TL;DR: The authors proposed a model of hedge fund returns that is similar to models based on arbitrage pricing theory, with dynamic risk-factor coefficients for diversified hedge fund portfolios, which can explain up to 80 percent of monthly return variations.
Abstract: Following a review of the data and methodological difficulties in applying conventional models used for traditional asset class indexes to hedge funds, this article argues against the conventional approach Instead, in an extension of previous work on asset-based style (ABS) factors, the article proposes a model of hedge fund returns that is similar to models based on arbitrage pricing theory, with dynamic risk-factor coefficients For diversified hedge fund portfolios (as proxied by indexes of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds), the seven ABS factors can explain up to 80 percent of monthly return variations Because ABS factors are directly observable from market prices, this model provides a standardized framework for identifying differences among major hedge fund indexes that is free of the biases inherent in hedge fund databases
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used a large hand-collected dataset from 2001 to 2006 to find that hedge funds in the U.S. propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two thirds of the cases.
Abstract: Using a large hand-collected dataset from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the U.S. propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism. Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the role of fund family structure in the economics of mutual fund investments and found that the fund family's strategy for maximizing firm value by maximizing assets under management has at least four dimensions: fee schedules, distribution channels, breadth of fund offerings, and performance.
Abstract: Incubation is a strategy for initiating new funds, where multiple funds are started privately, and, at the end of an evaluation period, some are opened to the public. Consistent with incubation being used by fund families to increase performance and attract flows, funds in incubation outperform nonincubated funds by 3.5% risk-adjusted, and when they are opened to the public they attract higher flows. Postincubation, however, this outperformance disappears. This performance reversal imparts an upward bias to returns that is not removed by a fund size filter. Fund age and ticker creation date filters, however, eliminate the bias. The prevalence of the fund family structure in the asset management industry suggests that families play an important role in the economics of mutual fund investments. A number of papers have examined the strategic decisions of families. An important message of this research is that the fund family's strategy for maximizing firm value by maximizing assets under management has at least four dimensions: fee schedules, distribution channels, breadth of fund offerings, and performance. By setting a fund's fee schedules (i.e., management fee, 12b-l fee, etc.),1 choosing a particular distribution channel (brokered or direct),2 and deciding on the overall breadth of their fund offerings (e.g., starting
TL;DR: The claim that hedge funds offer investors a superior risk-return tradeoff is investigated using a continuous-time version of Dybvig's (1988a), (1988b) payoff distribution pricing model, and it is shown that, as a stand-alone investment, hedge funds do not offer a superiorrisk-return profile.
Abstract: In this paper we investigate the claim that hedge funds offer investors a superior risk-return trade-off. We do so using a continuous time version of Dybvig's (1988a, 1988b) payoff distribution pricing model. The evaluation model, which does not require any assumptions with regard to the return distribution of the funds in question, is applied to the monthly returns of 77 hedge funds and 13 hedge fund indices over the period May 1990-April 2000. The results show that as a stand-alone investment hedge funds do not offer a superior risk-return profile. We find 12 indices and 72 individual funds to be inefficient, with the average efficiency loss amounting to 2.76% per annum for indices and 6.42% for individual funds. Part of the inefficiency cost of individual funds can be diversified away. Funds of funds, however, are not the preferred vehicle for this as their performance appears to suffer badly from their double fee structure. Looking at hedge funds in a portfolio context results in a marked improvement in the evaluation outcomes. Seven of the 12 hedge fund indices and 58 of the 72 individual funds classified as inefficient on a stand-alone basis are capable of producing an efficient payoff profile when mixed with the S&P 500. The best results are obtained when 10-20% of the portfolio value is invested in hedge funds
TL;DR: This article examined the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance and found that hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance.
Abstract: Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.