TL;DR: Gunning as mentioned in this paper argued that Rothbard failed in that paper to comprehend the true basis of Mises's defense of laissez faire and that he attributed ideas to Mises, including the unanimity principle and utilitarianism, that he did not hold.
Abstract: I Introduction MISES ERRED TWICE IN THINKING that he had provided a defense of laissez faire based on value-free economics. First, when he discussed a market intervention, he did not realize that his defense made the unwarranted assumption that he knew the preferences of those who are affected by it. Second, partly because he made this unwarranted assumption, he failed to see that his defense was based on the unanimity principle and/or "his utilitarianism." These are the major deficiencies identified by Murray Rothbard in his 1976 paper. To the contrary, I have argued that Rothbard failed in that paper to comprehend the true basis of Mises's defense of laissez faire and that he attributed ideas to Mises, including the unanimity principle and utilitarianism, that he did not hold (Gunning 2005). A careful reading of my paper shows that I made two claims about Rothbard. First, Rothbard failed to identify Mises's principal argument for laissez faire. Mises's argument was based on a comparison, using value-free economic reasoning, of arguments for market intervention according to criteria that Mises claimed were either explicitly or implicitly espoused by those who promoted the intervention. Second, Rothbard misinterpreted Mises's analyses of the arguments against the particular interventionist policies that he cited in Mises's work. In his comment on my paper, Walter Block chose to criticize my second claim, basically arguing that I did not appreciate Rothbard's depth (Block 2005). His argument amounts to an effort to reaffirm Rothbard's critique of Mises's alleged error and Mises's alleged utilitarianism. In Section II of this reply, I provide the textual support for my first claim, which Block writes was absent from my original paper. In Sections III and IV, I focus on what I take to be the main assertions of both Rothbard and Block, as described in the introductory sentences above. In Section III, I argue that Mises did not believe or assume that he could know others' ends and, therefore, did not err in this respect. In Section IV, I argue that the assertion that Mises was a utilitarian contradicts what Mises himself wrote about the issue. In Section V, I respond to several minor points in Block's critique. II Mises's Defense of Laissez Faire as an Ideology Against the Ideologies of Socialism and Interventionism IN MY PAPER, I WROTE: "Mises's argument that an economist could advocate laissez faire and still remain value free stemmed from his conception of the goal of economics." What was that goal? Consider the following quotations from Mises's Human Action: It is the task of history to describe the historical conditions which made such a crude doctrine popular. Economics has another task. It must analyze both Marxian polylogism and the other brands of polylogism formed after its pattern, and expose their fallacies and contradictions. (Mises [1949] 1966: 75) It is the task of scientific technology and therapeutics to explode errors in their respective fields. It is the task of economics to expose erroneous doctrines in the field of social action. But if men do not follow the advice of science, but cling to fallacious prejudices, these errors are reality and must be dealt with as such. ([1949] 1966: 93) The main objective of praxeology and economics is to substitute consistent correct ideologies for the contradictory tenets of popular eclecticism. ([1949] 1966: 185) I regard these quotes as additional support for my proposition that, for Mises, the goal of economics is to show either that particular ideologies are contradictory or erroneous or that the policies promoted by those who hold the ideologies will not accomplish the aims that they believe the policies will accomplish. The goal, or set of goals, of economics can be accomplished with logical reasoning and judgments of relevance. …
TL;DR: Structuralism is a prerogative of the human species because the human being is a semiotic animal as mentioned in this paper, and it is used from different perspectives and in different sciences such as philosophy, linguistics, semiotics and anthropology.
Abstract: The term structuralism is used from different perspectives and in different sciences such as philosophy, linguistics, semiotics and anthropology. Structuralism is a prerogative of the human species because the human being is a semiotic animal. Important to signal are the following: in linguistics the structuralism of the Prague and Russian schools; in philosophy the structuralism of Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms; in anthropology the structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss; in the critique of political economy, Marx's structuralism. Structuralism is also present in biosemiotics. Criteria that distinguish among semiotic approaches to structure include: conception of the world to which structure belongs; use of the notion of ‘code’; difference between ‘code semiotics’ and ‘interpretation semiotics’; ontologic and methodologic structuralism. Structure may be conceived as ‘a-priori’ and as ‘interpretive process.’ In semiotics structuralist approaches are founded in binarism or triadism, monologism or polylogism. Structuralism in linguistics is taxonomic or generativist. Generative-transformational structuralism is monogradual or bigradual.
TL;DR: In this paper, a rational reconstruction of Mises' problem situation reveals that his primary epistemological concern is the problem of induction, which is the postulate that there is no induction in the social universe, rendering the efforts of the Historical School spurious.
Abstract: A rational reconstruction of Mises’ problem situation reveals that his primary epistemological concern is the problem of induction. Applying a regressive method, three major tenets of his philosophy of science and their implications can be identified: (1) Anti-naturalism, i.e., the postulate that there is no induction in the social universe, renders the efforts of the Historical School spurious. (2) Mises opines that his dualism concerning the psycho-physical problem, the purely methodological character of which is often overlooked, is incompatible with materialistic and physicalistic research in the social sciences. This involves a rejection of behaviorism. (3) Finally, all holistic, essentialist, and even many macroeconomic approaches contradict Mises’ individualism and are thus rejected. Further traits of Mises’ philosophy of science include realism, Wertfreiheit (value freedom), and a rejection of polylogism.