TL;DR: The authors examines the historical origins and regulatory basis for the modern xinfang system and examines the characteristic tactics of Chinese petitioners who seek to use the system to resolve their grievances, and analyzes statistics suggesting that the use of the former far exceeds the latter.
Abstract: Formal legal institutions are almost entirely absent from the lives of most Chinese citizens. A range of petitioning institutions and practices operate as a dysfunctional proxy for formal legal channels. Deeply rooted in imperial Chinese history, these practices and institutions have survived into the present in the form of citizen petitioning efforts directed at numerous “letters and visits” (xinfang) bureaus distributed throughout Chinese government organs, including the courts.This Article examines the historical origins and regulatory basis for the modern xinfang system. It outlines the characteristic tactics of Chinese petitioners who seek to use the system to resolve their grievances. The Article also examines the overlap between xinfang institutions and formal legal ones, and analyzes statistics suggesting that the use of the former far exceeds the latter.The Article argues that the xinfang system serves as a multi-purpose governance tool for Chinese leaders, with resolution of individual grievances but one of several objectives. Xinfang interests overlap with, but also contradict, those of formal legal institutions. Further, Chinese xinfang regulations and institutions create a unique incentive system to which the behavior of Chinese petitioners is an adaptive response. This interplay not only poses serious challenges to the development of the rule of law in China, but may also be fueling a dangerously escalating cycle of social destabilization.
TL;DR: The authors examines the historical origins and regulatory basis for the modern xinfang system and examines the characteristic tactics of Chinese petitioners who seek to use the system to resolve their grievances, and analyzes statistics suggesting that the use of the former far exceeds the latter.
Abstract: Formal legal institutions are almost entirely absent from the lives of most Chinese citizens. A range of petitioning institutions and practices operate as a dysfunctional proxy for formal legal channels. Deeply rooted in imperial Chinese history, these practices and institutions have survived into the present in the form of citizen petitioning efforts directed at numerous “letters and visits” (xinfang) bureaus distributed throughout Chinese government organs, including the courts.This Article examines the historical origins and regulatory basis for the modern xinfang system. It outlines the characteristic tactics of Chinese petitioners who seek to use the system to resolve their grievances. The Article also examines the overlap between xinfang institutions and formal legal ones, and analyzes statistics suggesting that the use of the former far exceeds the latter.The Article argues that the xinfang system serves as a multi-purpose governance tool for Chinese leaders, with resolution of individual grievances but one of several objectives. Xinfang interests overlap with, but also contradict, those of formal legal institutions. Further, Chinese xinfang regulations and institutions create a unique incentive system to which the behavior of Chinese petitioners is an adaptive response. This interplay not only poses serious challenges to the development of the rule of law in China, but may also be fueling a dangerously escalating cycle of social destabilization.
TL;DR: One of the most common types of manda is the minor manda as discussed by the authors where a wellwisher makes a vow that implicates another person, so that that person must comply, and if the person implicated refuses to comply, the responsibility bounces back to the one who made the vow and he or she must extract himself from the predicament.
Abstract: and to most of the saints and pictures in the Tzintzuntzan churches Several points in the manda complex require further discussion Can a wellwisher make a vow that implicates another person, so that that person must comply? At first glance, it looks as if Macaria was implicated by her friends However, if the person implicated refuses to comply, the responsibility bounces back to the one who made the vow, and he or she must extract himself from the predicament It is hard to tell how often this kind of manda is made; not often, probably, because the priests say that it is wrong to make a manda in the name of another person Actually, except for major vows, supernatural patrons are not choosy about who completes a manda; the important thing is that it be completed, almost in mechanical form If, for example, one makes a minor manda to Sefior del Rescate to light a candle and it isn't convenient for the petitioner to comply, he or she gives the candle to a child, with the promised alms, and sends the little messenger along to do the job Manuel once bought a house that turned out to be haunted Twice he wrestled with the ghost before he realized it was a soul in purgatory; then he asked it what it wanted and was told it had died before lighting a 50 centavo candle to the Virgin of Light in San Jos6 Church in Morelia Manuel promised to light the candle, which he did, and the ghost departed, his contract fulfilled Can a person make a vow or promise to more than one potential patron for a single reason? Some informants say no When I asked Laura Prieto she mumbled "yes," looked embarrassed, and acted as if maybe it were really cheating a bit to do so In fact, there seems to be a number one object of the request, but, following the usual pattern of trying to maximize potential help in every situation, a number of people make secondary requests, hoping that these acts will slide by unnoticed by the major object of attention Do two or more people jointly petition a single patron? For example, might This content downloaded from 2074613189 on Thu, 16 Jun 2016 05:47:38 UTC All use subject to http://aboutjstororg/terms 1292 American Anthropologist [65, 1963 two daughters say to the Virgin of Health of Patzcuaro, "We promise to wear your habit if our mother is restored to health"? All of the evidence I have indicates that this is not done No informant ever used a plural personal pronoun in describing a petition; no informant