Topic
Pirate game
About: Pirate game is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 49 publications have been published within this topic receiving 6219 citations.
Papers
TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimatum bargaining games with two players and two stages were investigated. But the authors focused on situations with two agents and two stage bargaining games and only one agent has to decide and the set of outcomes is restricted to two results.
Abstract: There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on every stage of the bargaining process only one player has to decide and that before the last stage the set of outcomes is already restricted to only two results. To make the ultimatum aspect obvious we concentrated on situations with two players and two stages. In the ‘easy games’ a given amount c has to be distributed among the two players, whereas in the ‘complicated games’ the players have to allocate a bundle of black and white chips with different values for both players. We performed two main experiments for easy games as well as for complicated games. By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related to their acceptance decisions as player 2.
5,042 citations
TL;DR: It is shown that fairness will evolve if the proposer can obtain some information on what deals the responder has accepted in the past, and similarly to the evolution of cooperation, is linked to reputation.
Abstract: In the Ultimatum Game, two players are offered a chance to win a certain sum of money. All they must do is divide it. The proposer suggests how to split the sum. The responder can accept or reject the deal. If the deal is rejected, neither player gets anything. The rational solution, suggested by game theory, is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible share and for the responder to accept it. If humans play the game, however, the most frequent outcome is a fair share. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary approach to the Ultimatum Game. We show that fairness will evolve if the proposer can obtain some information on what deals the responder has accepted in the past. Hence, the evolution of fairness, similarly to the evolution of cooperation, is linked to reputation.
909 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors report the results of additional exchange ultimatum game experiments conducted at the same time as Hoffman et al. (1994) and report a significant increase in seller offers to buyers.
Abstract: In this paper we report the results of additional exchange ultimatum game experiments conducted at the same time as the exchange ultimatum game experiments reported in Hoffman et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 7(3), pp. 346–380, 1994). In these additional experiments, we use instructions to change an impersonal exchange situation to a personal exchange situation. To do this, we prompt sellers to consider what choices their buyers will make. Game theory would predict that thinking about the situation would lead sellers to make smaller offers to buyers. In contrast, we find a significant increase in seller offers to buyers. This result suggests that encouraging sellers to thinking about buyer choices focuses their attention on the strategic interaction with humans who think they way they do in personal exchange situations, and who may punish them for unacceptable behavior, and not on the logic of the game theoretic structure of the problem.
104 citations
TL;DR: This paper has three goals: to introduce the “knowledge game”, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions, and to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious and conscious-less agents, depending on which version of the game they can win.
Abstract: This paper has three goals. The first is to introduce the "knowledge game", a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions. The second is to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious (human) and conscious-less agents (zombies and robots), depending on which version of the game they can win. And the third is to use a version of the knowledge game to provide an answer to Dretske's question "how do you know you are not a zombie?".
94 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that economic majors are less motivated by self-interest than other students in the ultimatum game, and that their choices conform with the social norm of "fairness" (i.e., a 50/50 split).
Abstract: Following Adam Smith, conventional economics gives self-interest the primary role of all economic behavior. However, past experiments with the ultimatum game often produce outcomes inconsistent with this orthodox conception of ‘economic man.’ In our replication of the ultimatum experiment, students at a small, liberal arts college do not allocate monetary rewards in a self-interested manner, but rather their choices conform with the social norm of ‘fairness’ (i.e., a 50/50 split). Contrary to past research, we find that economic majors are less motivated by self-interest than other students.
44 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2020 | 2 |
| 2018 | 1 |
| 2017 | 1 |
| 2016 | 1 |
| 2015 | 2 |
| 2014 | 1 |