TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a view of the Gricean view on Intrusive Implicature in the context of the philosophy of Ordinary Language and its relation to the Logic of Communicative Acts, the Paradigm Case Argument and the Two Dogmas of Kant'otelianism.
Abstract: Acknowledgements Notes on Contributors Introduction: Paul Grice, Philosopher of Language, But More Than That K.Petrus Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Ordinary Language S.Chapman Intuition, the Paradigm Case Argument, and the Two Dogmas of Kant'otelianism: Grice's Defense of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Kripke's Defense of Essentialism J.D.Atlas Grice on Presupposition A.Bezuidenhout Irregular Negations: Implicature and Idion Theories W.A.Davis A Gricean View on Intrusive Implicature M.Simons Speaker Meaning, Conversational Implicature, and Calculability J.Saul Some Aspects of Reasons and Rationality J.Baker Showing and Meaning: On How We Make Our Ideas Clear M.Green Illocution, Perillocution and Communication K.Petrus Speaker Meaning and the Logic of Communicative Acts C.Plunze The Total Content of What a Speaker Means A.Martinich On Three Theories of Implicature: Default Theory, Relevance Theory and Minimalism E.Borg Contextualism in the Philosophy of Language N.Kompa WJ-40: Issues in the Investigation of Implicature L.R.Horn Index
TL;DR: In this paper, the parodied version of van Inwagen's Martian Manipulation objection is used to undercut metasemantic arguments which aim to show that deliverances of physics do not tell us that no objects are solid.
Abstract: Metasemantic security arguments aim to show, on metasemantic grounds, that even if we were to discover that determinism is true, that wouldn't give us reason to think that people never act freely. Flew's [1955] Paradigm Case Argument is one such argument; Heller's [1996] Putnamian argument is another. In this paper I introduce a third which uses a metasemantic picture on which meanings are settled as though by an ideal interpreter. Metasemantic security arguments are widely thought discredited by van Inwagen's [1983] Martian Manipulation objection. I argue that van Inwagen's objection, if right, can be parodied to undercut metasemantic arguments which aim to show that deliverances of physics do not tell us that no objects are solid. A diagnosis of where the parody objection breaks down against the pro-solidity argument is then used to resist the objection as applied to the Ideal Interpreter Argument. I go on to defend the argument from the charge that it relies on a ham-fisted version of interpretivism.
TL;DR: Flew strongly defends a compatibilist thesis in the free will debate before going on to totally object to theistic libertarianism as mentioned in this paper, which is not very common in compatibiliist theses.
Abstract: Flew strongly defends a compatibilist thesis in the free will debate before going on to totally object to theistic libertarianism. His objections basically rely on his compatibilism embracing the notion of agent causation, which is not very common in compatibilist theses. Since he is a strong proponent of ordinary language philosophy, he also holds that linguistic analyses can certainly solve the free will problem as well as many other problems of philosophy. In doing so, he first uses the paradigm cases based on our common sense experience and then assumes the verity of principle of alternative possibilities. This study attempts to show, on the one hand, that there are some serious difficulties in both his justification of compatibilism and his objections to theistic libertarianism, and on the other hand, that he cannot easily defend both at the same time.