ever suggested that anyone else was equally implicated in fulfilling a vow; and no informant ever suggested that his responsibility was shared with another In all nineteen retablos, the petitioner who fulfills the terms of his vow is invariably a single person Several people may take action in the face of a single calamity threatening a family, but each action is dyadic, independent of the others, involving a single petitioner and a single patron Patron-client relationships are enormously personalistic, and the benefits that accrue from a successful contract are not willingly shared by a client It rather looks as if the bounty of a supernatural patron, like all other good things in life, is looked upon as a limited and precious commodity, and to the extent one shares it with others, so in that degree is one's portion reduced Two petitions to a single patron will not produce twice the bounty; they will simply dilute and divide a finite quantity Where this point of view prevails, it is clear that several people individually appealing to several patrons is a more logical policy, offering greater potential help, than the same people appealing collectively to a single patron Basic to an understanding of patron-client relationships, both between human beings alone, and with the supernatural, is the concept of palanca, or "lever" Broadly speaking, the palanca is a way of access to a patron, someone with "leverage" "For example," says Macaria to me, "I want something from you, but I don't want to ask you directly, so I ask Mariquita (Mary Foster) to approach you She is my palanca" And again, "When I ask an intimate friend to help, I say 'Que me hagas una palanca' ('You be my lever')" A palanca, then, is a go-between, someone with whom ego feels on reasonably close terms, who is helpful in getting to the real patron A palanca, perhaps, is a semi-patron as well as a patron He can help in himself, but his real value resides in his ability to favorably influence the ultimate source of power As previously pointed out, priests are reluctant to accept compadrazgo ties with villagers Consequently, their nieces are deluged with requests to be godmothers, and they often accept The nieces are looked upon as palancas The relationship with them is not particularly valued in itself, but it is assumed that via them the client can more easily gain the ear of the priest in time of need; they are the lever, the device to achieve the desired end Although the term palanca is used only for human beings, it is clear that this concept of power structure is equally applicable to the supernatural In trying to work out the pattern, I commented to Macaria that the person who wants to get ahead looks for palancas, tries to get them in debt by offering a meal or doing some other favor, but one is merely trying; and until the potential palanca comes through, one doesn't know Nevertheless, a person keeps searching for the best palancas "Es la misma cosa con los santos," said Macaria with considerable feeling-"It's the very same thing with the saints" One continually tries different saints, shopping around, hoping to find the most This content downloaded from 2074613189 on Thu, 16 Jun 2016 05:47:38 UTC All use subject to http://aboutjstororg/terms FoSTER] The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan 1293 influential ones, or the ones that can help the petitioner to the greatest extent When I suggested to other informants that saints were really palancas, most were shocked; but a few, not too upset to speculate, said, in effect, "Yes, that's really the way it is" The concept of the palanca also helps us in understanding the real nature of the patron-client relationship with saints The saints, and the Virgin Mary as well, in one sense are patrons in that the contract is made with them, but ultimately they are palancas, or go-betweens Cuando Di6s no quiere, los santos no pueden, the saying goes ("When God doesn't wish it, the saints can't do it") The saints and the Virgin are, then, advocates, special pleaders, whom one can approach more readily than God They will handle your case when presented with it, but only if they are successful must the fee be paid, must the petitioner "comply" with the terms of the manda
TL;DR: In the past fifteen years, federal courts of appeals have been urged to reverse death sentences on the ground that the death penalty was administered along racially discriminatory lines as discussed by the authors, but the courts refused to find proof of racial discrimination.
Abstract: T WICE in the past fifteen years, federal courts of appeals I have been urged to reverse death sentences on the ground that the death penalty was administered along racially discriminatory lines. The first time, in Maxwell v. Bishop,' a petitioner submitted data to show discrimination against black offenders. The second time, in Spinkellink v. Wainwright,2 a petitioner submitted data to show bias against murderers of white victims. The Spinkellink data indicated that such offenders were substantially more likely to end up on death row than were murderers of black victims. Both times, the courts refused to find proof of racial discrimination. Data that have since become available, provided by the criminal justice system itself, make it clear that both kinds of discrimination existed.
TL;DR: In this paper, two female experimenters, one dressed as a "hippie" and the other wearing "straight" dress, solicited signatures for an anti-war petition at the April 1971 Washington peace demonstration.
Abstract: Two female experimenters, one dressed as a “hippie” and the other wearing “straight” dress, solicited signatures for an anti-war petition at the April 1971 Washington peace demonstration. Although the petition was identical in both conditions, and a large degree of attitudinal homogeneity in the subject population could be assumed, the hippie condition produced more signatures, more subjects who signed without looking at the petition, and attracted a larger number of unsolicited signatures. These differences were attributed to the effect of implied attitude (reference group) similarity between experimenters and subjects in the hippie and dissimilarity in the straight condition; in-group members were more effective than out-group members, despite experimenter-subject similarity in explicit attitudes under both conditions.