiding bad company 3. The limited impact of bad company objections 9) "The conclusions of easy arguments don't answer ontological questions" 1. Hofweber's solution to the puzzle about ontology 2. Focus and ontology 3. Ways to read the quantifier 10) "Hard ontological questions can be revived in Ontologese" 1. Existence questions in Ontologese 2. Just more metaphysics? 3. Avoiding the joint-carving quantifier 4. Problematizing the joint-carving quantifier Conclusion: The Importance of Not Being Earnest 1. The empirical, conceptual, and pragmatic case for deflationism 2. Metaphysics in a new key?
225 citations
204 citations
Book•
16 Mar 2011
TL;DR: In this paper, Sosa and his critics discuss the Vagueness of Identity and its relation to the notion of "objectivity without objects" in the context of metaphysics.
Abstract: INTRODUCTION 1. "A Sense of Unity," The Journal of Philosophy, September l978 2. "Basic Objects: A Reply to Xu," Mind & Language, 1997 3. "Objectivity Without Objects," in World Congress of Philosophers, Volume 5: Epistemology, 1999 4. "The Vagueness of Identity," Philosophical Topics, 2000 5. "Quantifier Variance and Realism," Philosophical Issues, 2002 6. . "Against Revisionary Ontology," Philosophical Topics, 2003 7. "Comments on Theodore Sider's Four Dimensionalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, May 2004 8. "Sosa's Existential Relativism," in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell, 2004 9. "Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, January 2005 10. "Ontological Arguments: Interpretive Charity and Quantifier Variance", in Metaphysical Debates , Blackwell, 2008 11. "Language, Ontology, and Structure", Nous, September 2008 12. "Ontology and Alternative Languages", Metametaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2009
123 citations
Book•
12 Nov 2015
TL;DR: In this article, the existential quantifier and ontological commitment are used to define a fine-grained notion of ontological dependence in metametaphysics, and a case study of Sider's ontological realism is presented.
Abstract: 1. Why should you care about metametaphysics? 1.1. Metametaphysics or metaontology? 1.2. How to read this book 1.3. Chapter outlines 1.4. Further reading 2. Quine vs Carnap: on what there is and what there isn't 2.1. On what there is 2.2. Plato's beard 2.3. Enter Meinong 2.4. External and internal questions 2.5. Language pluralism 3. Quantification and ontological commitment 3.1. The meaning of the existential quantifier 3.2. The existential quantifier and ontological commitment 3.3. Quantifier variance and verbal debates 3.4. Beyond existence questions 4. Identifying the alternatives: ontological realism, deflationism, and conventionalism 4.1. Ontological realism and anti-realism 4.2. Ontological deflationism 4.3. Towards extreme conventionalism 4.4. A case study: Sider's ontological realism 4.5. Taking stock 5. Grounding and ontological dependence 5.1. Ontological dependence: a fine-grained notion 5.2. Identity-dependence and essential dependence 5.3. Is grounding ontological dependence? 5.4. Formal features of ground 5.5. Grounding, causation, reduction, and modality 5.6. Grounding and truthmaking 6. Fundamentality and levels of reality 6.1. The 'levels' metaphor 6.2. Mereological fundamentality 6.3. Further specifications: well-foundedness and dependence 6.4. Generic ontological fundamentality 6.5. Fundamentality and physics 7. The epistemology of metaphysics: a priori or a posteriori? 7.1. A priori vs a posteriori 7.2. Modal rationalism and a priori methods 7.3. The epistemology of essence 7.4. Modal empiricism and the status of armchair methods 7.5. Combining a priori and a posteriori methods 8. Intuitions and thought experiments in metaphysics 8.1. Specifying 'intuition' 8.2. Intuitions and experimental philosophy 8.3. Experience-based intuitions 8.4. Rational intuition 8.5. Scientific thought experiments 8.6. Philosophical thought experiments 9. Demarcating metaphysics and science: can metaphysics be naturalized? 9.1. Autonomous metaphysics 9.2. Fully naturalistic metaphysics 9.3. The Principle of Naturalistic Closure and the Primacy of Physics 9.4. Methodological similarities 9.5. Moderately naturalistic metaphysics Glossary Bibliography Index.
63 citations
1 Oct 2007
TL;DR: A somewhat abbreviated version of the remarks which follow was presented in the symposium on Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance at the Joint Session held in July 2007, in which the principal speakers were Ted Sider and Katherine Hawley.
Abstract: A somewhat abbreviated version of the remarks which follow was presented in the symposium on Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance at the Joint Session held in July 2007, in which the principal speakers were Ted Sider and Katherine Hawley. It will be obvious to anyone who has read their published contributions1 that a much fuller and detailed discussion of them is required than it has been possible to attempt in what follows, where I have been able only to indicate—often without much, or even any, supporting argument—what I take to be the main points that need to be made in response to their proposed revisions of the neo-Fregean position.
37 citations
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Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
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| 2021 | 4 |
| 2020 | 3 |
| 2019 | 3 |
| 2018 | 1 |
| 2017 | 2 |
| 2016 | 4 |